THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

UNIVERSITY AMALGAMATIONS IN AUSTRALIA IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

by

Stephen Leslie Kendal

This thesis is submitted for the Professional Doctorate Degree in Public Administration
University of Canberra
March 2006

(© Stephen Kendal 2006)
Dedication

I dedicate this work to my beloved wife Alison and my children, (Kristine, Iain and Andrew) who were my rock and constant inspiration and who supported and suffered my study.
Abstract

This thesis considers the adequacy of existing theories of implementation of tertiary education policy, in relation to university amalgamations in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia. In particular the thesis examines the difficulties of mergers attempted in the case of Monash University (a successful amalgamation), the University of New England (a partially successful amalgamation), and the Australian National University (an amalgamation which never took place).

The thesis argues that the best available model of policy implementation in the tertiary education sector is that set out by Cerych and Sabatier (1986), and that even this is less than adequate through its omission of several relevant factors, notably the factor of leadership. The thesis accordingly presents a modification of the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model as well as suggestions for inclusion of factors omitted in the broader implementation literature.
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training, for the support of the library and registry staff of this organisation was continuous and appreciated. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr Arthur O’Neill, and the staff of the archives areas of Monash University, Australian National University, University of Canberra, University of New England and Southern Cross University. Thanks are also due to my supervisors Dr Jenny Stewart and Professor John Halligan.

My thanks go also to Dr John Laver of the Centre for Research in Public Sector Management of the University of Canberra for his patient and critical assistance with the drafting and editing of the thesis.
# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAE</td>
<td>Armidale College of Advanced Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>Australian Committee of Directors and Principals in Advanced Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVCC</td>
<td>Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
<td>College of Advanced Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAE</td>
<td>Canberra College of Advanced Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITA</td>
<td>Canberra Institute of the Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEET</td>
<td>Department of Employment, Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETYA</td>
<td>Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTSU</td>
<td>Equivalent Full Time Student Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIAE</td>
<td>Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HECS</td>
<td>Higher Education Contribution Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAE</td>
<td>Institute of Advanced Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAS</td>
<td>Institute of Advanced Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHMRC</td>
<td>National Health and Medical Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRCAE</td>
<td>Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMIT</td>
<td>Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNE</td>
<td>University of New England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>Unified National System (of tertiary education)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Contents

Certificate of Authorship of Thesis iii  
Dedication iv  
Abstract v  
Acknowledgements vi  
Acronyms vii  
Contents viii  
Tables x  

INTRODUCTION – THESIS TOPIC AND JUSTIFICATION 1  

CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION LITERATURE 4  
Top-Down and Bottom-up Models of Implementation 5  
The Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) Model 7  
Other Theories 25  

CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DAWKINS POLICY 33  
Constraints 36  
Historical Background to the Tertiary Education Sector in Australia 40  

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 71  
Sampling 74  
Triangulation 75  

CHAPTER 4: SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION – THE MONASH MERGERS 79  
Institutional Profiles 79  
The Amalgamation Process 81  
Outline of Critical Events 105  

CHAPTER 5: PART-SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION – THE UNE MERGERS 107  
Institutional Profiles 108  
The Amalgamation Process 110  
Outline of Critical Events 127  

CHAPTER 6: IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE – THE ANU MERGER 129  
Institutional Profiles 129  
The Amalgamation Process – I 130  
Dawkins’ Options in 1989 144  
The Amalgamation Process – II 146  
Outline of Critical Events 149
CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
Comparison of Cerych and Sabatier Model (1986) with Thesis Research Results  
Leadership  
The Significance of Culture in the Merger Process  

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS  
Implications for Implementation Theory  
Implementation as Negotiation and Bargaining  
General Conclusion  

APPENDIX  
Diagram 1  
Diagram 2  

REFERENCES
Tables

Table 2.1: Higher Education Institutions by Size (1988)  36

Table 2.2: New Institutions Created through Merger (at the end of 1990)  54

Table 2.3: Institutions by Size and State or Territory (1991)  55

Table 2.4: Merger Behaviour by Institutional Size (1991)  56

Table 2.5: Concentration Ratios by National and Regional Level  56

Table 2.6: Australian Mergers by Type (1991)  58

Table 2.7: Organisation Linkage Continuum  59

Table 4.1: Consolidation of Monash University (1987-1994)  80

Table 7.1: Comparisons of Implementation of Case Studies  158

Table 7.2: Leading Change  160

Table 7.3: Loyalties and Values of Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges of Advanced Education  167
INTRODUCTION – THESIS TOPIC AND JUSTIFICATION

This thesis considers the adequacy of existing theories of implementation of tertiary education policy, in relation to university amalgamations in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia. In particular the thesis examines the difficulties of mergers attempted in the case of Monash University (a successful amalgamation), the University of New England (a partially successful amalgamation), and the Australian National University (an amalgamation which never took place).

The thesis argues that the best available model of policy implementation in the tertiary education sector is that set out by Cerych and Sabatier (1986), and that even this is less than adequate through its omission of several relevant factors, notably the factor of leadership. The thesis accordingly presents a modification of the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model as well as suggestions for inclusion of factors omitted in the broader implementation literature.

An ideal policy is of little use if it is not well implemented. Implementation – understood in this thesis as the means to fulfil or satisfy the conditions of a policy – is therefore increasingly under scrutiny because of its role in determining outcomes in practice. The thesis also argues that the role of leadership is crucial for successful implementation of policy designs. Study of implementation is important and some of the reasons for this are summarised excellently in the “Policy Advice Initiative” of the State Services Commission of New Zealand of 1992:

The greatest risk is the belief that implementation issues are not worth bothering about. Implementation issues tend to arise at the end of an analytical process, often disturbing agreements reached on more basic issues. To minimise the risks of a proposal working in theory but not in practice, policy analysis should incorporate implementation considerations from the earliest stages of a project (State Services Commission, 1992 p 20).

Study of implementation is vital to an appropriate understanding of the process of implementation in the various contexts where it is undertaken in Australia
(national, state and territory levels) and overseas. This includes the private as well as the public sector. Ministers, senior executives and the general public are curious to know about the process and how to improve it. There is a need to know, and research results can be expected to be widely appreciated when undertaken, but due to the complexity involved studies can only be made on a selective basis.

This thesis examines the implementation of the policy of merging the Australian colleges of advanced education and universities led by John Dawkins (then Federal Minister responsible for education), as an example of large scale implementation of government policy throughout Australia in the 1980s and 1990s. The implementation of the Dawkins policy was undertaken by many, including senior public servants, State and Territory Ministers and officials, Vice-Chancellors and staff and the senior executives and principals of the colleges of advanced education. The research is important because of the complexity studied of the changes brought about in an area of considerable importance to the nation. The cases selected for study are important as an example of the successes and pitfalls of such a large scale process, for planners of the future in Australia and overseas. Enquiries were made for this thesis to study the implementation of ongoing projects in many areas of the public sector but in many cases permission was not granted due to political and related sensitivities which prevented the research commencing. These sensitivities mean that research opportunities in the public sector are very restricted.

Many theoretical models of implementation have been devised. Many of these theories are discussed in Chapter 1, which is a review of the relevant literature. This has led to discussion and analysis of the linkage that could be relevant between policy implementation contexts in real-world higher education policy implementation situations. One analytical model developed in this tradition avoids the disadvantages of over-conceptualising implementation contexts and lends itself directly to testing and evaluation in a policy context. This model (Cerych and Sabatier 1986) will be used in this thesis to analyse real-world outcomes.
The research issue is to determine how implementation of amalgamations policy was handled in Australian universities and colleges of advanced education, and to examine the implications for implementation theory.

At the outset the term “higher education” needs some definition. It is employed here in the usage current in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia to refer to universities and colleges of advanced education:

This is a more restricted definition than found in many other countries where the term higher education means either all post-school education, or at least all post-secondary education. In Australia the term “tertiary” education is currently used to refer to post school education (Harman, 1989 p 25).

This study of higher education reform was undertaken for a variety of reasons. The most influential factor was the very great amount of published and unpublished material available. The availability of participants to provide additional comment and insight was also influential. Another reason for the thesis was the relevance and national importance of the policy area. Importantly, the Australian Federal, State and Territory authorities and universities, when approached, offered significant help and access to records or comment for such a thesis. The thesis also provided an opportunity to consider a major policy development which had now had a considerable time to mature, so that the benefits and deficiencies of the implementation process could be more readily identified and analysed and a satisfactory study undertaken.
CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION LITERATURE

As noted in the Introduction, the aim of this thesis is to advance the proposition that existing theories of policy implementation are inadequate, in that they take insufficient account of the critical importance of leadership in successful implementation. This argument is supported in the thesis by empirical evidence drawn from an examination of the implementation of a government policy on amalgamations of universities and colleges of advanced education. In terms of the relevant literature, thesis research showed that implementation in the higher education sector is seen as a mixture of both top-down and bottom-up processes (discussed below). Accordingly, in the analysis of the thesis case studies, the model by Cerych and Sabatier (1986) was used because: it successfully merges top-down and bottom-up approaches; it was derived from, and intended for, an higher education context; it provides a clear list of relevant factors for successful implementation; and it was flexible enough to accommodate the contested nature of the type of implementation being considered. This model – which emphasises the interactive nature of higher education policy implementation – is developed further in this thesis by identifying more clearly than in the past the nature of the key factors involved and their relative importance.

Moreover, as the primary implementing agencies in the cases researched were the higher education institutions themselves – bodies already possessed of considerable autonomy – academic models of implementation that stress conflict and bargaining are also of interest.

This chapter first provides a brief overview of key models of implementation, and then locates the work of the thesis in relation to those models, giving clear reasons for the choice of the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model. The literature discussed
considers the principal concerns of many theorists. These include those dealing with the prospect of perfect implementation and those commenting on the varying dilemmas and contexts that impose restrictions on this ideal circumstance. However, the issues of perfect and imperfect implementation are not of primary concern in this thesis.

**Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of Implementation**

As noted above, implementation in the higher education sector is seen as a mixture of both top-down and bottom-up processes. The *top-down* models suggest that the successful implementation of policy is achieved primarily through good executive management. Six major assumptions inform the top-down view:

1. The definitiveness of a statute structures implementation i.e. a law’s ability to enhance implementation is affected by how explicitly it employs a causal theory to define policy intentions.
2. Appropriate jurisdictional reach.
3. Sufficient resources and tools to address a policy’s underlying causes.
4. At the point of delivery, legal structures are sufficient to ensure compliance by implementers and clients. This means bureaucrats and clients are not free to establish their own priorities.
5. Implementers can be expected to behave self-interestedly. This means that the co-operation of implementers can be contingent on incentives. Incentives may also be needed to include the co-operation of others.
6. Economic and other conditions, if not supportive, can derail or prevent implementation (Calista in Nagel, 1994 p 132).

**Overhead control model**

Representative of the emphasis on top-down analysis is the model of overhead control developed by Thompson (Thompson in Edwards, 1984 pp 3 - 24). According to the model there are two principal dimensions of the implementation process viz. statutory provision (limited or great), and oversight (limited or great), which give rise to consideration of the following:

1. up-for-grabs implementation,
2. controlled implementation,
3. buffered implementation, and
4. prophylactic implementation.

The principal features of *up-for-grabs implementation* are imprecise structures and considerable oversight. These circumstances provide plenty of scope to policy support workers such as administrators to utilise an opportunity to display initiative and intelligence. The elasticity of such circumstances can also be developed to enhance and tailor-make implementation processes through novel solutions. The relative precision of such processes can also permit better error repair strategies than might otherwise be possible (Thompson in Edwards, 1984 pp 15 - 18).

*Controlled implementation* is a situation of precise mandates and much oversight. The role of technology, environment and commitment of implementers, and the functioning of critical factors such as societal attitudes and key institutions such as legislators and courts, are neutral or supportive. In these circumstances it is easy for implementers to display adequate judgment in support of processes (Thompson in Edwards, 1984 pp 6 - 14).

*Buffered implementation* is characterised as a situation of imprecise statutes and limited oversight. The resultant situation means wide scope for the activities of support workers especially in error correction. This can mean speedy resolution of disputes with low-key oversight of elected officials and review agencies such as the courts – all desirable matters (Thompson in Edwards, 1984 pp 18 - 20).

The principal features of *prophylactic implementation* are precise statutes and limited oversight. This situation requires special skills to anticipate, plan and design statutes which minimise error in outcomes. A consequence of this approach is that precise statutes reduce the need for a fixer. This can mean that unsympathetic administrators can find sufficient opportunities in these circumstances for sluggish (go-slow) implementation or sabotage – clearly an undesirable situation for successful implementation (Thompson in Edwards, 1984 pp 14 - 15).

Conversely, the bottom-up models suggest that successful implementation of policy is achieved primarily by good delivery of implementation services,
particularly in multi-organisation settings. This viewpoint questions whether successful policy implementation can ever be achieved without significant participation from the bottom. This model stresses the need for feasibility to be considered when implementing policy decisions (Calista in Nagel, 1994 p 134). According to Calista, policy analysts are familiar with the way bureaucrats use discretion but it was not until street-level bureaucrats were conceptualised by Lipsky that the significance of bottom-up policy making took hold. Calista also identified the following as the three major findings of the bottom-up view:

1. Bureaucrats dominate in the distribution process.
2. When more than a single organisation is involved, good coordination is necessary for good implementation.
3. The importance of bargaining when implementation takes place to facilitate desirable intentions. (Calista in Nagel, 1994 pp 134 - 136).

Top-down and bottom-up considerations are often ideal types – useful for broad understanding of implementation issues but not often attained in real situations. Many models of implementation identified in the literature are hybrids of these models (Ryan, 1995 pp 65 - 80). Several of these models are now discussed.

The Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) Model

The general perception in the literature – fully supported by the thesis research – is that implementation in the higher education sector is a mix of top-down and bottom-up approaches. The seminal model blending these two is that by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979), a model that was later applied by Cerych and Sabatier (1986) to the higher education sector, and consequently is used as the primary model for this thesis. Because of its central position in the thesis, this model is now covered in some detail.

In their original 1979 work, Sabatier and Mazmanian were in fact examining the conditions necessary for effective implementation, recognising that perfect implementation cannot be expected in the real world. Accordingly, they analysed the circumstances which must apply for imperfect implementation and nominated
five key conditions, as follows (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, pp 481 - 504; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981; and Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983):

**Condition 1:** The program of action is based on a sound theory, which relates changes in target group behaviour to the achievement of desired end state objectives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 486). In other words the condition specifies that there must be an underlying valid theory of cause and effect. This requirement is very similar to that specified by Gunn as the fourth precondition of perfect implementation (Gunn, 1978 p 171). The condition makes clear the requirement that what is to be implemented must be based on accurately focused action and consequently would appear to be a reasonable precondition. In their analysis of this condition Sabatier and Mazmanian state that each underlying causal theory can be divided into technical and compliance components. Both the technical and compliance components must be valid for the policy objective to be attained (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 486). In other words a program well designed technically but not also receiving the essential co-operation of a target group will be frustrated. Similarly a program well designed in terms of the compliance of a target group but unsound technically will not be successful to any significant degree. Sabatier and Mazmanian state the only exception would be in the case where target group compliance is the sole policy objective (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 487). In such circumstances due to the omission of any attempt to link target group behaviour to subsequent end state this condition would not apply.

**Condition 2:** The statute or other basic policy decision is composed of unambiguous policy directives, and structures the implementation process with the effect of maximising the probability that target groups will comply as desired (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 487). This condition, like condition 1, focuses on some of the aspects of necessary co-operation for implementation to be successful. Sabatier and Mazmanian state that this is the condition most under the control of policy formulators such as legislators. Due to its importance and the basic nature of its contribution to successful implementation Sabatier and Mazmanian analyse the following six constituents.
(1) The policy objectives are precise and clearly ranked both internally in regard to the relevant statute and externally to the overall program of implementing agencies (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 487). This condition makes clear the obvious need for objectives to be clearly intelligible to implementers, and clearly ranked both in terms of the goals of a particular program and also of the overall goals of the implementing organisation. Clear objectives are an advantage that can also facilitate an environment and mechanisms of accountability, which permit assessment both internally, and externally of any discrepancies between agency outputs and those objectives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 487). Clear objectives have thus a basic contribution to make to the development and maintenance of efficiency and effectiveness of administrative systems and are an important precondition of successful implementation. It is also important that objectives be clearly ranked internally within a program to establish priorities and resolve conflicts, and also ranked within the framework of agency program objectives to facilitate the establishment of a program within an agency and to specify its priority within total day to day operations.

(2) The financial resources provided to the implementers are sufficient to hire staff, to conduct the technical analyses as required for the development of regulations, and to administer permit/service delivery programs (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 pp 488 - 489). This condition highlights the basic importance of the contribution of financial resources to successful implementation. Sabatier and Mazmanian state that determining what constitutes sufficient resources presents enormous difficulties in practice (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 489). The condition makes apparent by implication that a threshold of funding is usually necessary for there to be any possibility of achieving statutory objectives and the level of funding above this threshold is up to some saturation point for the program affected (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 489).

(3) Implementation is assigned to implementing agencies that are supportive of the statutory objectives and will give the new program a
high priority (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 489). This condition makes explicit reference to the needed co-operation of the implementing agency for a program to be successful. New programs are the most vulnerable to these processes. They require implementing officials who are not merely neutral but sufficiently committed and persistent to develop new procedures and to enforce them in the face of resistance from target groups and from public officials reluctant to make authorised changes (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 489). It is extremely important therefore that implementation be the responsibility of agencies whose policy orientation is consistent with the statute or policy and who will accord the new program a high priority (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 489).

To this end a new agency may be created or alternatively implementation may be assigned to a well-established existing organisation that considers the program compatible with its traditional orientation. In practice the choice of implementing agencies and officials is highly constrained. Sabatier and Mazmanian state that there is little option but to assign implementation to existing agencies that may well be hostile or whose personnel may be preoccupied with existing programs (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 490). Career civil servants may also be a constraint when resistant to new priorities and the development of new commitments. This is often the underlying reason for lack of success in implementing initiatives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 490).

(4) The statute or other basic policy decision provides substantial hierarchical integration within and among implementers by minimising the number of veto/clearance points and by providing program supporters with inducements and sanctions sufficient to assure acquiescence amongst those with a potential veto (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 490). This condition is similar to conditions 5 and 6 specified by Gunn as a precondition for perfect implementation (Gunn, 1978 pp 171 - 172). This is no doubt due to its central importance in the
implementation process. Sabatier and Mazmanian state that one of the dominant themes in implementation literature is the difficulty of obtaining coordinated action within any agency in particular, and among the numerous semiautonomous agencies involved (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 491).

In the United States and other federal systems the problem can be important when federal statutes or policy decisions rely on State and local government bodies for the implementation of programs and when some field level implementers and sometimes target groups display considerable resistance to program objectives (Van Horn, 1979 p 139). An important attribute of any statute or other basic policy decision is the extent to which it hierarchically integrates the implementing agencies (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 491). A loosely integrated implementation system of agencies will allow and promote variation in the compliance among officials and target groups as each will be able to respond differentially to the incentives to modify a program or proposal within its local setting (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 491). A high degree of integration is thus desirable if implementation is to be successful in most cases.

There are several important factors that influence the degree of hierarchical integration among implementing agencies. As noted above, according to Sabatier and Mazmanian the degree of hierarchical integration is determined by the number of veto/clearance points involved in the attainment of statutory or policy objectives and the extent to which supporters of these objectives are provided with inducements and sanctions sufficient to assure co-operation of those with a potential veto (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 491). Veto/clearance points are the opportunities arising for implementing officials, agencies and target groups to impede or otherwise statutory or other policy objectives in the implementation process (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 491). Resistance at veto points is overcome when a statute or policy provides sufficient incentives to convince those concerned to alter their behaviour.
(Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 491). Sabatier and Mazmanian believe that if the incentives are sufficient in number and scope the number of veto points can delay but probably never ultimately impede successful implementation. In practice however the compliance incentives are usually modest and the number of veto/clearance points becomes quite important as a barrier to successful implementation (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 pp 491 - 492).

(5) The decision rules of implementers are supportive of statutory objectives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 492). Statutes frequently specify the decision rules of an agency so that final decisions are fully consistent with legislative intent. When not stipulated or inadequately specified decision rules adopted may actually impede or contradict original intent. Consequently supportive decision rules are a necessary condition of successful implementation.

(6) The statute or other basic policy decision provides sufficient opportunity for constituency interest groups and other bodies supportive of statutory objectives to intervene in the implementation process through, for example, liberal rules of standing in agency and judicial proceedings, and requirements for the periodic evaluation of performance of implementing agencies and target groups (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 492). According to Sabatier and Mazmanian implementing officials cannot necessarily be trusted to act in a manner consistent with statutory or policy objectives despite every opportunity and incentive not to impede the implementation process. What is required is constant oversight and sometimes intervention from supportive constituency groups, or legislative or executive “sovereigns” (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 493). To facilitate this process, statutes or other basic policy decisions can be designed to facilitate such intervention. For example there can and should be requirements for public input at many stages in the decision processes of implementing agencies (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 493).
Provision can also be made for the input of yet unorganised or poorly organised target groups or others (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 493). To facilitate litigation and independent assessment of implementation decisions it is also desirable to provide liberal views of standing to appeal agency decisions to the courts (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 493). It is also desirable that agencies be required where possible to periodically report to legislative and executive “sovereigns” and that evaluation studies by prestigious independent organisations be undertaken (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 493). The maintenance and development of these processes is essential for the attainment of successful implementation. This is especially true in the longer term as there are constant pressures for even supportive agency officials to loose commitment, for supportive groups to fail to maintain active political support and for the implementation process to be gradually undermined (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 494).

**Condition 3:** The leaders of implementing bodies possess the necessary managerial and political skill, and are committed to the statutory objectives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 494). Given the importance of top implementing personnel in terms of leadership and their influence over the allocation of staff and selection of other resources, their role warrants being highlighted as a separate condition (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 pp 494 - 495). Political and managerial skill is also essential. Political skill involves the ability to develop effective working arrangements, to convince opponents and target groups they are being treated fairly, to mobilise support to present the agency's case through the mass media etc (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 495). Managerial skill involves the development and maintenance of efficiency, maintaining morale and managing internal dissent (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 495).

**Condition 4:** The program being implemented is actively supported by organised constituency groups and by a few key legislators, or the chief executives throughout the implementation process, with the courts being neutral or supportive (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 pp 495 - 496). It is essential for the long-term success of implementation that the active political support of
constituency groups and key legislators or chief executives be maintained. This is not always accomplished. Firstly the attention of the general public and constituency groups may wane over time despite the misgivings of any of the target groups or others concerning the program. The resultant shift in the awareness and focus of the general public frequently is reflected by the development of a lack of concern by members of the legislature as a whole and committees in the relevant sub-systems (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 496). These problems can be reinforced where legislators frequently only learn of the development of a program from constituent complaints when investigated or referred to the agency for review. The net result is that progress becomes slower than otherwise would be the case if legislators showed positive support.

The necessary political support can be achieved given the presence of a fixer or fixers and organised supportive constituent groups (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 497). A fixer is an important legislator or executive member who controls resources and who has the motivation and resources to closely monitor the situation, to intervene frequently and is protective of the implementing agency resources and authority (Bardach, 1987 pp 268 - 283). The second necessary requirement is the presence of an organised supportive constituency group that is able to monitor closely the implementation of a program, to intervene as necessary, to appeal (if necessary) adverse agency decisions to the courts and legislatures etc. In the opinion of Sabatier and Mazmanian if the supportive constituency is present, fixers can generally be found and nurtured (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 497).

Inter-governmental relations can pose special difficulties for the maintenance of political support and consequently the implementation of a program. Often the programs of inter-governmental subordinates such as local or state governments are subject to revision by higher levels of government (Van Horn, 1979 p 147). Unless a program's representatives occupy significant positions at the higher level there is frequently little that can be done to maintain its integrity. Also higher levels of government are usually confronted with substantial local variation in political support for a program and frequently also wide variation in the compliance of local officials. Under these circumstances higher-level officials are forced sometimes to bargain with local implementers. Program objectives are
consequently watered down through such a process (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 498).

One must not forget the role of the courts. The review of legislation by courts has many implications especially the ensuring of conformity with the explicit statutory objectives. However courts strongly opposed to a given statute have the power to impede or prevent implementation. Some courts that have the appropriate power may even in extreme cases declare a statute unconstitutional. There are also instances of courts strengthening substantially the statutes authorising a program and consequently the implementation process. Given the role of courts it can be seen that successful implementation depends upon them being either neutral or supportive (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 499).

**Condition 5**: The relative priority of the objectives of the program is not significantly undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public policies or by changes in relevant social conditions that undermine the technical theory or political support of the program (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 499). Over time many of the original circumstances and conditions which arose when a program or policy originated could have altered. For example the evolution of competing and conflicting programs can seriously undermine the policy or program. The social conditions the program or policy was intended to affect may be altered over time thus calling into question the continued relevance of the approach. Shifts in political opinion can also undermine a policy or program. Consequently these variables should be included as a separate condition (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 pp 499 - 500).

In summary, Sabatier and Mazmanian argue that a statute or policy decision will achieve its objectives if:

1. It incorporates a valid theory linking target group compliance to those objectives.
2. It contains policy directives which are unambiguous and focus the implementation process to maximise target group compliance.
3. The leaders of implementing agencies support the objectives and utilise resources skilfully.
4. The program enjoys the support of constituency groups and key legislators, with the courts being neutral or supportive.

5. The program is not undermined by changing conditions (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 500).

Sabatier and Mazmanian state that if all these conditions are met then any statute will be effectively implemented. The only exception to the need for these five conditions to be met is where modest changes only are required or when little effort needs to be expended to obtain the co-operation of target groups (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 500). For example in the case of a school program the changes intended may be adopted with the wide support of staff affected. The fulfilment of other conditions (for example a very hierarchically integrated decision process or managerial skill of implementing officials) may not be necessary.

In practice there are many constraints that may prevent the fulfilment of these conditions (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 pp 503 - 504). Valid theories linking target group compliance to objectives may not be available and the information available concerning the object of a policy or a program may be imperfect or non-existent. In practice it may not prove possible to pass legislation with unambiguous objectives or which coherently structures the implementation process. Implementation may have to be assigned to those agencies not supportive of the policy objectives. Supportive interest groups and legislators with the resources to serve as fixers may not be available or change their allegiances over time.

Even if the conditions of effective implementation are not met at the time of a basic policy decision, later policy makers and others can still take a variety of steps to approximate the conditions over time. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979 pp 503 - 504) suggest the following:

1. If a valid theory linking target group behaviour to policy objectives is not forthcoming then the authors of the statute or policy can make an effort to incorporate it in a learning process through, for example, experimental projects, research and development etc and an open decision process.
2. If legislation is passed with only the most ambiguous policy directives then supporters of a different approach can test the legislation before the courts for consistency and constitutional relevance.

3. If implementation cannot be assigned to strongly supportive bodies then it is important to provide for intervention by constituents (including citizen suit provisions), periodic reporting to superior bodies, evaluation studies by independent organisations and special legislative oversight committees.

4. If there are no active supportive groups with the commitment and resources to monitor implementation, then identification and mobilisation of such a group must become an important priority of supporting legislators and officials.

5. If a fixer is not readily available then supporters of a program must make the effort to develop one. This may involve convincing a new legislator to take on the area.

**Higher Education Models**

Generic literature about implementation, if it is to be understood in the higher education context, needs to be supplemented by literature that specifically deals with implementation of higher education policy. One such model is by Cerych and Sabatier (1986) who essentially see implementation as a function of:

1. The amount of system change envisaged, and the extent of support and resistance of ministry and higher education officials.
2. The adequacy of the causal theory i.e. the extent to which the means of reaching the objective were understood.
3. The amount of support organised in favour of the reform.
4. The extent to which a specific objective was affected over time by changing socio-economic conditions.

This model is a development of the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) model, discussed above. Other writers such as Meek (1987a and 1987b), Harman and Meek (1988), Harman (1991 and 1999) and Goedegebuure (1992) emphasise factors such as the executive authorisation, and historical context. These matters are not of central relevance to the thesis and as a consequence these models are not examined further herein.
As previously noted, this 1979 work by Sabatier and Mazmanian was later applied specifically to the higher education sector by Cerych and Sabatier in 1986, which latter model is further examined in Chapter 7 below.

**Macro- and Micro-Implementation Models**

Theories of implementation can be subdivided into categories of macro- and micro-implementation. Macro-implementation refers to multi-organisation settings above, while micro-implementation refers to those processes particular to individual agencies (Palumbo and Calista, 1990 p 13). These models focus in depth on the implementation processes and are consequently helpful in their detailed analysis.

**Macro-implementation: rational choice theory and network analysis**

Research in this area has concentrated on the logical possibilities occurring when multi-organisations network or other complex administrative systems are coordinated. O’Toole (1995) has argued that formal network theory and games theory have been the principal focus of debate for implementers using these approaches. However the uncertainties stemming from complex multi-organisation interaction are a rich source of research ideas, the results of which in practice are ambivalent for implementers, as findings are both a source of efficiency in identifying potential strategies and lead to further uncertainties which need to be faced in practical situations. Consequently case study material using these approaches can vary significantly in principal findings (O’Toole and Montjoy, 1984). As the merger processes for the universities and colleges of advanced education examined in this thesis were individual in character, this issue is not discussed further herein.

**Micro-implementation**

Five examples of significant micro-implementation models follow. These are discussed in some detail below because of the strong organisational dimension in the case studies examined.
**Model 1: implementation as systems management**

The principal assumptions made in this model are:

1. Organisations operate as value maximisers i.e. they maximise performance.
2. Organisational responsibilities are structured on the principle of hierarchical control.
3. For each task there is an optimal allocation of responsibilities among a hierarchy that maximises the fulfilment of objectives (Elmore, 1978 p 191).

The model views implementation as a process consisting of defining a detailed set of objectives that reflect a given policy, allocating responsibilities within an organisation’s hierarchy in a way that maximises performance, and making internal adjustments that enhance the attainment of objectives. The model is dynamic, as it is assumed that the environment continually interacts with the implementing organisation creating new demands that require internal adjustments. According to the model, implementation is always objectives-driven and performance-enhancing (Elmore, 1978 p 191). An important consequence of the design and theory of the model is that it can be readily translated into a set of normative prescriptions and an evaluation framework that can be used to say how the implementation process should work. The model assumes there are four principal ingredients of effective implementation:

1. Clearly specified tasks and objectives that reflect the policy concerned.
2. A management plan that allocates tasks and performance standards to sub-units.
3. Objective assessment of sub-unit performance; and
4. A system of management controls and sanctions, which is sufficient to hold, subordinates accountable for their performance (Elmore, 1978 p 195).

Failures in implementation thus occur whenever any of these conditions is not met. The model can be used to anticipate failures in implementation by foreseeing or finding such breakdowns in the implementation processes. However it is misleading to focus on any normative aspect of the model, as participants do not necessarily conform to its design and assumptions (Elmore, 1978 p 199). It is this aspect, which leads to the consideration of other models.
This model is not pursued further herein because the thesis research showed clearly that the implementation activity was almost totally carried out by the institutions concerned, rather than by the policy executive.

**Model 2: implementation as bureaucratic process**

This model makes the following chief assumptions:

1. The two most important features of organisations are discretion and routine i.e. the behaviour of organisations stems from the discretion of individual workers, and operating routines.

2. Power in organisations is fragmented and dispersed among small units, which exercise high degrees of control over specific tasks and within their sphere of authority. This pattern is reinforced as organisations become more complex and specialised. The result is that subunits exercise a high degree of control over their internal operations.


According to the model successful implementation depends on a strategy of identifying where discretion of individual functions lies, and having selected these sub-units, of devising alternative routines consistent with the policy to be implemented and inducing these subunits to replace old routines with the newly devised routines (Elmore, 1978 p 200). The major difference between the systems management model and the bureaucratic process model is that the former assumes that management controls are sufficient to control subordinates, while the latter assumes discretion and operating routines are sufficiently well developed to inhibit top management influence and make possible resistance to control by subordinates (Elmore, 1978 p 201). The systems management model assumes that organisations can be readily programmed to respond to changes in policy. In the bureaucratic process model it is assumed that subunits will continue to do what they have been doing, despite imposed policy changes until some way is found to make them do otherwise (Elmore, 1978 pp 201 - 202).
Circumstances that reinforce the relevance of an important aspect of the bureaucratic process model have been the development of factors such as organisation size, complexity of modern administration, and the growth in distance between higher level bureaucrats and the street level implementers. These factors have reinforced the independence and therefore the control of lower level administrators wherein discretion is concentrated. The model assumes that lower level bureaucrats occupy the most critical position in the implementation process. This is often a fact of life: hence the utility of the model (Elmore, 1978 pp 202 - 203).

The model identifies lower level discretion as the relevant focal point for any corrective action to be taken to improve, develop or correct the implementation process. It foreshadows the development of organisational development and related processes, reviewed below and is a useful real-life model. Thesis research showed that this model had a high degree of applicability to the case studies examined.

**Model 3: implementation as organisational development**

This model makes the following major assumptions:

1. Organisations function to satisfy the following basic psychological and social need of individuals: autonomy and control over their own work, participation in decisions affecting them, and commitment to the purposes of work organisation.

2. Organisations are structured to maximise individual control, participation and commitment. Bureaucratic structures maximise these things for occupants of the higher levels at the expense of those in lower levels. The best organisational structure is consequently one that minimises hierarchy and distributes control and responsibility for decisions among all levels of an organisation.

3. Effective decision-making depends on the creation of effective work groups. The quality of interpersonal relations in organisations is the chief determinant of the quality of decisions. The characteristics of effective work groups are: mutual agreement on goals, open communications among individuals, mutual trust and support among group members, full
The focus of the implementation process, according to this model, should be the building of consensus, and the development of an accommodation between policy-makers and implementers. The central problem envisaged as critical by the model, is whether the implementation process results successfully in consensus in goals, and individual autonomy and commitment by those who must carry it out. The organisational development model consequently gives a different picture of the implementation process than either the systems management model or the bureaucratic process model (Elmore, 1978 p 212).

According to the systems management model the implementation process consists primarily in the skilful use of management controls to hold lower levels accountable. In the bureaucratic process model the implementation process focuses on changing the work routines of an organisation so that they conform to a given policy or decision. Thus according to these models policy is made at the top and implemented at the bottom. In the organisational development model this distinction is far less clear, as the model emphasises that the capacity to implement originates at the bottom of organisations not the top. The model assumes that the role of those at the top of the system is necessarily residual, as implementation is not feasible unless work groups targeted by a policy are enthusiastic and committed. The model assumes that such factors either lie outside the control of management or can be influenced to only a minor degree (Elmore, 1978 p 215). While not every facet of this model is reflected in the case studies, it has considerable relevance because of the often complex situations faced by vice-chancellors and college principals in the case studies.

However the model's assumptions concerning consensus, co-operation and strong interpersonal ties do not focus to a significant extent on the role of conflict in the implementation process. The same criticism may be levelled against all three models discussed so far, because none directly incorporates the issue of the consequences to organisations and the implementation process when control, routine
and consensus fail (Elmore, 1978 p 217). The role of conflict and bargaining is examined in the next model.

Model 4: implementation as conflict and bargaining

Two proposals are indicative of this approach: Elmore (1978), and Matland, (1995).

The model proposed by Elmore makes the following principal assumptions:

1. Organisations are areas of conflict in which individuals and subunits compete for advantage in the exercise of power and the allocation of resources.
2. The distribution of power within an organisation depends solely on the temporary ability of the individual or organisational subunit to mobilise the necessary resources and manipulate the behaviour of others. The distribution of power within organisations is consequently never stable. Formal position in an organisation is only one of a multitude of factors which can alter the distribution of power. Other factors include specialised knowledge, control of material resources and the ability to mobilise external political support. Consequently the exercise of power in organisations is only partly related to position within the formal structure.
3. Decision making in organisations consists essentially of bargaining within and among organisational units. Consequently bargained decisions are the result of convergence among those of different preferences and resources. The bargaining process does not require the parties agree on a common goal or to concur for implementation to proceed. It only requires that all parties agree to adjust mutually with the aim in mind of keeping the bargaining relationship as a means of allocating resources (Elmore, 1978 pp 217 - 218).

According to the model implementation consists of a series of bargained decisions reflecting the preferences and resources of participants. Success in implementation can consequently be defined relative to the goals of individual parties to the bargaining process or in terms of the preservation of the bargaining process itself, as no single set of purposes can provide an internally consistent settlement of the interests of all parties in the bargaining process (Elmore, 1978 p 218).
The communication process taking place may be explicit or tacit (Elmore, 1978 pp 218 - 219). Many forms of bargaining may occur without direct communication and with independent information of each party or the other. In the light of these circumstances implementation becomes a series of strategic moves by individual organisations and subunits within the organisation, each seeking to shape the behaviour to its own ends. Consequently even the strongest adversaries must take account of the moves of opponents when they formulate a bargaining strategy in the implementation process (Elmore, 1978 p 219). Thesis research showed that this model was particularly relevant to the thesis, both because of the high level of conflict experienced by many parties to the implementation process, and because Elmore provides a micro-model that is neither solely top-down nor solely bottom-up – a necessity given the strong organisational dimension of the amalgamations.

Matland’s model (1995, pp 159 - 170) is a similarly conflict-based. He proposes a matrix based on two variables, conflict and ambiguity, giving rise to four stereotypical situations:

1. Administrative implementation i.e. given sufficient resources, low conflict and low ambiguity, implementation is assured.
2. Political implementation – characterised by low policy ambiguity and high policy conflict.
3. Experimental implementation – characterised by high policy ambiguity and low policy conflict (contextual conditions dominate outcomes).
4. Symbolic implementation – characterised by high policy ambiguity and high policy conflict (coalition strength determines outcome).

The major contribution of such models is to emphasise that parties to the implementation process will not agree to anything except the necessity to bargain. Accordingly the bargaining process, whether between individuals within organisations or among organisations proceeds by convergence, adjustment and closure rather than hierarchical control or consensus. The approach consequently provides powerful descriptive advice, which permits an interpretation of implementation without attributing an overall purpose to implementation as it develops. However the approach does not provide for a determination of success
or failure of implementation as it does not provide for an objective definition of either. The approach only emphasises that all normative judgments involved are simply assertions of relative advantages and the bargaining process. None the less, this model – together with Elmore – is important to the thesis because of the complex situations involved, e.g. the vice-chancellors’ negotiations discussed below in the case studies,

**Model 5: project management approaches**

These have proven to be a development (usually restricted to single organisations but can be extendable to multi-organisation settings when required) sponsored by practitioners in an effort to control the critical events in individual implementations. While they map critical processes, and assist with planning and carrying out works such checklists are not fully developed theories of implementation. They are suggestive of such theories only. Examples are found in Chase (1979) and project materials such as the Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DETYA) Advance Policy Network course materials (1999). They are mentioned here for completeness only.

**Other Theories**

**Incentive theory**

Implementation (particularly in complex systems) can also be viewed as a potentially changing series of implementation relations, which depend on incentives to make implementation possible. According to the approach there are two principal sources of incentive failures that affect implementation. Intra-agency failures can occur in the core relation between implementer and elected officials, and other failures are possible in the context of review agencies such as the courts. Problems of over-simplification can arise using this approach.

An incentive can also be defined as any stimulus that evokes behaviour. Consequently if the relationship between two entities defines an incentive relationship in a system of two or more entities, their relations define the incentive system. The nature of such a system can be outlined. The dynamics can be
described, in individual case studies. Incentive concepts can also be attributed to many implementation researchers (Mitnick and Backoff in Edwards, 1984 pp 86 - 116). Incentive theory draws attention to the importance of motivation in successful implementation.

**Institution theory models**

Institution theory has also been utilised to model implementation. It can explain the variety and function of institutional contexts in the process of implementation and is a useful focus for analysis especially in case study design. Calista has proposed such a model, with four institutional contexts – the constitutional, collective, operational and distributional. The following factors are assumed to give rise to dynamism of the model: network composition, authoritative arrangements, implementation setting, public opinion and behaviour, interpretive institutions and individuals (Calista in Nagel, 1994 pp 120 - 125).

**Intergovernmental relations models**

Intergovernmental relations and associated considerations have also led to the development of applicable models. These models focus on the role of government relations processes especially the relations of federal systems and are a helpful focus of analysis for policy makers. For example one model of the US federal system, utilising such theory has been developed (Goggin, 1990 pp 29 - 41).

**Mandate design models**

Mandate design models and statistical modelling of the impact of mandate design can demonstrate that statutory coherence is a sufficient but not necessary condition for strong implementation efforts. Findings can show that policy designers can enhance implementation efforts and shape regulatory styles through better mandate designs – a helpful insight for implementation theorists (May, 1993 p 634).

**Transaction cost models**

Transaction costs can play a vital role in determining whether implementation can proceed, and the organisational design, and sometimes the sector of the implementing organisation – important insights into successful implementation
for implementation theorists. A transaction cost theory can explain why market forms of organising transaction costs lose their efficiency and are replaced often by hierarchical (frequently publicly owned) organisation. A frequent assumption of this approach is that the market driven processes are superior and always appropriate (Calista, 1987 p 463).

Summarising the chapter, it can be seen that implementation, although closely related to policy, can be separated from it for analytical purposes. Theoretical conditions have been devised to postulate a model of perfect implementation but these are unlikely to be fulfilled as a whole in reality. Conditions for effective implementation with a much greater probability of fulfilment in part or in whole in reality, have been identified which offer good guidance to the public policy practitioners when considering implementation of a particular policy. Several models of the implementation process have been proposed but it seems unlikely that one generic model will in the long run be preferred or be regarded as superior, due to the great variety of evidence and points of view as to what encompasses implementation. However the macro- and micro-implementation models seem to offer policy makers the most rewarding insights for successful implementation (Elmore, 1978 p227).

The generic models outlined are necessarily constructs or ideal types, which draw on established traditions of organisational enquiry. There is limited empirical evidence supporting each of the models’ principal assumptions. Of course one might ask what is there in the notion of alternative models in the analysis of implementation. One possibility is that the generic models should be regarded as rival hypotheses and that the gradual accumulation of empirical evidence will eventually prove some single model of the process superior to others. This appears unlikely for two reasons. Firstly the models contain not only descriptive information but also normative information. Despite evidence that implementation processes operate in a certain way, people can persist in the belief that it ought to happen in another way, and shape the implementation process accordingly. As noted above given the potential for a variety of approaches by participants in the implementation process it seems highly unlikely that generic theoretical models of
it will be in agreement or that one model will be regarded as superior (Elmore, 1978 p 227).

**Reasons for the choice of Cerych and Sabatier model**

Of the many models of implementation outlined in this chapter, the thesis focuses on the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) work because it alone is relevant to the thesis research issue dealing with factors critical to the successful implementation of tertiary education policy.

Cerych and Sabatier suggest a number of key factors which bring about change in the higher education sector:

- Degree of system change
- Clarity of objectives
- Adequate causal theory and resources
- Degree of Ministerial control
- The role of ‘fixers’

**Degree of system change**

Cerych and Sabatier state that:

> The success or failure of such reforms is critically dependent upon two aspects of the goals themselves: the amount of system change envisaged and their internal clarity and consistency (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 12).

A high degree of system change increases the difficulty of the reform process. In the words of Cerych and Sabatier:

> A seemingly obvious, but nevertheless often neglected, point is that the difficulty a reform encounters is likely to be crucially dependent upon its departure from the values and procedures of the existing order. Major changes are more likely than minor ones to be intensely resisted by such affected groups as teachers and ministry officials. And the ability to reach any new goal is likely to be delayed by numerous false starts until implementing institutions acquire the experience necessary to learn to effectively co-ordinate various elements.

> We would suggest that the degree of system change hoped for by the reform be conceptualised in terms of the number of institutions affected, the proportion of individuals within each institution whose behaviour would have to change and the amount of behavioural change required of each category of individuals (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 12)

**Clarity of objectives**

According to Cerych and Sabatier, precise goals which are clear and consistent:
... permit the clear evaluation of discrepancies between goals and outcomes and this may be used by program supporters to request additional legal or financial resources (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 14).

However:

Vague and somewhat conflicting goals are often the price to be paid for obtaining agreement among contending parties in the formulation stage, but they leave implementing officials considerable discretion, thus making it very difficult to ascertain with any precision the extent of goal achievement. ... On the other hand, ambiguity does facilitate adjustment to changing circumstances and may be particularly desirable where policy formulators have only the vaguest understanding of the trade-offs among competing objectives (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p14).

As indicated in the previous section, Cerych and Sabatier believe legal official objectives can have a crucial influence upon implementation, particularly in the formulation stage. This aspect is dependent upon their clarity and consistency and the degree of system change envisaged.

**Adequate causal theory and resources**

Cerych and Sabatier also state that:

Every reform is based on a set of assumptions about the exact causal process by which its goals are to be attained. If goals are to be realised, it is important that causal links be understood and that officials responsible for implementing the program have jurisdiction over sufficient critical linkages to make possible the attainment of objectives. Only when these two conditions have been met can the basic decision establishing the reform be said to ‘incorporate’ a valid causal theory (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 pp 15 - 16).

Cerych and Sabatier make a suggestion that changes in social and economic conditions can mean changes in the program design, and lead to conflicting public policies that undermine or reinforce its causal theory (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 pp 21 - 22). Moreover financial resources also play an important role in implementation. A programme cannot succeed unless supported by adequate financial resources (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 17).

Programs intended for university reform are not self-executing; they must be implemented by one or more governmental and sometimes private institutions. Consequently Cerych and Sabatier argue that the commitment to objectives of the reform by officials of such organisations can be crucial in the following ways:
… interpreting vague and conflicting objectives; selecting priorities for action within those objectives and among the numerous legal mandates with which any agency is concerned; incorporating the new program into the standard operating procedures of the institution; and making ‘political’ judgements about the compatibility of the reform with institutional survival and growth (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 17).

Thus according to Cerych and Sabatier it is extremely important that reformers allocate implementation of reforms to institutions and individuals most likely to cooperate with the program objectives, if the reform is to be successfully implemented. This can also mean the creation of completely new institutions to enable a fresh start, but this is only a partial solution (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 18).

**Ministerial control**

Another important consideration of university reforms, by Cerych and Sabatier, is the extent of control accorded the Minister of Education:

This is a function of how many veto/clearance points are involved in attaining program objectives and to what extent supporters of those objectives are provided with inducements and sanctions sufficient to assure acquiescence among those with a potential veto (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 18).

This aspect is indicative of the indirect chain of command which can be a feature of many university reforms. The chain of command is therefore not always a straight forward feature of university reform. Secrecy concerning the implementation process can also be a complication (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 20).

**The role of fixers**

In general Cerych and Sabatier believe that the implementation process, if it is to succeed, must be well managed and not left to itself:

Except in unusual circumstances where the original goals are clear and consistent, where the implementing agents are strongly committed to their realisation and where important implementing officials are very skilful in obtaining maximum return from available resources, simply trusting implementing agencies is likely to result in considerably less change in the status quo than originally hoped for by parliament (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 20).

Successful implementation, therefore, according to Cerych and Sabatier:
Cerych and Sabatier suggest two categories of actors fulfilling this role i.e. a fixer (usually an important member of parliament, or executive officials who have the staff and desire to closely monitor the implementation of a reform), and organised interest groups which have the resources and capacity to intervene where necessary (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 20).

In summary then, according to this model of Cerych and Sabatier, successful implementation of university reforms is a function of a values-change process brought about by the extent of system change and commitment to objectives of individual officials and institutions. It is almost always dependent on the function of fixers and interest groups responsible for the mobilisation of support. It is especially dependent on the adequacy of causal linkages thought to underlie the process and the extent to which a specific objective was affected over time by changing socio-economic conditions that give rise to conflicting public policy or which undermine or fostered its causal theory.

While the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model provides a good interpretative framework for system-wide change in higher education, it does not deal with factors at the organisational level. The model is therefore used as an interpretative framework for the comparative analysis of the case studies, which draws out a number of additional factors (especially leadership) in order to explain comparative patterns of success and failure.

Cerych and Sabatier’s (1986) work builds on Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) model by applying it to the tertiary education sector. These authors stand out among the researchers who have looked at implementation theory in the tertiary education sector because of the comprehensiveness of their approach. The aim of the thesis research is not to test which model of implementation is the best but rather, using the case studies inductively and the comparative method of the “most similar” strategy (discussed in Chapter 3), to identify factors which are critical to the success of the implementation process in the case of tertiary education policy – and which are not found in the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model.
As pointed out by Ryan (1995), the work of Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) – built on by Cerych and Sabatier – represents a successful but rare attempt to integrate ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to implementation by highlighting the importance of ‘mid-level’ actors and interest groups which are of great relevance in higher education policy. For example, the higher education organisations discussed in the case studies below contain both top-down factors (e.g. legislation, ministerial control over finance) and bottom-up factors (universities and colleges left to find their own paths to amalgamation) and Cerych and Sabatier (1986) – building on Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) – successfully combine both features. The thesis focuses on the importance of leadership in uniting these two approaches. It also suggests that in understanding processes of implementation where direct channels of command are not available, implementation theories that stress the importance of the processes of conflict and bargaining are of particular relevance (see for example Elmore 1978).
CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DAWKINS POLICY

The thesis examines the work of John Dawkins closely, in three case studies of the implementation of his policy to merge tertiary institutions. John Dawkins was the Federal Minister responsible for education in the 1980s and 1990s. The aim of the case studies is to develop insight into the reasons for the different degrees of success and failure of this merger policy, attempted in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia. It is significant that there was little attention paid to developing or managing the management skills (especially leadership) of Vice-Chancellors or other senior staff at Australian universities and colleges of advanced education. It was assumed by the Federal Government that Vice-Chancellors and senior staff would be able to achieve the changes required. Consequently factors leading to successful leadership are focused on in the thesis to provide a basis to judge the competencies needed by leaders to bring about change on the scale sort and expected by Dawkins.

Dawkins led a policy from the late 1980s until the early 1990s to restructure the Australian tertiary education scene. The policy reduced the existing number of institutions to about forty, and in this regard implementation of the policy was successful. The intention was to develop economies of scale within institutions to provide a wider choice of courses and the potential for cost savings in the sector. The change was brought about by two major considerations:

1. Abolition of the binary system
2. Strong public finance support for the restructuring.
The Context of University Amalgamations

The Green Paper

Dawkins authorised the circulation of two important discussion papers to canvas and develop changes to the tertiary education system. The first was the Green Paper *Higher Education – A Policy Discussion Paper* of December 1987. The sense of mission of the Green Paper was summarised in the following words:

> Australia now must examine the performance of its higher education system. We must ask the people and companies of Australia, whose taxes provide the resources for higher education, what demands and expectations the country has of its institutions and whether the institutions are responding to those demands and expectations. We must ask the institutions themselves what they see as their role in the social, cultural and economic lives of Australians and ask them how effectively they are discharging their roles (Dawkins, 1987 pp iii - iv).

The Green Paper advanced a serious challenge to past performance of the sector. It made clear that this was warranted and stemmed from the Government’s mandate, which it interpreted as justifying a major redesign of the higher education system. In his statement of 22 September 1987, Dawkins emphasised the importance of higher education to the Government’s cultural, social and economic objectives. He wrote that this important relationship was well recognised internationally. The OECD report, *Universities Under Scrutiny* expressed it in the following terms:

> During the past thirty years, there has been substantial expansion of the demands and expectations placed on the system of higher education in all Member countries with a number of new dimensions added to the traditional instructional as well as scholarly and professional functions of these systems. This has resulted from the cumulative effect of a much larger and varied student population, the rapid pace of scientific and technological development, the enhanced importance of innovation and knowledge in modern societies and the economic importance of a skilled labour force (Dawkins, 1987 p iii).

The analysis within the Green Paper emphasised that Australia’s relatively poor output of graduates required a substantial revision and expansion of the system if the supply of graduates was to keep pace with projected demographic changes and if Australia’s international competitiveness was to be maintained or enhanced. It also emphasised the need for administrative and structural efficiency and reform if such a challenge was to be met and economic gains attained. The Green Paper further stated that there was a need to re-scope the system to satisfy the need for
increased participation by low-income earners, aborigines, women and other disadvantaged groups. It envisaged a major policy role for the Federal Government that would use its financial dominance over the States and Territories to bring about change. Importantly, it envisaged the development of a unified national system of universities which would encourage amalgamations of existing universities and colleges of advanced education and the abolition of the distinction between them. It also envisaged better planning with the participation of State and Territory governments, and the rationalisation of the number of external course providers in the sector (Dawkins, 1987).

The White Paper
Following an extensive consultation process with the community and the higher education sector, a White Paper *Higher Education – A Policy Statement* was circulated in July 1988 (Dawkins, 1988). Wide ranging consultations with the higher education sector and the community confirmed the intentions and scope of reform envisaged in the Green Paper and consequently the policies envisaged were very much the same in the White Paper. The White Paper suggested that there should be more emphasis on a new policy to increase opportunities for Australians from all walks of life to enjoy the benefits of higher education, to create a higher education system more responsive to national social, cultural and economic requirements, and to provide a more flexible environment for the institutions to work in (DEET, 1993 p 26) There were no great differences between the content of the Green and White Papers in terms of policy initiatives identified for the tertiary education sector.

The White Paper followed strong support for the propositions advanced in the Green Paper. It suggested similar structural, finance and management changes. The abolition of the colleges of advanced education (CAEs) and the encouragement of mergers were proposed as the primary means of introducing structural and efficiency gains for the sector. The White Paper envisaged a unified national system of fewer institutions, funding for equity and specified performance contracts to operate in 1990, and the new Unified National System (UNS) to be established no later than 1990. To be eligible for membership of the UNS institutions were required to have a minimum sustainable student load of at
least 2000 EFTSU (Equivalent Full Time Student Units). The White Paper also affirmed the Government’s view that an institution would need at least 5000 EFTSU to justify a broad teaching profile and some specialised research activity. To have a comprehensive involvement in teaching with resources to undertake research across a significant proportion of its profile an institution was expected to have at least 8000 EFTSU. Institutions with a student load in the 2000 – 5000 EFTSU range and with poor prospects of student growth were encouraged to consider carefully their future development as independent institutions (National Board of Employment, Education and Training 1989, p 2). There would also be an emphasis on autonomy and accountability. If institutions fell outside the Unified National System, Federal funding was not guaranteed and could lapse (Dawkins, 1988 p 28). Table 2.1 indicates that in 1988 there were a substantial number of institutions below the 8000 EFTSU mark which meant that there was considerable scope for institutions to merge.

Table 2.1: Higher Education Institutions by Size (1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size (no. of students)</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;2,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-8,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;8,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 196)

**Constraints**

It is important to understand the constraints, actual and potential on the Dawkins reforms process. They stemmed largely from the political, economic and government relations contexts which were to be encountered if the Dawkins reform to the structure of the tertiary education sector was to be implemented.
These constraints were influential when considering a choice of model to evaluate the characteristics of the implementation process adopted as they provided the immediate context to Dawkins in determining targeted and appropriate implementation processes which are the object of study of this thesis.

**Limited Time Frame**

In September 1987 John Dawkins, as the Federal Minister responsible for education, announced the abolition of the binary system of higher education institutions, stating that in future all higher education institutions would be funded for teaching purposes on a basis determined by their respective educational profile rather than title. Resources for research were to be made on a competitive basis throughout the higher education system according to performance. The implications of this new arrangement were developed further in the subsequent policy discussion paper on higher education (the Green Paper) released in December 1987, and in the Commonwealth policy statement on higher education (the White Paper) released in July 1988, which both outlined the structure and function of the Unified National System (UNS), discussed earlier in this chapter. The commencement date proposed for the UNS for newly established or incorporating institutions was as close as possible to 1 January 1990. This allowed a short period for a complex and national change to be brought about across Australia (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 102).

Federal Governments in Australia have a maximum life of three years. This means that Ministers such as Dawkins have a limited time frame in which to implement policy changes. It can mean that emphasis on attaining medium and long-term changes needs to be sacrificed due to the lack of certainty of re-election given a short political cycle. It often means that Ministers are especially keen to obtain quick results from which they can benefit politically. This also means that there was limited time for John Dawkins to have feasibility studies done prior to forming policies.

**Public Finance**

Implementation of change frequently means some costs must be incurred. There is ample evidence that Dawkins was resourced sufficiently so there would be
sufficient incentive for the changes to sector structure and most other parameters hoped for, for example new funding mechanisms were adopted to give institutions maximum autonomy and choice in the management of their resources within a framework of agreed institutional goals and objectives. Institutions were to receive a single operating grant on a rolling triennial basis which meant each institution would be funded on the basis of their functions and performance rather than on how they were classified (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 21) This was in contrast to reforms designed by the Fraser Government in the early 1980s for the college sector which originated in a budget context of more restraint, and required any savings of institutions resulting to be returned to Consolidated Revenue (DEET, 1993 p 13).

The financial incentives later offered by Dawkins to introduce structural change could have controversial consequences if institutions in standing apart from merger processes no longer qualified for public support. This could mean an institution so affected could no longer continue to exist and consequently a political crisis would result. Later evidence indicates this circumstance did not result, largely because of the successful design of the financial package and the enthusiasm with which institutions embraced the merger process. John Dawkins aimed to establish a growth and quality enhancement process across the whole of the tertiary education system and was concerned to bring about greater responsiveness of higher education institutions to the needs of industry and the economy by increasing research funding to fields such as computer science, business studies and engineering (Curri, 2002 pp 134 - 135). The new policy when implemented was expected to offer teaching, scholarship and research of very high quality. The ultimate goal was a balanced system of quality institutions, each with its particular areas of strength and specialisation but coordinated in such a way so as to provide a comprehensive range of higher education offerings. The role of the Federal Government was to identify national goals and priorities and ensure that system wide resources (which would include financial resources) were allocated in accordance with those priorities (DEET, 1993 p 16).
**Autonomy of States and Territories, and Tertiary Education Institutions**

Australian States and Territories have responsibility within State and Territory boundaries for all aspects of education, while the Federal Government has none. The cooperation forthcoming from the States and Territories in the implementation of the Dawkins’ structural reforms was therefore vital because they could not be put into place without State and Territory cooperation. The cooperation of colleges of advanced education and universities, both of which had a strong tradition of autonomy and self-management was similarly crucial to success. However Federal leadership was possible due to its financial dominance, and its willingness to use moral suasion to introduce large-scale change.

**Credentialism**

The emphasis on university and college structural change stemmed from a widely held faith in credentialism. There is very little evidence to suggest that alternate approaches to tertiary education were envisaged or expected. This in part led to considerable emphasis on the formal nature of the changes envisaged at the time, which were primarily envisaged as enhancements to the formal delivery, and comprehensiveness, of credentials available to the public. This led to emphasis on delivery of paper qualifications rather than other educational reforms.

**Locations of Campuses**

The regional and niche nature of colleges of advanced education and universities often limited the possibilities of amalgamation of, especially widely-dispersed, campuses due to the local nature of the clientele each served, and led to more emphasis on formal governance reform rather than consolidation of campuses.

**Lack of an Ideal Overall Design**

The wide variety of courses, clientele and locations served by the institutions made design of an appropriate number of institutions by the Federal Government problematic. The existing setting was perceived as far from ideal (see later in this chapter) and economies of scale were expected if mergers between colleges of advanced education and universities could be encouraged (Dawkins, 1988 p 11).
State and Territory and institutional autonomy meant there was an important constraint to a policy for an ideal number of institutions.

**Historical Background to the Tertiary Education Sector in Australia**

*Development of the Binary System*

Australian Universities were established initially in the pre-Federation period and were modelled on English universities. The sector developed slowly as the nation developed. Prior to the Second World War the Commonwealth Government made a minor contribution to higher education in the form of assistance for research. During that war the States granted the Federal Government through the Grants Commission, the sole power to collect income tax. This and other measures taken during the war were to have lasting effects on Australian government and society. Significant steps were taken to widen the scope of the higher education sector and to widen participation in the sector in period after World War II. During the 1950s the Commonwealth Government undertook to assist the States and Territories, through a system of matching grants, to finance their universities. In the 1960s this system was extended to colleges of advanced education:

> From 1942 the Commonwealth Government has contributed substantially to growth in higher education and it has been responsible for major shifts in policy which have brought about change (DEET, 1993 p 7).

From the mid 1960s, a period of financial stringency and economic downturn, this growth was diverted to the colleges of advanced education and other non-university, post-secondary, institutions such as small specialised institutes. This dual system became known as the binary system (DEET, 1993 p 11). This was as a result of a decision taken by the Federal Government in 1960 during a period of economic recession, when a university education for all qualified applicants was considered too expensive. An extract from a speech made by Sir Robert Menzies, then Prime Minister of Australia, summarises the situation:

> … unless there is early and substantial modification of the university pattern, away from the traditional nineteenth-century model on which it is now based, it may not and I say it with reluctance be practicable for Australian governments to meet all the needs for university education in Australia and at the same time
to achieve the best use of resources in the national interest. We think, therefore, that development of alternative kinds of tertiary education is likely to be of the greatest importance (Menzies, 1960).

In a short time many colleges of advanced education offered comprehensive ranges of degrees and subsequently higher degrees. They also engaged in applied research. A number of colleges of advanced education adopted the titles and procedures of universities. Universities did not remain unchanged over this period. The concepts of the open-university and recurrent education (continuous learning) led the universities to favour more flexible entry requirements, many more opportunities for external and part-time study, new forms of organisation, a wider range of courses, greater response to community needs and consideration of alliances or mergers with the college sector (DEET, 1993 p 13).

The decision by the Whitlam Government in 1974 to abolish tuition fees at universities and colleges of advanced education has become widely recognised as an attempt to democratise higher education. Student numbers in universities grew from 100,000 in 1968 to 159,500 in 1978 (59%). Student numbers in colleges of advanced education grew from about 45,000 in 1968 to 153,500 in 1978 (242%). However the number of students enrolled in each college was usually less than that of a traditional university. This led to a significant attempt at rationalisation through an across-the-board cost cutting exercise in the college sector by the Fraser Government in 1981 (Meek, 1987b pp 85 - 110). By the mid 1980s mergers of universities and colleges of advanced education were mooted but did not go ahead for political reasons (DEET, 1993 p 14).

By the early 1980s there were many tensions and issues of structural governance and organisation being considered including:

1. a recession-induced government cut in higher education funding;
2. too large an array of structures;
3. overlap between colleges of advanced education and universities;
4. issues of access and equity for groups poorly represented in the sector; and
5. insufficient research funding (DEET, 1993 p 14)
In March 1983 the Hawke Labor government was elected. The Minister responsible for education, Senator Susan Ryan initially gave priority to measures that would increase access and equity. Her successor John Dawkins addressed other matters of concern, particularly the structural design and efficiency of the tertiary education sector.

The Change Processes

Authorisation of Change

Mergers, and Dawkins’ Reforms 1987 - 1991

The mergers of tertiary institutions which took place between 1987 and circa 1991 became an integral part of a major Federal Government reform of the higher education sector, led by Mr John Dawkins as Minister for Employment, Education and Training. The reform agenda was as follows:

- Abolition of the binary system and replacement with a new Unified System of Higher Education;
- Major consolidation of institutions through mergers, to form larger more broadly based units;
- To make possible increased economic competitiveness and provision for increases in student enrolments through the provision of appropriate funding;
- Emphasis on such curriculum fields as applied science and technology, computer science and business studies, to reinforce national competitiveness;
- A selective approach to research funding;
- Changes in the composition of the governing bodies of universities to make them more like boards in the corporate sector;
- Changes in staffing arrangements aimed to achieve increased flexibility;
- Changes to achieve increased institutional efficiency, including reduced unit costs in teaching, and improved student credit transfer between institutions; and
• Efforts to move some of the financial burden of higher education to individuals and the private sector (Harman, 1999 pp 16 - 17).

In brief the Federal Government saw the new Unified National System as providing an opportunity to develop in a systematic way a higher education system with fewer institutions, with each having a broader, more diverse, educational profile and thus providing a sound basis on which to operate in a more competitive environment in which funding would be allocated increasingly on the basis of performance (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 2). When the Government’s plan and criteria with regard to institutional size were announced, a large number of institutions began a frantic search for partners. These included not only small institutions but even major universities well above the 8000 EFTSU criterion. In no time a belief developed among the universities that in the UNS, size was likely to be of great importance in attracting resources. This led to a bidding war among universities to attract the maximum number of colleges of advanced education to enter into merger agreements (Harman, 1991).

The case studies of this thesis focus on the criticisms of the overall plan of reform, especially from academic staff and their unions. The criticisms overall were far less than expected and the reform package won wide community support. Many elements of the reform package were supported by Vice-Chancellors (Harman, 1999 p 18).

In a number of cases State or Territory agencies went far beyond the Federal Government’s requirements even to the extent of proposing the dismemberment of particular CAEs with over 7000 EFTSU. In some States many options were canvassed but in the end a sensible set of proposals came forward, most of which received approval from the relevant State, Territory and Federal authorities. Throughout the change process Minister Dawkins emphasised that the Federal Government did not intend to force any institution to enter into a merger but made it plain that institutions which did not comply with the Federal Government’s criteria ran the risk of financial penalties. In addition Commonwealth guidelines clearly specified that amalgamated institutions should have one governing body, one chief executive, one educational profile, one funding allocation and one set of academic awards (Harman, 1999 p 18).
The Minister also appointed a Task Force on Amalgamations (led by the Chair of the Higher Education Council) which performed the role of facilitating amalgamations, negotiating with States, Territories and institutions, and advising the Minister on which State or Territory plans for merger were satisfactory. The Task Force on Amalgamations presented its final report in April 1989 and praised those States, Territories and institutions that had developed appropriate proposals but was highly critical of those that had failed to act (Harman 1999, p 18). The Task Force also recommended the allocation of capital funds and special funds to assist the amalgamations from the National Priority (Reserve) Fund:

Allocation of these funds plus loan funds to assist with early retirements and redundancy played a major part in the success of the merger efforts. In the allocation of regular operating grant funding, former CAEs, which entered mergers, were treated reasonably generously and merged institutions were given the bulk of the funds available to support the growth in student numbers. A total of $238.8 million was made available in the calendar years 1990 and 1991 for capital projects and most of this went to merged institutions. The special funds to assist amalgamations of $21 million were allocated to assist with communication links; integration of library systems; integration of administrative systems, including student and staff records and financial administrative systems; transport links, particularly to remote campuses; and miscellaneous expenses, including signage, publicity and new letterheads (Harman, 1999 p 18).

Financial constraints were thus not a significant issue in the merger process.

**Consequences of Amalgamation**

It was clear to the Task Force on Amalgamations, from the number and pattern of institutional amalgamations already agreed and in progress, that the UNS would involve fewer, larger and more broadly-based institutions, as the then-current educational profiles (1988), revealed an extraordinary range in both size and scope of teaching activity with many institutions still heavily dependent on a few main discipline areas. A similar disparity arose when considering the allocation of research funds in 1988 due to the binary system (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 12).

These patterns of teaching and research would change however, as the consolidation trend proceeded with each of the newly established and modified institutions having not only a larger student load but also a more diverse and
potentially a more evenly balanced distribution of students across the various discipline areas (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 12).

A further consequence of amalgamations was the establishment of a number of multi-campus institutions, some operating entirely within metropolitan areas, some only in regional areas and others involving a combination of both. Most of these structures already had well established precedents in Australia from which to derive some guidance in determining appropriate management structures that balanced the need for institutional unity with efficiency in day to day campus administration and concern for regional identity. However the model of a multi-campus regional university proposed for UNE and Charles Sturt University in western New South Wales and possibly Tasmania represented an important new development for which suitable management systems may have effectively integrated both the educational programs and associated planning and resource allocation provisions (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 13).

One of the encouraging trends in amalgamation proposals was the coalescence of institutions presently competing for students in similar catchment areas. Without requiring potential students to attend the local institution this had the potential to strengthen community links with the new consolidated institution and as a result to enhance its public profile and increase the general awareness of higher education institutions. Associated also with amalgamation proposals was the apparent desire of college institutions either to become, or be affiliated with, universities. This raises the fundamental issue of what the term “university” incorporated as part of an institution’s title should imply (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 13).

**Implementation of Change**

As just noted proposals for amalgamations throughout Australia were analysed by the Task Force appointed by Dawkins, which envisaged that amalgamations should proceed if there was clear evidence of educational benefits and obvious potential for increased efficiency. It also envisaged that newly formed institutions would have one governing body, one chief executive, funding for the amalgamated institution would be the sum of the funding for component
institutions (with additional assistance for one-off costs of amalgamation) and that there would be one set of academic awards (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 2).

Importantly although the merger process was strongly led by Dawkins, it was left to the individual initiatives of each institution to find an affiliate or partner when this was necessary or desirable, and State and Territory governments played a pivotal role because of their formal responsibility for tertiary education in their respective regions of responsibility.

**New South Wales**

In New South Wales in October 1988 a similar policy development process was undertaken whereby a position paper entitled “The Future Structure of Higher Education in New South Wales” was released proposing a new structure for higher education in the State based on seven network universities covering all existing universities and colleges of advanced education.

On 21 February 1989 the State Government agreed on a new structure for higher education in New South Wales. The plan involved the establishment of six universities, the disestablishment of Sydney College of Advanced Education and the New South Wales Institute of the Arts, and the continuation of separate institutions of the University of Wollongong and Mac Arthur Institute of Higher Education. This structure was subsequently revised on 3 April 1989 with the proposed establishment of a new rural university in Western New South Wales under the academic sponsorship of the University of New South Wales, incorporating inter alia Riverina-Murray Institute of Advanced Education, and Mitchell College of Advanced Education (National Board of Education, Employment and Training, 1989 p 28).

**Victoria**

In May 1988, the Victorian Government established a Higher Education Consultative Committee to advise the Minister responsible for Post-Secondary Education on proposals for the amalgamation, affiliation, or change of status/role of higher education institutions in the State. The Government indicated that it would only consider proposals which had the support of the institutions and key interest groups involved and which would not have a detrimental effect on other providers of higher education in the State (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 51).

Stemming from this review the Victorian Parliament passed legislation in November 1988 merging the University of Melbourne and the Melbourne College
of Advanced Education from 1 January 1989. Also in November 1988 a joint Commonwealth-State Working Party was established to examine the provision of higher education in the western region of Melbourne. Two members of the Commonwealth’s Task Force on Amalgamation were the Commonwealth’s representatives on the Committee. On 28 February 1989 the Victorian Minister for Post-Secondary Education announced a plan to restructure higher education in the State which would significantly reduce the number of higher education institutions. Prior to the more general review a merger agreement was established between Lincoln Institute and La Trobe University. The merger was supported by both the State and Commonwealth Governments and came into effect on 1 January 1988 in the absence of an overall State plan and rationalisation of all teaching and research activities, (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 51).

Queensland

In June 1988 the Queensland Minister for Education, Youth and Sport released a set of guidelines for the establishment of new universities in Queensland:

Where the prima facie case was considered satisfactory the Queensland Minister appointed an Advisory Committee to examine the matter in detail and to report on whether and under what conditions the institution should be accorded university status, so that the State Minister could make an appropriate recommendation to Cabinet.

In the course of this assessment process, the Queensland Minister announced in November 1988 the State Government’s intention to establish a new University of South East Queensland incorporating Griffith University, Brisbane CAE, Gold Coast CAE and Queensland Conservatorium of Music. The proposal was not accepted by the constituent institutions, and in February 1989 the State Government announced its decision not to proceed with the merger. Instead a working party was to be established to explore the possibility of some form of amalgamation for the Queensland Conservatorium of Music which could both maintain its identity and secure its future within the unified national system as part of a larger institution. Shortly afterwards, on 6 March 1989, the Queensland Government announced that Brisbane CAE, Capricornia Institute of Advanced Education and the Darling Downs Institute of Advanced Education would all be granted full autonomy from 1990 and be accorded university status from 1 January 1993. The former Queensland Institute of Technology had already been assessed and was redesignated Queensland University of Technology in January 1989 (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p109).

This process raised a number of issues of serious concern to the Commonwealth. At a procedural level the lack of prior consultation on redesignation of institutions
as universities raised questions concerning the validity of the exercise. Of more serious concern, however was that the Queensland decisions were inevitably based on assumptions of increased Commonwealth funding to establish a general research infrastructure in institutions not presently funded for this purpose, and in most cases having no substantial record of research achievement. There were in addition questions of continuity involving both existing and proposed independent universities, and of the means by which redesignated institutions were expected to grow student load and broaden their current educational profile in order to achieve the desired university characteristics. These questions had yet to be resolved at the time of the implementation of the Dawkins reforms (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 110).

**Western Australia**

The Western Australia State Government decided in October 1988 to establish a committee chaired by the Minister for Education to review higher education structures and develop plans for the future development of higher education in Western Australia. This Committee did not complete its work in time for its approach to be considered by the National Board of Employment, Education and Training when finalising merger proposals for the Federal Minister (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 75).

**South Australia**

In December 1987 in response to the Commonwealth Government’s Green Paper on higher education, the South Australian Minister for Employment and Further Education released the publication “Higher Education in South Australia: A Discussion Paper, Including Options for Restructuring”, in which the State Government put forward options for a one-university, two-university or three-university model for the State. A subsequent discussion paper was released in July 1988 entitled “Higher Education in South Australia: Future Directions and Organisation” which recommended the amalgamation of the State’s five higher education institutions into two universities based on Adelaide and Flinders universities. The Minister also announced the establishment of a working party to examine proposals to restructure higher education in South Australia. In December 1988 the State Government announced that it had decided against any
major restructuring of higher education (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 82).

**Tasmania**

Over the period 1988-89, at the time of the Dawkins reforms, the three higher education institutions in Tasmania had extensive consultations on the possibilities for amalgamation and entered in to the final stages of a single plan intended to eventually lead to the establishment of a single integrated higher education institution for the whole State (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 90).

**Northern Territory**

The Northern Territory Government legislated in 1988 to establish the Northern Territory University which came into being on 1 January 1989. The university was formed by the amalgamation of the University College of the Northern Territory (which opened in 1987), with the Darwin Institute of Technology. The university college was funded by the Territory Government and under an arrangement with the University of Queensland offered the university’s B.A. and B. Sc. degrees (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 93).

**Australian Capital Territory**

In the case of the proposed merger between ANU, CCAE (Canberra College of Advanced Education) and CITA (Canberra Institute of the Arts), legislation for the merger was drawn up at federal level as self-government in the ACT did not occur until 1989. In December 1988 the Commonwealth Minister for Employment, Education and Training introduced draft legislation into parliament for the amalgamation. A draft Memorandum of Understanding was drawn up by the three institutions on the provisions of the legislation (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 95).
Outcomes from Change

The Unified National System

One of the characteristic features of universities in Australia as they have developed is their general commitment to research and scholarship and, associated with this, their substantial involvement in training for higher degrees. This was also one of the basic distinctions underpinning the binary system in which universities alone were specifically funded on the basis that all academic staff should be engaged in both teaching and research. While the basis of funding for research changed to reflect more appropriately the need for greater concentration of effort, better management of institutional resources and a more competitive system of allocation open to all institutions with due account of their respective performance, the underlying principle of commitment to research and scholarship and provision of higher degrees remained a valid and essential characteristic of universities (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 14). This principle was consistent with the criteria for university designation adopted by the AVCC – (Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee), and with the range of desired characteristics of universities outlined by the ACDP – (Australian Committee of Directors and Principals in Advanced Education) (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 14). It follows from these requirements, particularly those relating to research and higher degrees, that universities must have an appropriate range and standard of capital facilities, sufficient and well qualified staff, and access to adequate resources to maintain the necessary infrastructure on which these activities are based (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 15).

The Task Force on Amalgamations examined possible criteria which could be used to determine whether a particular institution should be recognised as a university. It believed that the following characteristics should be used as a general guide and that universities within the UNS should be able to demonstrate:

1. A range of academic and professional programs covering all types of higher education award from sub-degree to higher degree and conforming to recognised national and international standards of performance;
2. A substantial body of academic staff appropriately qualified to teach at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels and with recognised professional standing in their respective discipline areas;
3. A general commitment to free enquiry and to the search for and preservation of knowledge through teaching, research and professional practice with a corresponding record of achievement in each major field of activity provided;
4. A range of capital facilities equipment and other resource materials suitably designed and of appropriate standard to service the needs of both undergraduate and postgraduate teaching and research;
5. An effective and efficient management system with appropriate procedures for institutional planning, staff development, research support and academic program review and taking account of relevant national priorities (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 16).

The designation of particular institutions as universities, on the basis of expert judgement according to these criteria, is in legislative terms generally a matter for State and Territory governments. However the provision of appropriate funding required to develop and maintain the characteristic university functions is a Commonwealth responsibility, and as a result it is essential that the designation of university status be made on the basis of proper consultation and mutual agreement between the Commonwealth and relevant State or Territory Government (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 pp 16 - 17).

There were four main ways envisaged by the Task Force for an institution to become a university:

(a) Redesignation

An institution could apply to a State or Territory Government for redesignation as a university. If the State or Territory had sympathy for the proposal, then the matter could be brought before a Joint Planning Committee (sponsored by the Commonwealth and State or Territory Government) so that Commonwealth and State or Territory authorities could comment on the proposed change of status. When Governments agreed with a positive recommendation to proceed from the Joint Planning Committee, the State or Territory Government would establish an assessment group to determine whether the institution meets the specified criteria for a university. The State or Territory would ensure that the assessment group has a composition and membership acceptable to the Commonwealth and bodies such as the AVCC and ACDP and the institution itself. The report would therefore advise whether to accept the application, accept it with qualification, or reject it.
Following receipt of the report, the Commonwealth and the relevant State or Territory could agree on timing and any strategies which are to be put in place to ensure university status. Examples of universities established consistent with redesignation are Curtin University of Technology, University of Technology, Sydney and Queensland University of Technology (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 17).

The redesignation was considered appropriate for an institution which has a strong likelihood of meeting the criteria of a university in its own right. An institution intending to pursue this course of action needed to have a wide range of teaching disciplines and have concentrated upon building its research infrastructure (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 19).

(b) Sponsorship

If, following advice, a State or Territory Government decides to proceed to establish a new university by incorporating an existing institution (or institutions) in legislation but with the academic credibility of the institution assured through a sponsoring university, the general conditions of sponsorship were to be specified in the enabling legislation. The period of sponsorship would continue until the new sponsored university can itself meet the criteria for a university. Such a decision was taken after a significant period of sponsorship and an assessment of the sponsored university’s status and standing (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 18). Universities which were created using a sponsorship model include the University of Western Sydney and Charles Sturt University and the University of Canberra (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 18).

The Task Force on Amalgamations envisaged that the sponsorship model should be used where an institution or group of institutions would together grow into a large institution over time and have the potential to stand alone as a university in its own right. This model was seen as more appropriate to institutions that served metropolitan populations or larger country regions (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 19).
(c) Incorporation
In this process an existing institution is incorporated by legislation as part of an established university following agreement of the institutions concerned and usually the State, Territory and Commonwealth Governments concerned. Examples of institutions gaining university status by this mechanism include the Hunter Institute of Higher Education when incorporated into the University of Newcastle, and the advanced education institutions which in 1981-82 were incorporated as part of James Cook University.

Other examples include the amalgamations identified in this thesis of advanced education institutions with Monash University and the UNE network merger. A large number of institutions were to gain university status by this method (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 18). It was envisaged by the Task Force on Amalgamations that the incorporation model should be used for smaller institutions which were either contiguous or have overlapping catchments. This was not always the case but confirmed in the case of ANU and CITA, and UNE and ACAE.

(d) University College
A university college model is suited for small institutions which may or may not over time become universities in their own right. It is a mechanism which might be useful for campuses some distance from the larger host university which require a closer association than a sponsorship. Any change to university status would need to be supported by external assessment. Smaller institutions in the former advanced education sector might be redesignated as university colleges while remaining autonomous institutions without any formal links with an established university. The Task Force did not support this approach:

Some institutions contemplated negotiating status as a college of an established university. For example, the Universities of New England, Newcastle and Wollongong were all established by this mechanism. More recently the University College of the Northern Territory was a College associated with the University of Queensland until it merged with the Darwin Institute of Technology to become the University of the Northern Territory (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 19).
The Task Force on Amalgamations envisaged that the college model should only be used for small institutions located some distance from the host university, where a specific regional or discipline focus applied (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 19). This was certainly the case when Orange Agricultural College merged with the UNE – discussed in Chapter 5.

**New Tertiary Education Institutions**

By the end of 1990 the following new tertiary education institutions emerged through merger in Australia. Some institutions remained independent despite attempts to amalgamate them (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 199).

**Table 2.2: New Tertiary Education Institutions Created through Merger (at the end of 1990)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State or Territory</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>University of Western Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macquarie University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Technology Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of New England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Sturt University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Newcastle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>University of Queensland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Griffith University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Queensland University of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>University of Adelaide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flinders University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of South Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>University of Melbourne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victoria University of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La Trobe University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monash University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deakin University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prior to the Dawkins reforms Australian higher education was quite fragmented in 1988. The majority (69%) were smaller than 5,000 EFTSU. The situation changed by 1991 (refer Table 2.3):

**Table 2.3: Institutions by Size and State or Territory (1991)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State or Territory</th>
<th>&lt;2,000</th>
<th>2,000-5000</th>
<th>5,000-8,000</th>
<th>&gt;8,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 202)

As can be seen by reference to the above table “if we relate the outcomes of the White Paper restructuring to its original intention of creating large institutions, the policies have to be judged as very successful” (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 201). However State and Territory experience (expressed apparently in EFTSU) was not uniform, as the merger experience of each of the States and Territories differed markedly. In New South Wales all the higher education institutions combined into 9 universities. However in both the larger Sydney area and in the regions of New England and the Hunter there were problems, aspects of which are treated in the case studies selected for this thesis. It is noteworthy that the institutions did not support a plan of one network university for New South Wales and this option lapsed.

**Mergers**

In regard to institutional behaviour Goedegebuure argues that, the more merger is a necessary condition to ensure a continuous supply of critical resources, the more likely an institution will engage in merger. The Australian mergers can be seen from this perspective (see Table 2.4):
Table 2.4: Merger Behaviour by Institutional Size (1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>&lt;2000</th>
<th>2,000-5,000</th>
<th>5,000-8000</th>
<th>&gt;8,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merger</td>
<td>21 (81%)</td>
<td>16 (70%)</td>
<td>10 (83%)</td>
<td>9 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Merger</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>7 (30%)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26 (100%)</td>
<td>23 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>13 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 206)

With respect to the institutions below the 2,000 EFTSU benchmark, the behaviour is according to the proposition … With respect to the other categories discussion is possible (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 206).

Consequently there is need to compare and contrast case studies of universities in Australia which operate in different regional contexts and size categories to form a judgement as to the nature of the overall merger process.

The mergers have resulted in a substantial number of very large institutions and from a national viewpoint concentration has increased substantially. Table 2.5 (below), indicates that at the national level Australian higher education institutions have become more concentrated. For example Goedegebuure observes almost half of the students were enrolled in the ten largest institutions. The second feature which can be deduced from Table 2.5 is the large difference in concentration ratios at the regional level:

For most of the rural regions, the mergers have resulted in a ratio close to, or of, unity. On the other hand, for metropolitan regions the change has been far less spectacular (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 211).

Consequently a case study approach would provide valuable insight in to these observations and is attempted in this thesis.

Table 2.5: Concentration Ratios by National and Regional Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Type of Mergers

The analysis in Table 2.6 (below) is consistent with an observation that the more institutions strive towards maximum coverage of core activities, the more conglomerate mergers will take place over other types of merger and this appears consistent with the available data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>Type 2</th>
<th>Type 3</th>
<th>Type 4</th>
<th>Type 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murray and Riverina</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illawarra</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West Victoria</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central North Victoria</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Victoria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Queensland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Queensland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Queensland</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelaide</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia North</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 210)
Table 2.6: Australian Mergers by Type (1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Horizontal</th>
<th>Vertical</th>
<th>Diversification</th>
<th>Conglomerate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Goedegebuure, 1992 p 215)

The majority of mergers have been between universities and CAEs. As no merger has taken place between universities the diversification mergers have been between CAEs. The vertical mergers that have occurred were between a university and a CAE located in Tasmania and South West Victoria. The types of mergers indicate that universities have joined up with colleges of advanced education that were an addition to their educational profile. According to Goedegebuure (1992, p216) apart from two isolated cases this is a universal picture. The large majority of mergers have occurred between institutions of substantially different sizes especially in the case of university and CAE mergers. The mergers identified clearly demonstrate an expansion policy on the part of universities but there is no statistical data available on program expansion as a result of any negotiations between the Commonwealth and the individual institutions (Goedegebuure, 1992 pp 216 - 217). Consequently case study solutions to the necessary research would be useful.

The case studies in the thesis will help identify the context and degree of the merger attempted, emphasising the large range of possible degrees of merger.

Basically, a merger is the combination of two or more organisations to form one entity, while integration is the process following merger when components of the two organisations are combined. … … The process of integration can take years (Harman and Meek, 1988 p 112).

The term “network university” is also used in this thesis as a short hand term to refer to the second of the “mergers” relating to the university located at Armidale in the following sequence:

- Pre-1989: the University of New England
- Post-1993: the University of New England
Amalgamation or merger is one of the ways linking institutions. Table 2.7 presents a continuum of linking institutions.

**Table 2.7: Organisation Linkage Continuum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voluntary Cooperative Agreement</th>
<th>Formalised Consortium</th>
<th>Federation</th>
<th>Amalgamation to form new Unitary Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>Unitary Structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Harman and Meek, 1988 p 113)

At the far left of the continuum, is the voluntary co-operative agreement between two or more institutions. Such an agreement may be enacted by the simple exchange of letters between institution heads, or they may take the form of formal, legal agreement. Examples of formal agreements are the arrangements whereby various independent research or teaching institutions or university residential halls affiliate with universities, or where institutions agree to co-operate in some activity or to share a resource (Harman and Meek, 1988 p 112).

Next is the formalised consortium, which is usually formed to provide a common service to participating institutions. In such arrangements, apart from the agreed area of common activity, the participating institutions are able to pursue autonomous directions. Moving along the continuum the next two types of organisational arrangements are federations and unitary institutions. In a federation, responsibility and authority are divided between the participating institutions and an over-arching body. In a unitary structure there is a single coordinating authority and organisation structure (Harman and Meek, 1988 p 112). How is the pressure towards amalgamation explained? What is seen in the case studies, with respect to renewed pressure for amalgamation of higher education institutions, can be seen as part of an international trend:

> Amalgamations are not a new phenomenon by any means in higher education systems in western societies, but their incidence clearly has become much greater and more marked over the past couple of decades or so (Harman and Meek, 1988 p 115).

This can be seen in the experience of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands (Harman and Meek, 1988 p 112).

Mergers can come in many different forms which in turn can affect the difficulty of achieving a combination of separate structures likely to emerge and the success of the effort. The first distinction to make is between voluntary and involuntary mergers. A voluntary merger is where two or more institutions initiate a merger themselves, rather than the merger being initiated by the
Government. Most mergers in Australia have been involuntarily, resulting from government direction or at least encouragement (Harman, 1999 p 7).

In many mergers in the public higher education sector in Australia, and elsewhere, there is often a combination of motivations at work. Even where there is clear government direction or pressure, some institutions enthusiastically wish to proceed while in other cases senior managers use government direction as a tool to help convince staff to support a merger that they personally favour. Different examples of merger can be identified in the case study research. For example Harman has observed that a distinction can also be made between consolidations and acquisitions. A consolidation takes place when one participating institution continues largely unaffected, with other institutions being absorbed. In the case of acquisitions the merger process involves all participating institutions coming together to establish a different organisation.

Harman also points out that mergers can be cross-sectoral:

Prior to the late 1980s, most Australian mergers took place in the CAE sector, whereas many of the amalgamations of the late 1980s brought together former universities and former CAEs (Harman, 1999 p 7).

Cross sectoral mergers can pose special problems especially when different sectors have distinctly different missions and roles … As Meek has noted, cross-sectoral mergers raise special difficulties, particularly with regard to matters such as funding, coordination and course accreditation. However cross-sectoral mergers provide opportunities in terms of creating innovative academic programs, which offer a broader range of courses, often-closer contact with the community and creation of entirely new organisational structures and activities (Meek, 1987a p 3)

Furthermore:

Mergers in the public sector are traumatic experiences for all involved, with merger negotiations being conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy and intrigue in which an external investigator may not be welcome. A second problem is that mergers are complex processes involving a wide range of actors; affecting academic activities, management, staff and students; and often extending over many months or even years. This complexity presents a major challenge for researchers. In many cases, even telling the basic story of what happened involves considerable effort and skill (Harman, 1999 pp 9 - 10).

Consequently the case studies undertaken for this thesis focus on the principal factors involved and do not account for minor variables and issues that may have had a bearing on the outcome. Another issue is that it is not possible to predict
what the outcome might have been if the two or more institutions concerned had not entered into a merger. Consequently each case study, and the broader conclusions, need to be qualified in any over-all judgement of the results of this research.

It has been noted that people, not organisations, bring about mergers: “Much of the merger process involves human ability, foresight and idiosyncrasies, factors that are difficult if not impossible to control” (Meek, 1987b p 104). Each merger can be considered as a stand-alone example and compared to others such as those of this thesis. The emphasis by Dawkins on voluntary mergers in the Australian context in the 1980s and 1990s could mean every point of negotiation was open to dispute and unique to a given merger context. Consequently, to be successful, all proposed mergers require strong leadership, and voluntary mergers most likely require a core of institutional elites in the institutions involved who are committed to the proposal and prepared to push it through despite opposition. The achievement of a successful merger requires skilful leaders, dedicated to the idea of change but the merger process does not transcend normal organisational politics and conflicts. These factors can be fleshed out best in a case study approach to inform analysis and discussion.

Furthermore various groups within the organisation, such as faculties, can be expected to endeavour to maintain their positions of power and influence both before and after the merger has been attempted, and as a consequence analysis of their role would be helpful to understanding these facets. This becomes particularly apparent in cases where groups from different institutions have similar functions, so that a merger between the institutions will mean these groups compete with one another over such matters as status and prestige (the greater the similarity, the greater the competition):

Change always involves some degree of inter- and intra-organisational conflict, and even if a group looses out in the initial round of negotiations, its members can be expected to attempt to recoup their losses during the implementation phase (Meek, 1987b p 105).
The case study approach adopted in this thesis is thus a good opportunity to
determine whether this has occurred. In addition it is likely that the post-merger
experience would not be painless:

Mergers involve dramatic change, the death of established institutions and the
creation of new ones. Mergers affect the lives of everyone involved, from Vice-
Chancellors and Directors to secretaries and cleaning staff. To merge is to
change … there is no such thing as painless social change (Meek, 1987b p 106).

Consequently it can be expected, in most instances of merger that there will be a
rich source of data of the events, making possible a useful account of the
circumstances, using a case study approach. The benefits of a merger may not be
obvious for some years and consequently the case study approach adopted in this
thesis is broad enough to accommodate this issue.

Moreover mergers do not accomplish miracles; they merely change the pattern of
social interaction within the participating organisations:

During the negotiation phase of a merger, staff often wants guarantees about the
future. They want assurances that there will be no shortfalls in funding, or that
funding will actually be increased. They want guarantees that new and major
research initiatives will be achieved, that teaching will be improved and offered
to a larger, better qualified and more highly motivated group of students, and so
on. It is quite understandable why people seek such guarantees, though they are
impossible to provide (Meek, 1987b p 107).

The case study approach adopted in this thesis offers a fairly clear statement about
the potential gains (educational and material) that may result in a particular
merger. Consequently whether or not substantial achievements actually result
from merger is dependent on the operational context which will be identified in
case studies within the thesis. Further, forces that lead to merger usually originate
primarily, but not solely, externally consequently each case study has its own mix
of external and internal drivers to merger which are accounted for in each case
study and there is a regional and local circumstance to each case study which
needs to be identified.

To be part of the Unified National System, Australian tertiary institutions had to
meet minimum student loads. For many institutions, consolidation with another
institution became necessary for continued funding. The actual minimum figures
for student load seem to have been plucked out of the air – it would appear that they do not have a solid research base to justify their use. The Green and White Papers attribute great benefits in consolidation but this may vary greatly in individual contexts. Dawkins believed that better facilities and services, and more flexibility in teaching and research loads, would follow merger, and that larger institutions offer education, economic and other benefits, including a wider range of courses. He also believed that larger institutions tend to be more flexible, responsive to community needs and better able to manage their affairs. The Dawkins approach emphasises possible savings in merging adjacent institutions rather than problems or costs. Consequently, context identified in the case studies of the thesis can be expected to throw light on this topic (Harman and Meek, 1988 p 111).

**Educational and Related Benefits**

The Green Paper argued that larger institutions offered a number of educational and related benefits:

1. Students would be able to choose from a wider range of educational offerings, wider scope for transfer between disciplines with a maximum academic credit, better facilities such as libraries and computing centres and other services;
2. For staff the wider range of courses and programs enhances professional networking, provides more flexibility in apportionment of teaching and research loads and broader promotional opportunities; and
3. For institutions they provide wider scope to develop research infrastructure and substantial efficiencies of scale (Harman, 1999 pp 21 - 22).

These aspects are examined broadly to see if they apply in relation to each case study in the thesis.

Harman has analysed the factors that enhance success or failure in tertiary education mergers. In summary, these include:

1. A strong commitment to merger by participating institutions and their staffs, with strong leadership from heads of participating institutions;
2. A shared view of threat facing the current institutions and /or a shared vision of the future potential benefits from the merger;
3. Wide consultation with staff and their involvement in planning and integration processes and transparency in key decision making processes;
4. Guarantees given as soon as possible to staff about security of employment and to continuing students for continuity in courses;
5. A well thought out plan for merger negotiations and implementation of any merger agreement, and speed in achieving the merger once the agreement has been reached;
6. A decision as early as possible about the name of the new institution; and
7. Strong efforts to build a sense of loyalty to the new institution and a common culture (Harman, 1999 p 25).

These aspects are dealt with in the context of each of the case studies in the thesis.

**Case Studies**

To facilitate analysis, the following case studies were undertaken as examples of the success of the merger process, developed at the time of the Dawkins-led process of reform of the tertiary education sector.

**Monash University Amalgamations**

There was strong State and Federal leadership encouraging amalgamations in Victoria. For example, in May 1988 the Victorian Government established the Higher Education Consultative Committee to advise the Victorian authorities on proposals for amalgamation, affiliation or change of status or role of Victorian higher education institutions. It was envisaged that support would be considered for proposals that had the support of institutions or interest groups involved and which would not have a detrimental effect on education. This initiative and others were independent of the federally-led mergers (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 51). In this context the merger of Monash University, the Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education and the Chisholm Institute of Technology was proposed in 1990. The new Monash was designed with about 20,000 (EFTSU) and geographic coverage of a quarter of the State. The general view about the merger at the time was that it would be successful due to the extensive nature of the Monash network of institutions and the continued viability of the merged institution (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 pp 52 - 55). Thesis research has established that the new Monash was geographically widespread and far-flung and that the resultant strategy envisaged further amalgamations in the later 1990s.
University of New England Amalgamations

In 1988 New South Wales announced its own initiative in the higher education sector. In October 1988 the New South Wales Office of Further Education distributed a position paper *The Future Structure of Higher Education in New South Wales* and proposed a new structure for higher education in the State, with seven networks to cover all existing universities and colleges of advanced education (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 28). In this policy context, New South Wales decided to establish a new university to be entitled the University of New England (UNE) and to be formed through an amalgamation of the-then University of New England (located at Armidale), the Armidale College of Advanced Education (ACAE), and the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education (NRCAE) located at Lismore. In August 1988 the Heads of Agreement to amalgamate were signed by each institution. The consolidated new university was to have a combined student load of 9,000 EFTSU. In the event only the amalgamation of UNE with Armidale College of Advanced Education was successful (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 pp 38 - 40).

This thesis establishes that the amalgamation with the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education was not successful due in part to the considerable differences in culture between the established UNE and Northern Rivers CAE. The culture of the UNE was traditional and scholarly in character. The Northern Rivers CAE was more modern and entrepreneurial. There was insufficient common ground when considering educational enhancements and the future direction of the new university. There was also considerable conflict at the individual Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and institutional level due to different interpretations of policy goals, and to personal styles of leadership. Moreover the thesis research highlights the absence of effective leadership during the move to merger. It is also clear that much of the growth of the new university would be at the Northern Rivers CAE campus and this factor reinforced the incentive for independence by the Northern Rivers CAE. The pattern of financial assistance favoured growth factors and this provided for further incentive for the Northern Rivers CAE to remain apart from the proposed merger. The stand-alone
mentalities of both UNE at Armidale and Northern Rivers at Lismore undermined the basis of the proposed network. There is not much detail on the public record as to the merger between UNE at Armidale and Armidale College of Advanced Education but this merger was successful as both institutions were contiguous and believed the merger would prove essential to guarantee adequate funding, especially for new buildings.

**ANU Amalgamations**

In December 1988 Dawkins introduced legislation to amalgamate the Australian National University (ANU), the Canberra College of Advanced Education (CCAE) and the Canberra Institute of the Arts (CITA) (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 95). The new institution was to be named the Australian National University and initially a Memorandum of Understanding was developed to facilitate the merger. However only the Australian National University merger with the Canberra Institute of Arts succeeded.

Research indicates that debate on the proposal was widespread in the Territory and the Australian Senate. Sections of the Australian National University openly snubbed the proposal to amalgamate with the Canberra College of Advanced Education. However support was always strong, particularly among staff, for the established Australian National University and the Canberra Institute of the Arts (which was on a site contiguous to the established Australian National University) to amalgamate. Close personal relationships between the established Australian National University and staff at the Canberra Institute of the Arts also facilitated this aspect of the proposed merger. The thesis research also noted the near-total absence of effective leadership during the move to merge. Australian Capital Territory self-government (announced in this period) also complicated the issue as the local Legislative Assembly clearly supported the status quo. The development of financial links with the Assembly provided incentive for the Canberra College of Advanced Education to remain apart from the Australian National University and the Canberra Institute of the Arts. The Canberra College of Advanced Education later chose to become a university in its own right in association with Monash University in Victoria.
There were several major working parties and a committee of enquiry relevant to the merger set up at Federal level, and later also at Territory level (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 pp 95 - 97). The ANU Institute of Advanced Studies was reviewed separately in late 1990 by a Committee headed by Sir Ninian Stephens (a former Governor-General). Soon after, this review was in turn examined by Professor Ian Chubb (to determine the implications for the ANU) who recommended that the Faculties of the ANU (responsible for undergraduate teaching) merge with the University of Canberra. The Chubb recommendations caused uproar at the ANU and elsewhere and consequently the option considered by Chubb lapsed.

**The Contexts of the Reforms**

The following contexts were identified (using concepts developed by Cerych and Sabatier 1986) in the process of research undertaken for the case studies of the thesis, and are discussed more fully in Chapter 7.

**System Change**

The environment for change had built up steadily since the 1960s. Dawkins was only acknowledging what had become widely believed. The strong support shown for the Government Green and White Papers was only possible because of the pioneering work and leadership of many people who persuaded Dawkins to take action. The decision to abolish the distinction between colleges of advanced education and universities, taken by Dawkins, was seen as a valid response by all levels of government, the community, and the tertiary education sector. Motives for change in this area coincided with aims to develop the future tenure and interests of the colleges of advanced education and the universities. The gain in academic status of the colleges of advanced education proved to be a powerful incentive for change for the colleges. Universities took the opportunity to offer more relevant courses and expand their community presence. The sector was engineered in many instances so that the new universities were now medium to large universities.
**A Causal Theory**

The financial package, and the widespread recognition of the need for change, facilitated structural changes based on the theory that bigger universities would be more economic and efficient and a source of greater educational diversity. The limited time available for the merger process was sufficient for many new institutions to be created. Of the case studies undertaken only the Monash University mergers were wholly successful. Individual circumstances in the case of the ANU and the University of New England proposals were too influential for the proposals to succeed in these locations, given the absence of effective pro-merger leadership. There was a strong and sufficient causal link between the financial package developed and final results nationally but there were exceptions. In the words of the Task Force on Amalgamations:

In the evidence currently available concerning imminent and agreed amalgamations it is likely that by 1990 the unified national system of higher education will consist of less than 40 member institutions, ranging in size up to 22,400 (equivalent full time student units). The majority of these will be larger than the 8,000 (equivalent full time student units) indicated in the White Paper as required to support the development of broadly based research infrastructure. All but a few institutions will be above the 5,000 (equivalent full time student units) required to support a substantial, though narrower and necessarily more selective range of research and higher degree programs. Most institutions will have a broad and well balanced educational profile with a wide range of both undergraduate and postgraduate awards (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 101).

**Fixers and Advocates**

The role of leaders such as Dawkins, State and Territory leaders, university, college and public service CEOs was very important and intrinsic to the whole process of change and new institution development. In general, State and Territory efforts coincided with the broad aims of Dawkins. CEO leadership was also very important but could be constrained by immediate concerns of survival, control and institution design preference. No one fixer or advocate dominated the merger process. Dawkins’ leadership and oversight was possible due to the status of his position and the wider need for change, widely supported at the time. Dawkins made strong efforts to communicate and sell his process to the tertiary education sector and State and Territory governments. They were directed appropriately in a complex system of government relations, and emphasised
institution autonomy. Dawkins was well supported by advisors and public servants in Canberra and by State and Territory Ministers and officials. Support was also gained from, and articulated by, many university CEOs who strongly believed in the ideas of the Green and White papers. More importantly, Dawkins was able to lead, develop and coordinate Federal leadership in a way that recognised and facilitated change.

**Changing Socio-Economic Conditions**

The economic environment of the day played its part in influencing the Dawkins package. Efficiency gains and widening the scope of the system were relied on to boost national competitiveness. Government finance was strongly influential and made practical many in-principle mergers. The development of a unified national system was not dependent on fiscal or other external restraints. Capacity for private funding of university fees was later considered and developed to modify the very large commitments involved. This further development is not an object of the case study research that examines the merger process and its significance.

**Implications of Research for a Stages Model**

The overview in this thesis, the national situation, and the case study material all suggest that in practice the implementation identified was concerned primarily with the creation and instigation of new mergers to create medium and large institutions within a short time frame. Virtually no attempt was made to reformulate the merger program at the Federal level, due possibly to the pressure of electoral cycles and the time limit set for it.

**Limitation and Scope of the Research**

The research undertaken of the Dawkins process, and the case studies selected, was thorough but any conclusions would need to be qualified by acknowledging that the focus of the study—the merger of colleges of advanced education and universities in the 1980s and 1990s—was only one aspect of the work of John Dawkins. The development of a new scheme of student funding of university fees (the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS)), the recruitment and role of overseas students, and offshore activities overseas of Australian tertiary education
institutions are examples of the policies of John Dawkins not focused on or researched in this thesis. Resourcing for this research was adequate and made possible the thesis research but was limited and consequently, although sufficient, was a constraint.

Many of the participants in the Dawkins reform process had moved on since their activities in that process. Some are now deceased and others could not be contacted. Consequently, although those interviewed were helpful, responses were limited to those available at the time of the study. The recollection of those interviewed was sometimes imperfect and consequently this also impacted on the work of the thesis research activities. Records held by Government Departments and institutions were sometimes limited or restricted to those documents regarded as not containing highly sensitive material. One institution would not permit access to its Government relations file for the Dawkins period because of such sensitivities. Consequently although the thesis research was useful and permitted adequate insight there were restrictions which limited the case studies and understanding of policy development of the period.

**Overall Observation**

The case study data and published material supports the observation that in the public sector political sensitivities tend to dominate the design and planning by managers of the implementation process. Much of the thesis data indicates that short-term contexts are very limiting for implementers, especially given constraints on time or information available to adjust implementation and redevelop policy design. Models of implementation should reflect this reality more often. Practical realities limit, in most operative contexts, the opportunity of those responsible for policy to adjust or redefine policy because of the constraints involved. Leadership competencies can differ substantially between those responsible for operative contexts. Consequently leaders can differ significantly in ability and opinion concerning the management of the complexity involved in individual cases. This can be seen in the analysis of each of the case studies undertaken in this thesis.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This chapter makes explicit the features of the research design and methodology adopted in the thesis. The limitations of the method selected and the possibility of bias are also discussed to inform the reader of the limitations of the study results imposed by the design and practical realities encountered when the study was undertaken.

Qualitative Research

The method used in this study was qualitative research:

Qualitative researchers study spoken and written representations and records of human experience, using multiple methods and multiple sources of data (Punch, 1998 p 174).

Consistent with this understanding in-depth interviews were undertaken of individuals who could throw light on the Dawkins’ reform process, the public record held by the Federal Department now responsible for education and university institution records and published reports was scrutinised. The process of conceptualisation and identification of major issues, questions and propositions occurred in the framework of a research design that was based on the predominant use of qualitative data and an ethnographic-inductive approach (Kellehear, 1993 p 23). As Kellehear notes this is an approach, based on that favoured by anthropologists, in which the ethnographer attempts to understand the commonsense meanings and experiences of the participants of a social system (Kellehear, 1993, pp 20 - 21). The purpose of the research design was to provide a method and strategy that would provide a meaningful analysis of the research topic namely, leadership as an essential factor in the successful implementation of policy.

Thirty-three individuals (politicians, public servants, academics and a former Governor-General) who participated in the reform processes, and had held senior positions at the time, were approached for interview. A former NSW Minister for Education (at the time of the Dawkins reforms) declined, leaving thirty-two usable interviews. Interviews varied in length between half an hour and an hour’s duration and were semi-structured in the sense that they began with a list of topics
to be covered, but each interview was allowed to take its course by following the lead of the person being interviewed (an important technique in reducing bias in qualitative research). Interviews were conducted mostly in 2001 and 2002, on a confidential basis. This was important in obtaining consent. Subjects are therefore not identified. One former Senior Minister was interviewed more than once to clarify information and comment that had been collected.

Pre-study interviews were conducted with a senior academic and public servant. This provided valuable feedback for the development of appropriate questions for later interviews. Later interviewees were selected through a process of “snowball sampling”, in which a few individuals who were contacted personally and interviewed, referred other people in their networks, who then referred yet to further contacts. Interviews were mostly conducted in the offices of interviewees, but also in cafes and at the university. “Snowball sampling” is one of the two most common sampling techniques in qualitative research. It is particularly suited to studying groups where access can be a problem, being a successful way of gaining access to a very busy and wary target group. Being referred by someone they trusted was important as it was fundamental to the way they could successfully operate and take part in the interview process (Maley, 2002 p 49).

A qualitative method was chosen for several reasons. The research aims to determine how implementation of amalgamations policy was handled in Australian universities (and especially the role of leadership therein) and to examine the implications of this for implementation theory, through exploration of the experiences and perceptions of individuals, and variations in behaviour, called for a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. The study aimed to reveal the reality of the phenomenon in some depth and detail based on the personal experiences of participants (Maley, 2002 p 51). Qualitative methods, particularly ethnographic, unstructured interviewing, permit one to “understand and capture the points of view of other people without predetermining those points of view through prior selection of questionnaire categories” (Patton, 1990 p 24).

An important aim of the thesis was to capture a range of different types of participants in the reform process and to distinguish where possible leadership
behaviour. A qualitative approach is effective for highly individualised situations and suited to capturing and understanding variations in behaviour (Patton, 1990 p 17). It is also a methodology suited to incorporating multiple perspectives (Strauss and Corbin, 1994 p 280).

Investigations were not restricted to elite interviewing. Access was made to Government and related reports and other published sources of the period. Permission was sought and gained to investigate relevant archives of the Federal Department responsible for education, and the institution records of Monash University (which included those of the Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education and Chisholm Institute of Technology and the Victorian College of Pharmacy), the Australian National University, University of Canberra and Canberra Institute of the Arts, and the University of New England, Armidale College of Advanced Education and Southern Cross University. State archives in Victoria and New South Wales were unable to locate relevant files and consequently their records were excluded from the study. The Federal Department responsible for education advised that it had destroyed its policy files for Victorian amalgamations and consequently this material could not be supplied. The archives permitted the development of detailed case studies of three examples of university amalgamations in the study. Monash University was chosen because of its overall success, University of New England, Armidale Teachers College and Southern Cross University (then Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education) because this amalgamation only succeeded in part, and Australian National University and University of Canberra (then Canberra College of Advanced Education) and Canberra Institute of the Arts because this proposed amalgamation did not proceed.

Creswell considers a case study to be an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context:

This bounded system is bounded by time and place, and it is the case being studied – a program, an event, an activity, or individuals. For example, several programs (multi-site study) or single program (within-site study) might be selected (Creswell 1998 p 61).
In the case of this thesis three contrasting studies have been undertaken to provide multiple sources of information and throw more light on the research question. Stake (1994, p 237) has identified the three types of case studies: intrinsic studies where the interest is in the case itself, an instrumental case study where a particular case is studied to provide insight into an issue or refinement of a theory, and the collective case studies where a number of cases are chosen because it is believed that understanding them will lead to a better understanding and possibly better theorising about a still larger collection of cases. He notes that there is seldom a neat fit into this classification. This study has the principal elements of collective case studies.

**Comparative Method**

The three case study amalgamations were selected because each represented a significantly different outcome and individual circumstance. In comparing the three situations across a range of factors, it was hoped to extract several that varied between the three potential amalgamations in ways that were linked with the relative outcomes. This methodology is a variation of the “most similar” comparative methodology. According to Castles a ‘most similar’ strategy is one used when we seek to understand patterns of diversity. If one particular feature can be found in which otherwise similar cases differ we are entitled to suggest that this is attributable to one of the few other factors distinguishing them (Castles, 1991 p 5).

**Credibility Issues**

There are two issues which relate to the credibility or otherwise of qualitative studies and which should be addressed in designing a qualitative project. These are sampling and validity (Maley, 2002 p 52)

**Sampling**

In qualitative research, it is important to assess the adequacy of the sample and its representativeness to ensure that the study’s findings are meaningful:

> The aim of qualitative research is to elicit adequate data to reveal the variation and complexity of the phenomenon (Maley, 2002 p 52).
The variation among interviewees (demonstrated when interviewed) or in archival records, means that small samples had the potential to skew the analysis by covering only some interviewees or behaviours involved in the higher education sector:

To ensure there is adequate data, qualitative researchers keep interviewing until responses begin to be repetitive (termed saturation). Sampling ends when no new information emerges” (Maley, 2002 p 53).

In this study there began to be considerable repetition in interviews as the number of interviews approached thirty-five and this indicated further interviews were not necessary. Archival records, when searched, frequently demonstrated repetition. When this occurred unnecessary duplication was avoided by not copying the document for later analysis. Questions used at interviews were modified in light of responses at interviews and archival data.

Qualitative research does not produce statistically representative samples. However samples are representative in other ways, for example in their coverage of most types or aspects of a phenomenon. Because sampling was not random, the sample group is not statistically representative. (The data was not collected randomly and all possible subjects (individuals and archival material) did not have the opportunity to participate in the study). This is common in qualitative research, especially elite interviewing (Maley, 2002 p 53).

How valid the findings of a study are depend on the credibility of both the data and the interpretation of the data. The search for validity is approached differently in qualitative research from quantitative research (Maley, 2002 p 55).

For example Minichello et al suggest that ensuring validity in in-depth interviewing involves staying “close to the empirical world in order to ensure a close fit between the data and what people actually say and do” and “being concerned with the … correctness of one’s understanding of the informant’s perceptions, view, attitudes and behaviours (Minichello et al, 1995 p 176). “There are several ways of checking the validity of qualitative research. These include triangulation and cross checking” (Maley, 2002 p 55).

**Triangulation**

In qualitative research, triangulation involves the use of more than one method or more than one source of data. It may also involve the use of more than one theory or more than one researcher (Maley, 2002 p 55).
The term triangulation is taken from land surveying. Patton comments that:

… knowing a single landmark only locates you somewhere along a line in a direction from the landmark, whereas with two landmarks you can take bearings in two directions and locate yourself at their intersection (Patton, 1990 p 187).

In this case the study was designed so that three sources of data could be relied on to test the consistency of the material gained through interviews, archival searches and published reports and related documents. The data obtained through interviews was very helpful in clarifying the reliability of archives material which was selective of opinion at the time and not necessarily comprehensive or unbiased. “Multiple perspectives increased the depth and complexity of the analysis. There is no single objective reality, but rather, all views are ‘situated’” (Minichello et al, 1995 p 188). The researcher’s role is not to adjudicate between participants’ competing versions but to understand the situated work they do (Maley, 2002 p 56). Incorporating three views added to the richness and complexity of the data, and produced a more complete picture of the phenomenon.

Patton notes that triangulation seldom produces a single, totally consistent picture (Patton, 1990 p 467). An interesting aspect of the triangulation in this study was that in general the accounts of advisers and public servants and academics were very similar. In the case of two exceptions the accounts of ministerial advisors and academics of the institutions concerned were in conflict and demonstrated how sensitive the amalgamation issue continues to be in the case of those institutions. Such discrepancies were not common but when they occurred had several explanations. One is those interviews with former politicians and their staff was somewhat formal and unlike other participants they often maintained an ‘official’ stance in interviews. This is understandable as, even with assurances of anonymity, former politicians and their staff always expect that their utterances may be publicly cited. Those approached including former politicians and their staff as the public figures associated with the period also had the incentive to have history recorded as they would like it to be and this some times led to conflict over opinion and memory of those concerned.
Cross Checking

“Another way of testing the validity of qualitative research is to check findings against other sources and perspectives, termed cross checking” (Maley, 2002 p 57). Research findings were developed into three case studies using this method. One case study was referred to an established researcher familiar with the archives of the institution concerned to check for accuracy and interpretation of events. The archival material of the Commonwealth Ministry responsible for education was also used to ensure comprehensiveness and accurate interpretation of events and was a valuable supplement to institution archival data especially where institution records were not as substantial.

Insider/Outsider Status

It is worth considering the insider/outside status of the researcher (Maley, 2002 p 57). I was a public servant of thirty years standing and former consultant and lobbyist, and prior to my present status of academic researcher I spent three years working in the Higher Education Division of the Federal Department responsible for education. Although not working in the Higher Education Division at the time of the Dawkins reforms I could be perceived by academics, public servants, and former politicians as an insider on higher education policy development. On the one hand “insiders” can claim to have special knowledge of their own group, which means they bring special insight and discernment to the tasks of interviewing and interpreting data. They may see different problems and pose different questions to “outsiders” and have insight into nuances of behaviour not understood by others. On the other hand there are claims that “insiders” may be biased in researching a group known to them. This latter view does not acknowledge that “outsiders” also bring value-laden assumptions to the task of research, and cannot be said to be “objective” (Minichello et al, 1995 pp 82 - 186).

My experience as a consultant/lobbyist, public servant and academic researcher gave me several advantages in this project. It facilitated access to other consultants, advisers, public servants and academics by providing known individuals with whom to begin the “snowball sampling”, whose experiences and viewpoints I could gauge and compare (Maley, 2002 p 58). It increased my
understanding of how to approach each group and adjust my methods to their working conditions. It helped in decoding the meanings of what they said or what was written about them in archival material and in understanding the context of their behaviour. “It alerted me to the complexity of the situation” (Maley, 2002 p 58). It also enabled me to have a good rapport with them when interviewing. Good rapport is critical in eliciting rich and meaningful data in qualitative research, as Fontana and Frey suggest: “Close rapport with respondents opens doors to more informed research”. My background was explained in the course of interviews and this often seemed to relax and open up the interviewees much more as they thought I understood the situations they were describing (Fontana and Frey, 1994 p 367).

I believe my own experience enabled me to obtain richer, more complex data and to interpret it in light of an intimate understanding of the political and administrative processes involved. Patton suggests that “Closeness does not make bias and loss of perspective inevitable; distance is no guarantee of objectivity. Rather than detachment and distance, what guarantees valid research is neutrality” (Maley, 2002 p 58). Patton also refers to the concept of empathic neutrality: “Empathy … is a stance toward the people one encounters, while neutrality is a stance toward the findings”. I aimed therefore to take a stance of emphatic neutrality throughout this research (Patton, 1990 p 58).

In summary, the research method adopted in the thesis was qualitative. The analysis of one case study was checked with an established researcher familiar with the archives of the institution concerned. Interviews undertaken were semi-structured and often led to suggestions by participants of additional interviewees. This process was continued until sufficient numbers of people had been interviewed. Archival data was similarly checked until sufficient information had been obtained. The comparative method chosen was a variation of the “most similar” methodology.
CHAPTER 4: SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION — THE MONASH Mergers

This chapter is concerned with the developments in the 1980s and sometimes later which led to the merger of Monash University, the Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education, the Chisholm Institute of Technology and the Victoria College of Pharmacy. This case study is of interest because the belief is widespread that the merger was successful, even given the complex nature of the leadership, government relations, resourcing and institutional design required. The merger was made possible by the leadership shown by Mal Logan the then Vice-Chancellor of Monash University. Logan was responsible for the development and direction of the successful merger process.

Institutional Profiles

The pre-existing Monash University, which became the centrepiece of a new university arrangement and which retained “Monash” as the new merged-university name, was already a large institution located in Clayton, a suburb twenty kilometres to the south-east of Melbourne CBD. Details of the merger appear in Table 4.1 below. It had a broad profile and included engineering, law and medicine courses (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 53).

Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education was a small multidisciplinary college situated at Churchill, a town about one hundred and sixty kilometres east of Melbourne. As might be expected given the rural nature of the region (which had a dispersed population) the Institute had become a major provider of external studies. It is estimated that in the 1980s about sixty-two percent of the students were enrolled externally and that sixty percent of the students undertook studies within the fields of social science, education and business administration. The remainder studied applied science, engineering, health sciences and visual arts. It
is also notable that in the 1980s about one third of the Institute student level was at the sub-degree level (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 53).

**Chisholm Institute of Technology** in the 1980s was based at two campuses: Caulfield in the inner south of Melbourne, and Frankston in the outer south east of Melbourne. The institution was already of significant size. It offered programs in technology, applied science, business art, design, and social and behavioural sciences. It was estimated that in the 1980s twenty percent of the Institute student load was at sub-degree level. Higher degree students at the Institute were only a small proportion (1%) of students and specialised mostly in science and business (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 54)

**The Victorian College of Pharmacy** was located in the inner part of Melbourne, in the vicinity of the University of Melbourne. It was the principal provider of professional entry programs to the pharmaceutical profession in Victoria.

Table 4.1: Consolidation of Monash University (1987-1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution in 1987</th>
<th>Student load EFTSU</th>
<th>Institution in 1994</th>
<th>Student load EFTSU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monash University</td>
<td>11812</td>
<td>Monash University</td>
<td>28681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chisholm IT</td>
<td>5196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gippsland IAE</td>
<td>1818</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victorian College of Pharmacy</td>
<td>385</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Marginson, 2000 p 61)

The result of the merger of these institutions was a large multi-campus, multidisciplinary, university with geographical coverage of a quarter of Victoria. It reflects the policy priority to reshape the tertiary education sector in Victoria and to facilitate medium to large, multi-purpose, tertiary institutions.
The Amalgamation Process

Monash University in the 1980s evolved ideas, policies and leadership which influenced its operational environment and ambitions for the future. These internal factors meant that the university took early opportunities to develop, participate in and evidence change in the tertiary education sector. The leadership role of Mal Logan who became Vice-Chancellor over the merger period was important. Mal Logan was politically well connected with Senator John Button (who became at about this time the Commonwealth Minister responsible for industry) and was a key player in developing good relations between universities and industry: “A friend of Monash’s Mal Logan, he also became one of the links between the university and the government “ (Marginson, 2000 p 52). The choice of Mal Logan as Vice-Chancellor on 7 February 1987 reflected concerns of this nature. An indication of Logan’s approach was given as Deputy Vice-Chancellor, when he wrote in 1986 a statement of university objectives:

The university is conscious of its place in, and its responsibility toward Australia’s economic and social progress. No university of calibre can walk away from the economic and social transformation that has to occur in Australia over the next decade. We are currently studying our role, being aware of our responsibilities, as well, of the economic waters through which we have to chart a course (Logan, 1986).

From the early days of his involvement with Monash, Logan attempted to revitalise and redirect organisation strategies, and to overcome weaknesses, so as to modernise the university, and have it become relevant to current and longer-term needs. This was at a time when there was already a growing emphasis on professionalised management and corporate-like leadership by the university sector. Initiatives taken in the United Kingdom were influential. In April 1984 the British Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals instituted the Jarrat Committee to report on university management. The Committee noted:

Vice-Chancellors will always have differences of style arising from their own personalities; yet we do discern a more fundamental change, which is increasingly taking place. The tradition of Vice-Chancellors being scholars first and acting as a chairman of the Senate carrying out its will, rather than leading it strongly, is changing. The shift to the style of chief executive, bearing responsibility for leadership and effective management of the institution, is emerging and likely to all the more necessary for the future (Marginson, 2000 pp 71 - 72).
In 1985 Monash University Council formed a small committee to examine the senior leadership structure of the university. The chair of the committee was Sir James McNeill a member of Council and a senior executive of Broken Hill Proprietary Limited. The McNeill Committee was impressed by the Jarrat Report and like Jarrat, McNeill and his associates focused on the managerial aspects of leadership. It was noted that there had been little change in administrative structure at Monash since 1960. It had served the university well but the committee argued that there had been insufficient time put aside for future planning and strongly lobbied for Mal Logan’s future appointment to a very senior level. In late 1984 Monash Council established a search committee for the position of Vice-Chancellor due to the expected retirement of the then-incumbent. The selection committee developed a set of criteria including vision, a record of interaction outside universities, and a commitment to scholarship and the traditional goals of higher education. The committee after a tight selection process unanimously recommended Logan to be Vice-Chancellor after a bridging appointment as Deputy Vice-Chancellor for 12 months commencing late 1985 (see page 105) (Marginson, 2000 pp 76 - 77).

In March 1987 Logan advised his sense of mission along the lines indicated by the Jarrat and McNeill Committees to the Monash Council, indicating he “was working towards upgrading the roles of the Development Committee of the Professorial Board and the Planning Committee of Council in determining planning objectives for the university” (Monash University Council, 1987). He visited all departments “in an attempt to heighten morale and encourage self-evaluation as opposed to the passive process of merely demanding more resources.” He also said “the university must proceed by seeking out new initiatives and new niches for future endeavour and, where necessary, to find ways of closing down non-productive areas of activity” (Monash University Council, 1987). The management style of Logan can be clearly seen as relating to big issues but personal agreements and loyalties were always subordinated to considerations of leadership. For example he wrote to academic staff the following:

At this stage of Monash’s development it is imperative that we position ourselves in such a way as to maintain our standing as one of the major Australian universities. I believe we are about to see significant changes to the
categorisation of higher education institutions, changes could result in there being fewer institutions funded as universities, that is, where it is recognised that both teaching and research activities have to be properly funded (Logan, 1987a).

Staff frequently gave vigorous responses often in the form of open dialogue at the invitation of Logan. At this stage Logan once told them:

The main disappointment I felt after reading all replies was that we are a fairly introspective university: there were relatively few references to the community outside the university, very few suggestions about its expectations and how we might turn these to our advantage, little mention of fee-paying overseas students and about the quality of our own students, very few references to a role for Monotech (a consulting company owned by the university) or about the competitive position we are in relative to other tertiary institutions … I am convinced all these external factors must become clearly defined parts of our future agenda (Logan, 1987a).

“In summary the academic staff responded voluminously about research qualities and about money, staff and space shortages but no-one mentioned associating with other institutions” (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 1) p 3).

Importantly, Logan also explained the nature of the leadership commitment he expected. For example, he told a committee of Deans:

We will need a vision that hopefully excites imagination, a direction of travel not a rather uncertain future, guidelines that lead to priority-setting, initiatives that respond to our comparative advantages, mechanisms that allow us to measure how well we meet our objectives, incentives and flexibility in staffing, new ways of approaching research funding and great improvement in management skills of Department Chairmen and other senior officers … By a well thought out strategy plan we have the capacity to set an agenda for a debate about this university’s future and indeed about the future of the entire binary system (Logan, 1987b).

The focus of this style of commitment by Monash led Logan to believe that the uncertainty of the binary system was a key factor within the external environment and that, although there were many emerging possibilities, the university should move to create its own future through leadership, by exploiting links with other institutions (see page 105) (Logan, 1987c).

Monash staff liked to make comparisons between the status and role of their institution and the established achievements of the University of Melbourne. For example, Logan acknowledged the following:
We are commonly perceived as the second among Victorian tertiary institutions but we do not have the unique advantages of the University of New South Wales with its strong technical base relative to the University of Sydney. There may be room for only one premier research based university in Victoria and we must realise that many would favour Melbourne for the role. Moreover, if the Victorian Government should decide that there is a need for a research oriented technical university that could even be RMIT (the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology).

In short, we are in danger of being left later a shortage of roles for Monash. There is an urgent need for very clear thinking on policy, resolute implementation and integrated determination in finding new revenue sources if Monash is to occupy the leading place among Victorian Universities.

I believe it is not too much to say that we are looking for a new identity, built on all the good things we have achieved in the past twenty-five years, but which will lead to a fresh surge of development. We need a force for change that is strong enough to transform an already large institution with aging security, with aging faculty staff (Logan, 1987c).

Logan announced a university leadership plan to fulfil these goals in a public lecture on 9 November 1987, a month before the Green Paper was released for discussion by Minister Dawkins in Canberra. He states in his plan:

We have to think in terms of opportunities rather than in terms of problems” and “I would like to see an entrepreneurial university in which change occurs not only because of necessity but because of prudence … in addition we must, I believe, be ready to take advantage of market opportunities” (Logan, 1987d).

Although Logan played his part as an advisor to Minister Dawkins (through membership of a group of senior academics advising Dawkins known as the Purple Circle), he viewed his leadership role as separate and independent. Dawkins has been quoted as saying the Purple Circle was involved in the preparation of the Green Paper (together with a lot of others) but Dawkins was firmly in control of the exercise. He had his leadership agenda clear (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 1) p 6). This should be seen in context. For example in July 1987, soon after the Federal election where the Hawke Labor Government was returned for a third term, Senator Button telephoned Logan and indicated that Cabinet believed higher education had an important role in economic restructuring but the economy was not performing as it should. The Senator also indicated that the growing tensions between colleges of advanced education and universities needed to be addressed (Marginson, 2000 p 54). Soon after this conversation Logan and Dawkins met in Melbourne where Logan suggested a quick review of the higher education sector. Dawkins’ response was to ask “Why go through that if we know
most of what is wrong with the system already?” Dawkins also insisted that it would be better to bring together a small group of people who might provide new ideas and useful feed back (Marginson, 2000 p 55). It therefore is reasonable to believe that although Logan’s leadership thinking was part of a given context, it developed from independent circumstances that were part of an overall reassessment throughout higher education in Australia at that time. Minister Dawkins’ own position made possible the convergence of thinking necessary for a sector-wide approach to be developed through the development of national policy.

Initially, the possibility of amalgamations was not recognised in Logan’s thinking. By March 1988 Logan advocated that the university would “Collaborate in terms of facility utilisation and teaching and research ventures, with Colleges of Advanced Education and with Institutes of Technology.” He also indicated that the Victorian Government had expressed concern at the small size of some institutions and that, as consequence, mergers would be appropriate. He therefore concluded:

> Monash is willing to explore opportunities in these proposals where it is clear that the merger is consistent with Monash University’s educational objectives and overall strategy for development (Logan, 1988a).

Consequently, Logan, after 12 months as Vice-Chancellor, had explored a vibrant leadership approach to university development and, given the publication of the Green Paper, was positioned strongly as a major change-maker and university leader in Victoria (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 1) p 7).

Following the Green Paper there was much discussion throughout higher education in Australia about the possibility of many amalgamations. It was possible that Logan knew amalgamations were likely from his role in the Purple Circle. Logan has denied this interpretation saying:

> The reality of mergers and amalgamations was not settled in the Green Paper. In our discussions leading up to it (in the Purple Circle) we did not talk about that at all. We talked about reform and restructuring in very general terms – the need to make universities more relevant to changes taking place in the economy as a whole. Having amalgamations emerged more in the transition from the Green to White Paper, which was more controlled by public servants – that’s where mergers got on the agenda. But I think it is fair to say that a few of us who were VCs and Directors of CAEs saw the value in merging. Bob Smith (at the time Vice-Chancellor of the University of New England) was one and I was one. Both of us were influenced by our experience in North America. We both had
taught at the University of Wisconsin and knew how that operated off a number of campuses. The North American style was to move things around, to give students more choice of subjects, to have greater efficiencies (O’Neill 1999 (Chapter 1) p 8).

However there is evidence that many senior staff at Monash could see the beginning of a new leadership era before the Green Paper and that amalgamations could play a strong part in the reform process. In the words of one senior Monash official:

My recollection is quite clear that work on our approach precedes government interest in mergers. We were always aware that we had started down the track before mergers became government policy. We didn’t go down the track because of the policy but saw real values in exploring possibilities … you do not need to be clever to see change was coming (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 1) p 9).

There was also speculation about mergers outside Monash University. O’Neill has found that in August 1987 the Chief Executive of the Victorian Department of Education sent Logan, and later discussed with him, a proposal for the reorganisation of post-secondary education in Victoria. RMIT would become a university and all other colleges of advanced education were to be amalgamated with the four existing universities (Deakin, Latrobe, Melbourne, and Monash). Each university would be given a single governing body with advisory bodies in each particular campus (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 1) p 9). Institutional arrangements and Government policy concerning further institutional networks continued to develop from that point in time. To facilitate restructuring in Victoria, the Victorian Government devised an institutional consultative committee (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 1) p 14). Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education and Chisholm Institute of Technology were soon interested in an association with Monash, and Monash with each of these. Contact with these institutions developed, first informally and later through formal exchanges (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 1) pp 14 - 22).

**Discussions between Monash and the Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education**

We first learn of the development of the Gippsland and Monash relationship through considering the issues raised at a September 1988 meeting of Chisholm Institute of Technology where it is revealed that Monash was actively pursuing a merger agreement with Gippsland. This was attractive to Monash due to ambitions sometimes reported in staff documents to gain a strong regional
perspective east of Melbourne, and to take on board at Monash the significant
distance education success of Gippsland (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 18). After
the White Paper had been published it became clear to Gippsland that proposals to
rationalise the number of distance education providers could see this function lost unless
it could be protected through merger with Monash (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2 p 14).

On 8 August 1988 Logan advised Monash Council that a relationship with
Gippsland had developed and that the capacity and function of Gippsland in
distance education provision beckoned as an attractive aspect of a more formal
and permanent association (see page 101):

My view is that Monash would be willing to contribute to distance education in
an expanded form through Gippsland. The arrangements would be subject to
Gippsland entering into an arrangement with Monash (Logan, 1988b).

Logan had effectively provided Gippsland an alternative to a merger with Deakin
University, which was also actively seeking an association with Gippsland and
other providers of distance education in Victoria at this time (O’Neill, 1999
(Chapter 2) p 14). The implications of all these overtures to Gippsland were
recognised by the Victorian Government. On 17 August 1988 the Victorian
Minister for Post-Secondary Education and Training issued a press statement
stating that the Victorian Government’s commitment to regional provision of
higher education would remain strong, especially for Victorians living beyond the
metropolitan area. The statement also encouraged Gippsland to seek association
with Deakin or Monash, and made clear continual State Government support for
Gippsland as a provider of distance education, if it chose to integrate with
Monash. The next day Gippsland issued a strong public statement in support of
association under the leadership of Monash (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 14). The
future direction Gippsland was to take became clearer in public debate which
followed as to how distance education provision in Victoria should be
rationalised. The Victorian State Minister for Post-Secondary Education (who
indicated acceptance of possibly two such providers in Victoria) challenged a
claim made by Deakin authorities that Monash would cease provision of distance
education if an association with Gippsland were developed. This led to wider
appreciation of the need for at least one distance provider in Victoria especially
after the presentation of the White Paper (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 17).
One provider of distance education in Victoria could mean the development of an association between Deakin and Gippsland. The view of the Director of Gippsland at this time is informative of this issue:

Whoever we amalgamated with, we would spend more time going to them than they would spend coming to us. It’s an hour and three quarters to Clayton and then another one- and-a-half hours to Deakin. So it was nearly double the time to Deakin and you would have to get there and back in a day - over six hours in a day for travel as well as the time for meetings and so on. Another thing was that there was a lot of worry from David Roach (Director of Warrnambool College of Advanced Education then engaged in negotiating a merger with Deakin) that they would be chopped off at the socks. If Deakin could do it there, they would do it to us. But we did have an option. Mal Logan had an understanding of a regional college and could envisage a multi-campus institution … you only needed half a brain to realise that if you had distance education on two campuses, then that is not going to last too long. I know it looks like the greener interests of society did not count in carrying out deals but a Director has limited choice. Provided society is not disadvantaged, you look after the best interests of your institution (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 17).

Logan repeated these concerns of Gippsland in the following words:

Tom (the Director of Gippsland) saw that the future of Gippsland was really under threat. He saw a merger with Monash was logical and inevitable … Malcolm Skilbeck (Vice-Chancellor of Deakin) went around institutions in the State (Victoria) saying Deakin was the logical university for them … they saw Deakin as a threat (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 17).

Consequently, nothing was more important, about Gippsland from the Monash leadership viewpoint, than to get into external studies by way of association with Gippsland. To achieve this aim Monash had to negate Deakin’s bid at association with Gippsland (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 2). This was achieved by a two-stage process, first of affiliation, and then transfer to Monash as a university college after a period of conflict with Deakin (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 7). The issue as to whether there should be only one or possibly two distance education centres had to be resolved. Monash supported development of a case for more than one such provider and approached federal and Victorian authorities for support. It was necessary for Monash and Gippsland to await the outcome of this issue before contemplating full merger. Each lobbied strongly for a decision supporting more than one distance education centre in Victoria, and for distance education to form part of the eventual association between Monash and Gippsland. The final outcome was recognised by Logan in these words:
It is anticipated that within a relatively short period of time, say two years following the establishment of the institution (a form of association between Gippsland and Monash) as a university college, arrangements would be made for the Institute (Gippsland) to be fully merged into the university. This could occur by the first of June 1992 (Logan, 1989a).

Eight distance education centres (including centres at Deakin-Warrnambool and Monash-Gippsland) were announced by John Dawkins, the responsible Federal Minister, on 7 April 1989 (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 7). This situation meant that the leadership ambition of Logan to more strongly associate with Gippsland was highly likely to be realised. For this purpose a Heads of Agreement for amalgamation between Monash and Gippsland was developed in March 1989 (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 8). At this time events appeared to point the way to formal amalgamation. In the words of one official commenting on the Gippsland situation:

Gippsland is a little ambivalent about the university college model. Gippsland is anxious not to be disadvantaged by becoming a university college at arms length for a period of time (Pritchard, 1989).

Logan later challenged Gippsland to be specific about the relationship it wanted with Monash. For example, he said:

If it were considered that Gippsland students received Monash degrees and that the Gippsland courses were listed in the Monash handbook as Monash courses offered through its university college in Gippsland, I believe this could be accommodated. What I would wish to do here is for you to set down for me the nature of the university college relationship that you would prefer. … Alternatively if you wish to bypass the university college stage and move directly to merger, I believe that could also be accommodated (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 9).

Given the evidence of this correspondence it can be seen that both Gippsland and Monash were warming to a close relationship and possible merger. This attitude of the relevant participants helped shape later events and became accepted by leaders at Monash and Gippsland. Negotiations along these lines continued at this time and a Heads of Agreement was presented to Monash Council for approval in October 1989 (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 11). Logan gave the following advice to Council, about the Heads of Agreement: “Unlike some other associations being loosely forged between institutions around the country it (the proposed Heads of Agreement) represented an honest attempt at consolidation”. He also said, that the new link with Gippsland, “would be achieved with one chief executive officer, one governing council and one academic board … and continuance of its
(Gippsland’s) strong regional orientation”. The Monash Council passed the Heads of Agreement unanimously. Moreover the issue of Gippsland graduates receiving awards in the name of Monash University College Gippsland was resolved soon after. Gippsland Graduates would now receive awards directly from Monash University (Logan, 1989b).

A further concern arose over the leadership role and status of Kennedy (the Director of Gippsland) (see page 105). This issue was deferred to a later stage in the association between Monash and Gippsland, but indicates how the motivation of both parties to enter into agreement had become so strong that this issue was able to be put temporarily to one side. A formal Heads of Agreement was signed and entered into on 5 March 1990 (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 11). Kennedy later advised Logan about the issue of his place in the evolving executive structure:

It is very clear that when the arrangements for former college Directors is reviewed across the total system, the appellation of Deputy Vice-Chancellor is commonly adopted. In the case of the university college I therefore propose Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Chief Executive Officer of the university college (Kennedy, 1990).

These discussions (concerning the role and status of the Director of Gippsland once the association between Monash and Gippsland had been agreed to) were largely influenced by the leadership aim of Logan and other senior Monash staff to ensure that the Gippsland hierarchy reported directly to senior staff already established at Monash. Logan made this clear saying:

At the outset, it must be recognised that, as of 1 July 1990, Gippsland Institute will become wholly a part of Monash University. The university college is not being established to form a link between two separate institutions ... to the external world Monash will be managerially, an indivisible whole. It will speak with one voice. The university college must be established in recognition of that fact ... I see the university college not as a near autonomous stand alone institution as proposed but more like a large multi-faceted faculty, distinct not for the coherence of its academic offerings but for its location and regional orientation (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) pp 13 - 14).

However Kennedy was critical of the idea that senior Gippsland staff should report directly to Monash senior staff. He commented that despite this unexpected development Gippsland remained strongly committed to playing a role within the greater Monash. He believed the college CEO position would be reduced to that of a figurehead if Logan’s leadership views on the direct reporting of Gippsland
staff to Monash were implemented. He therefore requested Logan to consider his designation as Deputy Vice-Chancellor (University College) (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 14). In light of the tension, Logan later considered the issue of direct reporting lines to Monash by Gippsland staff. He designated the Director position of Gippsland as that of Pro-Vice-Chancellor and indicated this was a satisfactory approach, as Deputy Vice-Chancellors had no line management responsibilities at Monash (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 15). In addition, the Gippsland Council became an advisory body to make recommendations concerning the new university college to the Academic Board at Monash. This relationship probably reflects recognition of the continuing separate leadership but highly integrated role of Gippsland (O’Neill, 1999 Chapter 3) p 15).

Logan had also formed the view that Gippsland’s future depended on how successfully its distance education functions were incorporated throughout Monash (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) pp 15 - 16). It was feared that the separate nature of the college, if reinforced, would inhibit wide involvement by Monash in distance education (O’Neill, (Chapter 3) p 18). Tensions and concerns arose that Monash was promoting exclusionary leadership ideas that meant Gippsland could not play an effective and mature role even given its established expertise in distance education. Tensions of this nature led to internal reviews of the implementation and design of procedures meant to reinforce the association of Monash and Gippsland (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 20). The situation was summarised in the following terms:

Complete facultisation of the university college at this stage is not acceptable to the college and the Gippsland community. This approach would be contrary to both the intent and spirit of the Heads of Agreement … Such an action would turn the university college into the campus of a university and in so doing would destroy any … commitment to regionality. In my opinion this would not be in the best interests of the university (Hatsell, 1991).

Tensions between Gippsland and Monash on such issues led to further internal leadership debate (and for a time community dispute) about the future of the college. However, these tensions dissipated as Gippsland became integrated as a campus of the newly established Monash University commencing early 1993. Gippsland from this point on retained a separate advisory council but the Gippsland Academic Board was reduced to a forum. The Director of Gippsland,
presumably due to misgivings about the integration process, played no further leadership part (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) pp 22 - 30). Gippsland was thereafter completely integrated to the Monash system. Kennedy has evaluated the situation in the following terms:

I was for measured change and wished to avoid preceptive action. But the argument was that there was a perceived disadvantage in being less than a full campus of Monash. This was so in external eyes, with internal students and with staff themselves who argued that with full status they would have greater access to the trappings of the academic university environment ... I preferred moving in a measured way (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 3) p 30).

From the preceding analysis it is clear the focus of Gippsland to secure a role in the Monash leadership network overrode consideration of other concerns.

**Discussions between Monash and the Chisholm Institute of Technology**

In April 1988 Chisholm had considered Dawkins’ Green Paper, and a Victorian Government policy paper indicating that federation under Monash leadership was only one of five possible alternate arrangements (these others were: stand alone, participate in a new State University of Victoria system, amalgamate with Swinburne and Victoria college, or amalgamation with Gippsland). Chisholm Council reviewed each possibility with the result that support was expressed for federation with Monash (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 6). Federation implied a degree of separate identity for Chisholm in a new Monash. Monash did not encourage this. In the words of a Monash official:

The availability of a wider range of options for students and the notion of how to render coherent a greater Monash … could not be done through federation (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 7).

Strong ties (forged through intended merger) became a basis of association and cooperation. For example a Merger Implementation Committee was instituted to advise how to make merger possible. It was hoped to achieve a merger by 1 July 1990 (see page 106) (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 9). There was much debate within each institution but sceptics did not prevail in the consulting and negotiating process on a Heads of Agreement (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) pp 10 - 12).
On 9 May 1988 representatives from Chisholm and Monash met and accepted in broad terms a proposal for merger: Monash Council would incorporate Chisholm representatives; Chisholm Academic Board and Monash Professorial Board would continue to exist separately for the time being; and a joint management committee would be established (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 4). There were some Monash staff that opposed the merger, and emphasised that there were significant quality differences between staff and students of these two institutions (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) pp 5 - 9). Some of this criticism was supported at a meeting of the Staff Association of Monash University in June 1988.

Logan responded in July with a formal commitment to explore joint arrangements with Chisholm rather than full merger (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 8). The search for a solution continued. For example, a joint meeting of Monash and Chisholm Staff Associations was conducted to find common ground and protect status quo interests (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 10). It was decided to await the outcome of the White Paper before considering any action to formalise the merger (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 2) p 11). Later events developed further when a Memorandum of Understanding acknowledging that a formal relationship intended to lead to a merger between Chisholm and Monash was signed on 19 October 1988. Both institutions considered that the proposal being developed that Gippsland should amalgamate with Monash, could serve as a leadership model for future developments between Chisholm and Monash. The attitude of Chisholm to the prospect of association under Monash leadership is exemplified in the words used in the Chisholm minute at that time by a senior Chisholm staff member:

As a result of these discussions, I now believe Council should resolve on the route it wishes to take. In the first instance it could involve Chisholm becoming a university college within the Monash University system (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 2).

A committee was proposed to develop a merger agreement. Both sides were keen to develop the potential of a merger and strong personal ties developed and later reinforced the negotiation and leadership process (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 3). Informal meetings were beneficial to both parties and were sometimes referred to as meetings of the “kitchen cabinet”. According to the memory of the Director of Chisholm:
The only thing that ever came out of the kitchen cabinet of any consequence was a draft merger document or a draft on principles for merger, or something like that. But the kitchen cabinet was behind the scenes – it was the one that decided about professorial appointments, what would be the function of Deans and the academic arrangements. At the next level up we had a Merger Implementation Committee but it was just an excuse … it was the public consultative process (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4), p 3).

The vulnerability of Chisholm staff to likely changes led to demands to insulate staff members from change. For example, two staff groups at Chisholm clarified their expectations of the negotiation and leadership process. They sought:

No loss of tenure, no forced retrenchments, retention of governance structures, retention of rights to present superannuation schemes, advantaged staff terms and conditions and no disadvantaging, reassurance that advanced education courses did not bear the brunt of post amalgamations rationalisations, research opportunities to ex-CAE staff on the same basis as provided to existing university faculties and retention of existing campuses (Costar and Blyth, 1989).

It was an attempt to put both parties on notice that all union member interests would be closely scrutinised, and by implication steadfastly defended, in the merger and leadership process being finalised by the Merger Implementation Committee (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 15). Sensitivities of this kind led to Chisholm permitting the appointment of two union representatives to the Merger Implementation Committee. A representative was also appointed from the Student Union, which was an incorporated body servicing students (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 15). This was in recognition that the Student Union at Chisholm had a guild structure and was responsible for all student services at Chisholm.

The Heads of Agreement to facilitate the merger were signed on 10 May 1989. This agreement made possible voluntary redundancies. There were to be no compulsory redundancies. It was also agreed there would be preservation of salary and employment rights such as status and professional levels of Chisholm staff, and the executive structure of the new Monash was deferred for resolution (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 16). With the signing of the Heads of Agreement and the anticipation of a full merger becoming widespread, new sensitivities arose in engineering, business studies and nursing, possibly motivated by the view of some academics at Monash that Chisholm achievements and staff were inferior to the established Monash. For example, soon after the Heads of Agreement were signed the Monash Faculty of Engineering passed the following unanimous resolution:
The Faculty of Engineering strongly opposes amalgamation of Monash University with Chisholm Institute of Technology, since such a course of action is inconsistent with our strategy for the future, in which the pursuit of excellence in teaching and research is not only of the highest priority, but is consistent with national goals (Brown, 1989).

Similarly sensitivities arose over the possible incorporation of the David Syme Business School (developed within Chisholm) within the Monash Faculty of Economics and Politics. The staff qualification profile at the David Syme School did not assist the resolution of this issue. At the time only two David Syme staff members had Doctoral qualifications and only about six had a research Master’s degree. Each institution had, moreover, developed its own cultural identity and professional approach. Amalgamation would mean devising a convergence process for the leadership, governance and administration of a merged system. Further sensitivities arose concerning the prospect of any rationalisation of courses that were to result (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 25).

This process became even more complex when proposals by Monash to rationalise MBA programmes offered at Mount Eliza Business School, (credentialed through Monash) were entered into (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 25). Negotiations of these issues were complex and were often the subject of scrutiny and debate within the Merger Implementation Committee. The issues prominent in its discussions included rationalisation of engineering courses (both provided by Monash and Chisholm), the relationship between the Faculty of Economics and Politics and the David Syme Business School, and the status and incorporation of the School of Nursing at Chisholm (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 30).

The Merger Implementation Committee soon endorsed principles to guide discussion at its meeting of 23 June 1989. Interim organisational considerations dominated at this time. Discussions initially examined the possibility of introducing Schools to consolidate and coordinate teaching and research and leadership in the merged institution. This approach was explained in the following way:

While preserving a devoted faculty structure, advantage should be taken of the creative opportunities offered by the possibility of establishing Schools, either a permanent feature or as transitional mechanisms in the evolution of new faculties. However, all Schools should generally be located in and expected to report in the appropriate faculties (Working Party on Academic Programs and Structures, 1989).
This approach was developed to solve many then-current leadership, governance and organisation issues.

**Engineering**

For example the Merger Implementation Committee considered that the Departments in the Division of Engineering and Industrial Technology at Chisholm were thought to correspond broadly with the divisions of engineering studies at Monash. This led to consideration that there become one Faculty of Engineering with single Departments of Chemical, Civil, Electrical and Electronic, and Materials engineering (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 31). This proposal was soon accepted and it was agreed that there soon be an agreement for a single Faculty of Engineering including a gradualist approach to integration at departmental level. It became expected that the merger would recognise the complementary nature of the work and leadership of the two institutions as well as the nature of the structure and segments served by each (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 31). In summary, the Committee arrived at a provisional recommendation for a single Faculty of Engineering comprising a merger of the existing Monash and Chisholm provisions.

In response the Engineering Faculty Board of Monash raised objections, and passed a motion rejecting the provisional recommendation. As a temporary measure Engineering at Chisholm was placed into a Division, with horizontal and vertical options for integrating departments to be explored in the longer term over a period of five years. This led to discussion and later resolution of issues concerning engineering course provision at both institutions. Inevitably discussion turned to whether there should be separate four-year Bachelor of Engineering degrees at both institutions. However it was decided that students at Caulfield would be enrolled in a three-year Bachelor of Technology course from 1991 onwards.

To facilitate this decision those already enrolled or starting the bachelor degree of Engineering at Caulfield campus in 1991 would have their degrees separately identified as Chisholm degrees (O’Neill, 1991 (Chapter 4) p 32), while professional engineers undertook the Bachelor of Engineering degree at Clayton.
The Bachelor of Technology degree at Caulfield was designed to prepare engineering technologists who would be able to join the professional engineers either by transfer to the Bachelor of Engineering course at Clayton or by undertaking a Master of Technology degree. Concern that the engineers at Caulfield satisfied professional requirements was resolved through reliance on this arrangement which made possible a single Faculty of Engineering (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 32). Both courses became recognised by the Institution of Engineers. However, a further stumbling block arose in September 1991 when Monash-based faculty would not accept the equivalence of the Caulfield campus course. Further leadership decisions and debate by the committee led to the support for the development of one faculty and two Schools and provision of a wider range of offerings in engineering courses (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4), p 33).

**Business, Economics, and Politics**

Both institutions also considered other issues. For example, consideration was given in late 1989 to the relationship of the Faculty of Economics and Politics at Clayton and the David Syme Business School of Chisholm. Initially, staff at Chisholm developed a proposal to retain the David Syme School. This idea was integrated with a single faculty proposal to link the both institutions. It was later also considered as a proposal that the Bowater School of Business, Economics and Politics at Victoria College be integrated and form the Monash Business School, which it was thought could form links with the Australian Management School at Mount Eliza. This proposal provided also for the David Syme Business School to retain much of its identity (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 34). Further development of ideas were encouraged by an Implementation Working Party and, as a guide, the following themes were devised for submissions:

- The (Syme) School and the (Economics and Politics) Faculty could remain separate in such a way as to avoid duplication;
- The School and the Faculty could merge in such a way to retain the distinctiveness of their academic programs;
- The development of activity in Graduate Management Education; and
- The creation of two entirely new Faculties from a realignment of the present components of the Faculty and School (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 35).
In response a further proposal was developed which provided for five small business schools based around existing elements but the David Syme School having a large measure of separate leadership identity (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 35). The question as to whether there should be a single or separate faculty in the case of each School became a dispute that proved difficult to resolve. The case for a single faculty depended on obtaining structural efficiency through leadership, disciplinary consolidation and rationalisation, but this was not sufficient to resolve the arguments, which arose (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 36).

These issues were considered and as a result it was proposed to make provisional recommendations for a Faculty of Economics at Clayton (to include the existing Departments with the exception of Politics which was to be transferred to the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences) and for a Faculty of Business (to incorporate the David Syme Business School), with the intention of integrating each of these in a few years and the development of a joint approach to research training and postgraduate study in management. This proposal led to the opinion by the Clayton staff that the creation of one faculty would lead to a dilution of academic standards. This opinion assumed that offerings at Clayton were far superior. Inability to find common ground led to adoption of an aim that there should be a single faculty but implementation should be deferred until the issue could be bedded down (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 37).

The Monash and Chisholm integrated system had now developed faculty design proposals that could lead to a future coherent and significant structure to support the new developing institution. Gradually a suitable organisational design was put together. For example, it was eventually resolved that there be one Faculty of Business and Economics but two separate Schools located at each of the institutions. Lobbying widened the debate and consideration of leadership options. It was finally resolved that following the merger of the institutions there would be a Faculty of Economics, Politics and Commerce. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Logan this arrangement:

Achieved the principal aims of the Heads of Agreement in combining the strengths of Monash and Chisholm and creating new opportunities for students - they had attracted a high level of support despite differences of opinion in
certain areas and represented a workable set of conclusions (Monash University Council, 1989).

**Nursing**

The issues surrounding the provision of nursing courses in the developing Monash context also received considerable attention. In April and May 1988 the initial plan developed was that nursing courses would become the responsibility of the Faculty of Health Sciences. In June 1989 a fresh proposal was advanced by Chisholm that nursing be established within a faculty of nursing in its own right. This did not satisfy an implementation working party, which developed a counter proposal, that nursing be linked to course provision for medicine and similar professional courses. This idea was challenged in discussion through consideration of the following type of options: nursing as a school in a Faculty of Health Science, and nursing as a component of a Faculty of Social Health and Community Welfare. Several other possibilities were also considered. By August 1989 a consensus had developed that nursing had now evolved sufficient professional status to require substantial recognition which could even justify a stand-alone faculty specialising in the teaching of nursing and appropriate research (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 37).

A provisional proposal was then developed that nursing be integrated in a Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences and the question of the developing association between nursing and the Faculty of Medicine would be further examined. By August 1989 this proposal was refined and a serious attempt was made to examine the future course provision of nursing through the medium of a Faculty of Professional Studies which would integrate nursing, applied psychology and welfare studies at Chisholm, and social work and librarianship at Clayton. This was agreed to subject to the suggestion that once nursing student numbers were substantial the case for including nursing in the Faculty of Medicine would be examined (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 39).

**Pharmacy**

Organisational design and redesign was undertaken to enhance the emerging larger institution from component campuses of previously separate institutions. In this regard the leadership of the professional provision and incorporation of
pharmacy courses is also revealing. The initial plans of the Federal and State agencies responsible for such course provision sought to link the future of the Victorian College of Pharmacy to the development of the University of Melbourne. This approach could be summarised thus:

No result could be more evident: the distance (from the Victorian College of Pharmacy to the University of Melbourne) and down the Royal Parade in the Suburb of Parkville, is 1.2 kilometres to the northern (edge of the University of Melbourne) and 1.8 kilometres to the Medical School on the southern edge of the (University of Melbourne) (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 1).

The contiguity of the site of the Victorian College of the Pharmacy had the University of Melbourne and State and Federal authorities expecting this development. Senior staff at the College did not share this belief in the inevitability of a merger of the College with the University of Melbourne. The Dean of Pharmacy and the then-President of the Victorian Branch of the Pharmaceutical Society in a letter to Dawkins explained this in the following words:

The college has never considered itself to be contiguous with the University of Melbourne. The fact that the college is well over a kilometre from the University accounts for the failure to interact more frequently in either training or research. While there have been a few collaborative research projects these have been no more common than collaborative research projects between the college and more distant institutions. The distance has undoubtedly been a factor in the failure of the college and the university to amalgamate during the last one hundred years despite relevant discussions on a least six occasions (Watson and Butcher, 1990).

The stumbling block in negotiations with the University of Melbourne arose especially over the issue of whether pharmacy should be recognised as a discipline in its own right or be incorporated in to the University of Melbourne, Faculty of Medicine. There was a long history of no common ground on this issue (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 2). Squabbles also developed over the design of any proposed integrating structures (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) pp 3 - 4). A further issue of contention developed concerning the future ownership of four blocks of land and three buildings at the College, which were owned by the Pharmaceutical Society. The Pharmaceutical Society sought to be paid out for these assets in any future merger by the University of Melbourne. In November 1989 the University of Melbourne indicated it would purchase these assets at the time of merger but the College doubted the priority that the University of Melbourne would give this arrangement. This situation became a major source of frustration, especially for
the College, leading it to look elsewhere for a future partner despite a strong preference for autonomy (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 5).

Informal approaches were made to Monash by the end of May 1990. Vice-Chancellor Logan responded to the invitation to amalgamation by proposing a process of two stages: affiliation initially as a college of the university for twelve months, followed by a formal merger. Logan also explained that the College would retain its identity as a separate college (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 6). He clarified that there were insufficient funds to finance the land and buildings package sought by the Pharmaceutical Society, stating:

I believe it would be possible to keep the Society’s ownership clearly identified in any merged situation and move in one of two directions to provide the Society with some financial return on that investment. The first option could well involve the opportunity for the Society to be invited to participate in a joint venture development with the private sector of the land to the north of the existing buildings in such a way that enables a return to come to the Society. A second option would be change the existing rental arrangement on the site, over a period to one in which return was earned by the Society on its asset. The special nature of the relationship between the Society, the college and the university would, of course need to be taken into account in determining the quantification of that return and the period in which it became available to the Society (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) pp 6 - 7).

Encouraged by the constructive nature of Logan’s response, representatives of the College and Society advised Dawkins formally on 4 September 1990 that amalgamation negotiations with the University of Melbourne had ceased, and that formal negotiations for merger with Monash had commenced (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 7). Negotiations then focused on the organisational design and governance structures that would be needed to facilitate the merger. It was proposed by Monash that consistent with the aim of a degree of autonomy for the College its Advisory Council would continue, its Chief Executive would report direct to the Vice-Chancellor and that Monash would negotiate a substantial annual sum as its contribution to the College liability to the Society for its assets. This gesture was well received by the College so that by 24 September 1990 an agreement was finalised and approved, consistent with the Monash offer. Both contracting parties signed and endorsed a formal agreement to merge on 23 October 1990 (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 11).
Throughout this process of merger State authorities lobbied and supported the alternative merger of the College with the University of Melbourne. Vice-Chancellor Logan responded to this claim believing the Victorian authorities were encouraging Monash to choose between the Pharmacy option and being denied access to nearby Rusden campus, which was then part of the Victoria College and later merged with Deakin University. Logan explained his perception of this dilemma to Dawkins thus:

On any rational educational ground this is a ridiculous proposal. It is doubly ridiculous when the proposal involves absorbing Rusden College, located one hundred metres from Monash and about 100 miles from Geelong, into Deakin University. What is being proposed is contrary to the guidelines put forward by the Task Force on Amalgamations established by you (Logan, 1990).

The clear preference of the College for a merger with Monash was put to the Federal authorities, emphasising that the means of merger would be facilitated by reliance on the nature of the College incorporation, in the following terms:

The Victorian College of Pharmacy is a company limited by guarantee. At an extraordinary general meeting on 5 December (1990), the company decided to make a number of changes to its Memorandum and Articles of Association. This involved the admittance of Monash University as a member of the company and the appointment of three Monash University directors to the Council of the college, which is the Board of the company. In addition, a schedule was inserted to the Articles of Association to the effect that … a number of matters would only be valid if the Monash University representatives form part of the majority supporting the decision (Logan and Watson, 1990).

This method of implementation indicated the strong support of both sides for the merger, and indicated that concurrence was hoped for in the circumstances by the authorities. In light of these developments, in February 1991 Vice-Chancellor Logan said:

I am now firmly of the opinion that it is impossible for Monash to absorb the staff and students of Rusden … Monash does not wish to be seen as responsible for “breaking up” Victoria College … We believe a sensible solution will be for Rusden staff and students to relocate over time to another part of the (Victoria) College. Along with the State to contribute towards the critical costs involved in this move (Logan, 1991).

However on the 15 March 1991 Federal and State Ministers announced support for the Deakin-Victoria College merger and as part of the package, Rusden campus would transfer to Monash with the transfer of the programmes at Rusden
to other elements of the Deakin network but the question of the College of Pharmacy leadership remained unresolved at that time (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) pp 16 - 17).

It is notable that the question of financial incentive to the Victorian Pharmaceutical Society led to a last minute revision of the terms offered the College of Pharmacy by Monash, which had the intention and effect of closing the deal. This offer matched the University of Melbourne, which sought backup through the then-continued support by the authorities for a merger with the College. Monash University through Vice-Chancellor Logan offered a long lease of the Society’s assets for $100,000 per year and access to prime space in the Monash University Science Park. It was estimated that this offer equated to an offer of federal money and other assistance to support the College merger with the University of Melbourne valued at about two million dollars. This offer meant that the Monash offer of merger remained competitive (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 18). By early May 1991 support by the Victorian and Federal authorities for the merger by the College with Monash was given – no doubt due to the Monash counter offer to the College to merge (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 19). By late May 1991 it became clear that Monash no longer sought the transfer of Rusden programs to Monash, and the transfer of Rusden programs to Deakin University became public knowledge (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 19). This situation possibly evolved to satisfy criticism that a Monash University system that included Rusden, Rusden programs and the College of Pharmacy was far too ambitious and possibly not acceptable to other institutions (O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 20).

**Summary**

The modern Monash campus system developed by the early 1990s. The ideals of amalgamation forged by Logan meshed with the policy initiatives undertaken by Dawkins, were eventually accepted by a network of stakeholders, and formed the basis of amalgamation between the institutions concerned under leadership by Monash. The amalgamation was the result of a process of continuous policy management, and organisational change which was dynamic and caught up in the leadership tensions between conservative and progressive forces. The unique
leadership role played by Logan is apparent. On the big issues, the personal loyalties and agreements of Mal Logan, the principal steersman of the new Monash, were subordinate to leadership and the considerations of policy and power. His approach was to lead through emerging opportunities for which he was responsible for oversight and direction. The wider implications of the Monash amalgamation are examined in the Chapters 7 and 8.
Outline of Critical Events

1985
• Logan recommended for Vice-Chancellor’s position by McNeil Committee

1986
• Logan states objectives to modernise and reform Monash’s position in the community but personal loyalties subordinate to considerations of policy and power

1987
• Logan strongly of the opinion that the binary system may be altered and that Monash should create its own future by exploiting links with other institutions
• Monash staff strongly compare their status and role to the University of Melbourne
• Logan joins “Purple Circle” of advisors to Dawkins
• In July immediately following to office of the Hawke Government John Dawkins becomes Federal Minister responsible for education
• Green Paper circulated by Dawkins (December)

1987-c. 1991
• Abolition of the binary system was a key event enhancing the prospect of mergers of nearby universities and CAEs
• State Governments put up little opposition to merger of tertiary educational institutions – this is important because educational institutions depend on State legislation

1988
• White Paper circulated by Dawkins (July)

1989
• Report of the Task Force on Amalgamations in Higher Education made available (April)

1988-89 Development of Monash relationship with Gippsland
August 1988
• Logan advised Monash Council that a relationship had developed and that the capacity and function of Gippsland distance education was an attractive prospect
• Logan has effectively provided Gippsland an alternative to merger with Deakin University
New arrangements entered into in Victoria for more than one distance provider

1989

- Heads of Agreement developed and presented to Monash Council October 1989 and entered into 5 March 1990 so that Gippsland would become an integral part of Monash as of 1 July 1990.
- Senior staff at Gippsland report direct to Monash, Director of Gippsland named Pro-Vice-Chancellor

1993

- Gippsland integrated with Monash as a campus of the university.

Discussions between Monash and Chisholm

1988/89

- April/May 1988 - Chisholm expresses support for amalgamation with Monash. A Merger Implementation Committee instituted to achieve a merger by 1 July 1990
- 19 October 1988 – Memorandum of Understanding signed and a Kitchen Cabinet presides informally
- 10 May 1989 – Heads of Agreement signed
- Sensitivities arise for resolution over engineering, business and nursing courses (referred to the Merger Implementation Committee)

Pharmacy

1990

- Prior to 1990 authorities consider Pharmacy should be integrated with the University of Melbourne
- Issue of long standing is whether Pharmacy is a profession in its own right
- A further issue of concern developed concerning the future ownership of four blocks of land and three buildings at the Pharmacy College site owned by the Pharmaceutical Society
- May 1990 - informal approaches are made to Monash by the College to merge. Logan responded by suggesting a twelve months relationship as a university college followed by merger
- 4 September - Dawkins advised that merger negotiations with the University of Melbourne have now ceased.
- 23 October - Monash and the Pharmacy College sign a formal agreement to merge
- 5 December 1990 – College amends Articles of Association to give Monash additional advantages of control

1991

- May 1991 – support of the merger given after Monash gives special financial deal for the Society’s assets
CHAPTER 5: PART-SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION — THE UNE MERGERS

This chapter analyses the developments associated with the University of New England mergers because of their intrinsic interest and also because they were in part successful albeit for a brief period.

To conform to New South Wales and Federal government policy and New South Wales legislation the University of New England Armidale and the Armidale College of Advanced Education at Armidale and the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education at Lismore formed a network university to serve the northern region of New South Wales in July 1989 (refer to page 127). Each had a history of stand-alone provision of courses, and a separate identity. The merger between the Armidale College of Advanced Education and the University of New England (also located at Armidale) was successful but the merger between the institutions located at Armidale and the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education was not. Throughout the merger process and the negotiations that led to the merger, the University of New England at Armidale assumed it was the senior academic partner of each of the colleges of advanced education. The merger negotiations between the University of New England, the Armidale College of Advanced Education and the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education continued for some time and a formal agreement to work towards a merger was signed on 10 August 1988 (Amalgamation Implementation Committee, 1989 (Appendix 1), p 1).

The New South Wales Government at the time was a non-Labor government but it put up little resistance to the Hawke (Labor) Federal Government in support of such mergers in New South Wales. Minister Dawkins had set certain criteria, which were influential in producing a powerful incentive to change through mergers in the New South Wales context. All higher education institutions had to make application to join the new Unified National System and to qualify for
continued funding (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 3). Even the large universities took the benchmarks seriously – with 5685 EFTSU in 1987 the University of New England could not expect to qualify as a comprehensive research university; Armidale College of Advanced Education with only 1370 EFTSU in 1987, and Orange Agricultural College with 378 EFTSU, in 1987 were also clearly under the 2000 EFTSU required for Unified National System membership, and Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education was also under the limit of 2000 EFTSU with 1745 EFTSU in 1987.

The political climate of cooperation was also evident in these prospects at the time (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 3). The New South Wales Government at the time was a Liberal-National Party Government lead by Mr Nick Greiner. The education Minister (Dr Terry Metherell) supported the Federal policy on amalgamations and went about pursuing this policy in early 1989 and pushed through a series of amalgamations, which made it possible for most of the colleges of advanced education to combine with existing universities. One college which stood alone (the MacArthur Institute of Higher Education) soon agreed to merge with the newly-formed University of Western Sydney. The reforms supported by the State Government and initiated by the Hawke Government created the circumstances that the New South Wales higher education system was transformed from a system of seven universities and fifteen colleges to one of just eight universities and a branch of the Catholic university (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 4).

**Institutional Profiles**

At the time the *University of New England* was a medium-sized institution situated about 5 kilometres to the northwest of Armidale. It had been founded in 1938 as a university college of the University of Sydney. The university had a student load of 5,846 EFTSU in 1988 of which 2/3 was in the humanities, social sciences and business studies, whereas education and science counted for 10% of the total. The university also had the Key Centre for Teaching and Research in Agricultural Economics. A special feature of the university profile was that 62% of enrolments were external (i.e. were not resident on campus). The population in the region of the university was static and the growth potential of students was
therefore very limited (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 39).

The *Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education* was a very small but fast growing institution located at Lismore about 350 kilometres north east of Armidale (refer to page 123). It was founded in the late 1960s as Lismore Teachers College and became a college of advanced education in the 1970s. The College had 1931 EFTSU in 1988, which evenly distributed between the disciplines of education, health sciences, business and applied sciences, arts/humanities, and social sciences. About 60% of the student load was at sub-degree level. It was estimated to have substantial growth prospects (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 39).

Orange Agricultural College and Coffs Harbour Campus of the University of New England do not form a significant part of the story of the University of New England network merger because of their very small student numbers. *Orange Agricultural College* was a very small specialist body located 4 kilometres north of Orange and several hours by road from Armidale or Lismore. The College at the time the network was being formed had 476 EFTSU in 1988, distributed evenly between agriculture and business studies and all the students were enrolled at the associate diploma level. It was estimated that in 1989 66% of students were external (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 pp 36 - 39). *Orange Agricultural College* entered into negotiations in May 1989 because it felt strongly opposed at the time to merge with Charles Sturt University, which was available to it as an alternate opportunity (Chudleigh in Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 22). When given the opportunity to join the University of New England network it seized the opportunity. In regard to the *Coffs Harbour Campus*, immediately prior to the 1989 merger the University of New England at Armidale gained approval and funding to begin university courses in the town of Coffs Harbour, which is near Lismore. In 1991 this centre became a university campus in its own right (Harman, 1993 p 121). It was also considered for a brief period that *Hawkesbury Agricultural College* would form part of the network but this debate was not focused on for long as the College
soon became part of the University of Western Sydney (Proposed UNE Network, circa 1988).

The **Armidale College of Advanced Education** was small, first founded in 1928 (1390 EFTSU in 1988) and located in south Armidale 6 kilometres from the UNE. It was a predominantly teacher-education institution but an important number of students (approximately 22%) were nursing students. There were virtually no growth prospects for on-campus students (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 39). From about 1970, attempts were made at the State and Federal level to amalgamate the University of New England and the Armidale College of Advanced Education but these efforts were unsuccessful. In the 1980’s the idea was revived but insufficient common ground remained a stumbling block (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 4).

### The Amalgamation Process

Amalgamation of the Armidale College of Advanced Education and the University of New England at Armidale and the merger of the Armidale amalgamated institution and Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education were initially undertaken in a public context of political support, and the initial enthusiasm of the institutions concerned. The University of New England, on the advice of its new Vice-Chancellor (Professor Don McNicol) in early 1988, decided not to initiate amalgamation decisions with other institutions but to respond favourably to any requests from nearby colleges of advanced education. The Armidale and the Northern Rivers Colleges of Advanced Education both made formal proposals to amalgamate at the time. The Armidale College of Advanced Education indicated it would not support a merger unless the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education was included – this was due to a past record of failure to achieve merger in Armidale. The University of New England responded favourably and negotiations commenced (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 5).

The University of New England at Armidale had a particularly strong motive for seeking to amalgamate with the Armidale College of Advanced Education. The
Vice-Chancellor and a group of senior staff believed that the Commonwealth Government strongly favoured the amalgamation of the two Armidale institutions, and that the two institutions would most likely not attract new funding for buildings if they remained separate. In addition the Armidale College of Advanced Education possibly recognised that amalgamation with the nearby university would be inevitable and tried to foster a situation in 1988 where the new amalgamated university was not just simply one where the College was absorbed without separate identity or recognition (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 pp 5 - 6).

In mid-1989 a trans-campus administrative unit was set up to facilitate a federated institution (Harman, 1993 p 130). Armidale and Lismore each had their own CEO responsible to the Board of Governors and reported to the trans-campus Vice-Chancellor (see page 124). This was contrary to the ideas of the Amalgamation Implementation Committee (discussed below), which had opted for a single CEO through appointment to a trans-campus Vice-Chancellor (the CEO) and Deputy Vice-Chancellor each based in Armidale (Amalgamation Implementation Committee, 1989 p 15). This situation led to tensions over governance between Armidale and Lismore campuses but not on public record at the Armidale campus level. Later the Birt Committee in 1992, reporting on the University of New England network, recommended that the University of New England (Armidale) incorporating the Armidale College of Advanced Education should be reconstituted as an autonomous university. Consequently the merger between the Armidale College of Advance Education and the University of New England can be viewed as successful. The merger continues to the present day.

**Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education Concerns**

There appears to be little or no public record of concerns being held about Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education merging with Armidale College of Advanced Education. However in relation to the proposed merger between Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education, the Armidale College of Advanced Education and the University of New England at Armidale, staff at University of New England had concerns about the appropriateness of the merger and whether it could succeed from the period of its inception. For example staff at
the University of New England wrote to the Chancellor of the university about their concerns in the following way in September 1988:

It has become very clear indeed, that all is not well with the proposal to amalgamate the Armidale College of Advanced Education and the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education, with the University of New England. An increasingly large number of staff and students of the New England campus, alumni, members of Convocation and other concerned citizens of Armidale are beginning to appreciate the many complex issues. Many, who initially may have seen some merit in the proposals, have taken up a firm opposing view and there are many shades of favourable and unfavourable reactions now abroad the community. The whole issue has become bedevilled by a single-minded dash towards a decision-making timetable that locks all concerned into an irreversible process.

We, as senior members of the university, charged with the responsibility of maintaining those standards of excellence that have been in place for 50 years, are seriously concerned at the inevitable outcome of such administrative irresponsibility. Not only the pace, but also the procedures and representation by which the present decision making is taking place gives us cause for serious misgivings.

We now believe that Council has not appreciated the extent and the seriousness of the real and genuine concerns of the university community. Consequently we respectfully caution Council, in all earnestness, to take note of these concerns and not to enter into precipitate decisions to proceed with an amalgamation at this stage. Whilst we agree that the university has no option but to apply for membership of the unified system, we urge Council to do so at this stage only on behalf of the University of New England. In the present climate of misinformation, contradiction and inability to weigh up advantages, disadvantages and economic savings, it would be most unwise, indeed down right foolish, to do otherwise. Given the present low morale in the work place and the fragile nature of those important teaching and research functions that have established the university’s reputation, it would be disastrous to add an extra load of insoluble amalgamation issues to an already overburdened work place (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 90).

On 10 October 1988 the Chancellor replied:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter to me concerning the proposed amalgamation of the University with two Colleges ... While I readily acknowledge that there have been many differing views held by members of the university about the proposed amalgamation I do not believe that there has been a single minded dash towards an irreversible process. At the insistence of the Minister we may have acted at an usually fast pace and in good faith the Councils of the three institutions have agreed to an amalgamation providing certain conditions are met. Though I do not consider amalgamation to be inevitable. I am most apprehensive of taking a position in which we seem unwilling to contemplate or negotiate an amalgamation. I must emphasise that we face a deficit of $900,000, I am mindful ... the way to reduce this deficit must lie in the salaries component. If we are obdurate in opposing amalgamation, it is my expectation that we will experience an even greater
reduction in the funds that we receive from the federal government (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 90).

This correspondence has been cited because the issues it exemplifies were never resolved and consequently the merger between Armidale College of Advanced Education and University of New England at Armidale, and the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education at Lismore, was not successful. Much effort and resources were expended to protect the merger from failure but these were only partially successful and not enough to save the unified university.

**Amalgamation**

**The Amalgamation Implementation Committee**

An Amalgamation Implementation Committee of nine persons (composed of three representatives from Armidale College of Advanced Education, University of New England at Armidale and Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education) was formed, with the University of New England at Armidale Vice-Chancellor (Don McNicol) as chairman. The Committee met for the first time on 26 August 1988 and for the last time on 6 August 1989 (see page 128). In August 1988 Armidale and Lismore campuses entered into a formal agreement to amalgamate. In addition to the Committee, shortly after this agreement, a Secretariat was established to support the unified institution. The secretariat was staffed on a trans-campus basis and had an external leader. The Committee met on twelve occasions, alternately at the Armidale and Lismore campuses. There were two reports that set out detailed plans for the proposed new institution. However there was frequent conflict within the Committee, especially between Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education and other members.

The situation was made more difficult by a flow of provocative statements (especially those reputed to be from senior Northern Rivers staff) criticising members. As an example just prior to the amalgamation a senior administrator at Northern Rivers claimed that the University of New England was bankrupt, when in fact the University of New England had $40 million invested in funds (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 pp 4 - 7). There were frequent public sessions of the committee where staff, or those with an agenda, could talk to those steering
working groups. The voluntary process of amalgamation made progress until late 1988 and early 1989. The Armidale campus (Armidale College of Advanced Education and the University of New England at Armidale) accepted the broad thrust of the process but soon afterwards the environment altered with the intervention of the State Government (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 pp 6 - 7).

**New South Wales Legislation and Policy**

In March 1989 Dr Terry Metherell, the New South Wales Minister for Education, circulated draft legislation providing for a number of mergers (including the UNE proposal). Three weeks later this legislation was passed with only minor amendments. However the University of New England Act 1989 departed from key ideas prepared by the Amalgamation Implementation Committee. Instead of establishing an integrated unitary institution it provided for a university network which was defined as a federation of the University of New England at Armidale, the University of New England Northern Rivers and network members as determined from time to time, such as Orange Agricultural College and Armidale College of Advanced Education.

The legislation also required appointment of a trans-campus Vice Chancellor together with a CEO for the Armidale and Northern Rivers campuses (each CEO being responsible to the governing board). This was contrary to the ideas of the Amalgamation Implementation Committee, which opted for a single CEO through appointment of a trans-campus Vice-Chancellor and Deputy Vice-Chancellor each based in Armidale (Amalgamation Implementation Committee, 1989 p 15). The Amalgamation Committee believed that the focus of the Vice-Chancellor’s role should be to provide overall academic leadership, to be responsible for institutional policy and planning, to conduct the university’s external relations and to monitor university performance. These differences were to become of major importance later. For example staff at Northern Rivers often used the legislation to press for the maximum degree of devolution, whereas senior staff at Armidale continued to believe they should work toward a highly integrated institution (Harman, 1993 p 129).
The process of implementation of the Metherell plan began in June 1989 and support was given by the Australian Vice-Chancellor’s Committee to secure the objectives of the plan through making available an expert on amalgamations known to it, to help support the merger of Armidale and Lismore campuses. The Minister also decided to introduce through legislation statutory roles for senior staff. This was quite contrary to the Armidale expectation but consistent with the Lismore idea that Lismore would be a separate university in the network. According to a commentator it now seemed clear that neither Armidale nor Lismore had an adequate appreciation of the benefits of a clearly unified university and did not test or seek clarity of the meaning of “network” in the context that had evolved (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 pp 47 - 48).

**Disamalgamation**

**UNE Staff Concerns**

The negotiation and merger process was watched by staff who raised issues in magazines and the local press about circumstances they could not agree to, or understand, or wished to speculate about. This was often the method adopted, as university authorities would not give permission for a referendum on the issue. An informal survey at the University of New England (Armidale campus) was undertaken. Details of the survey revealed a high degree of misinformation and confusion by staff, and that the process of change had not been adequately explained or communicated. The survey provides the only quantitative data on the views of the university at a critical time of its history. The survey was circulated to 1463 academic, administrative and general technical staff, 505 responses were received. The major response was from academic staff. Some of the results appear below – it is interesting to note the strong support for the continuation of the name of University of New England for the merged institution:

- Do you believe that there are good reasons for UNE considering amalgamation and/or expansion along the lines outlined in the Government White Paper? (51.3% no or not sure)
- Do you believe that the proposed amalgamation of the University of New England, Armidale College of Advanced Education and Northern Rivers...
College of Advanced Education by 1989, as you understand it is a good idea? (75.1% no or not sure)

- Do you feel that all the pros and cons for the amalgamation have been adequately investigated? (88.7% no or not sure)
- Do you feel that all the pros and cons for the amalgamation have been adequately explained to the staff and students of the University of New England? (91.3% no or not sure)
- Do you feel that the views of the academic staff of the University of New England should be canvassed after details of the proposed amalgamation are drawn up? (19.8% no or not sure)
- Do you feel that the views of the academic staff of the University of New England should be canvassed after details of the proposed amalgamation are drawn up, but before its implementation? (23% no or not sure)
- Do you think the name, the University of New England should be not negotiable in an amalgamation/expansion of the type currently being considered? (23.9% no or not sure) (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 pp 102 - 103).

**Student Growth Implications**

It was recognised by UNE that population numbers in the northern tablelands were static and it was consequently expected that funding to meet the needs of growing student numbers would most likely favour the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education. Consequently one of the considerations of the University of New England at Armidale in entering into a relationship with the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education was to try to make it possible for UNE to attract additional students, from the north coast. Increased demand for student places and the Commonwealth Government’s decision to allocate substantial additional funds to support growth, provided a new opportunity for institutions which wished to grow. Each of the University of New England constituent bodies were keen to achieve growth and, following amalgamation, the various campuses put a great deal of effort in trying to attract as much additional funded load as possible. After July 1989 such load was allocated in block to the network university and so inevitably disputes soon emerged on how additional load should be allocated between campuses. Since it was located in a region of rapid growth,
the Northern Rivers campus argued it should receive the bulk of the funded load. This issue was never resolved and gave way to a continuous dispute between Armidale and Northern Rivers campuses.

**Lack of Certainty and Unity**

Poor communication and apprehension about planning and equity within the network is illustrated in perceptions of “redundancy”, as in this example:

Not all cases were treated fairly, equitably or in accordance with the redundancy provisions which existed at the time. I know of staff that was made to prove their redundancy, … Some of the staff who were “pushed” by lure of redundancy packages have in fact been replaced … while other staff were left to lament their futures when their positions were deleted, promotion prospects destroyed and redundancy packages denied to them (R J Howard, in Smith’s Weekly, 27 May 1994 pp 4 - 5 in Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 74).

Again, some innovations in management methods were suggested at the time of the merger particularly in the budget area but these were not optimised and developed for the system as a whole, even though this had the potential to help working arrangements of the new university. Further there appeared to be a significant element of discord and disharmony stemming from the academic structures devised for the new institution. It would have made unity on central issues of academic professionalism easier to resolve and mentor if there had been a single set of faculties spanning all locations. Instead the provision of its own Academic Board at Lismore, and five component schools standing apart from the university-wide Senate (as the principal body to advise the Board of Governors), in practice reinforced a stand alone mentality at Lismore. This appeared to be a fundamental structural and thus political weakness given the differences in views and professional profiles of the Armidale and Lismore campuses (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 pp 48 - 49). The opportunity for Lismore to represent its educational ideas in a separate regional context was thus possible and highly connective to any aims for independent regional identity.

In fact the Amalgamation Implementation Committee had foreseen the need for coordination and development of professional issues for the new university and made the following comments:
The Amalgamation Implementation Committee believes that there must be arrangements which provide a formal framework for interaction between academic staff in the two network members who are engaged in related academic activities, which encourage the process of coordination and rationalisation, and which help create a sense of identity across campuses.

However, consistent with its previously stated view that the Academic Senate should have the principal responsibility for cross-campus academic coordination, the Amalgamation Implementation Committee recommended that the Academic Senate should identify areas of cognate academic activity which span the major campuses and, in each case, establish a joint Board of Studies which linked the Armidale Faculty and the Northern Rivers School concerned (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 49).

The development of tension between the campuses meant that little was served by the Joint Board concept. One commentator believed there was little interest in the concept. The issue was discussed and interim agreement made to establish the Joint Board concept but this was not realised when hostility arose between Lismore and Armidale over the introduction of honours degrees and higher degree courses, new rules for promotion of academic staff and allocation of research funding and new student load between campuses. Each campus insisted on having its own campus-based awards (Harman, 1993 p131). This proved to be a major reason why the merger did not succeed. Amalgamation became gradually unworkable. The network University of New England came into being in July 1989 and its structure as explained previously gave considerable autonomy to each campus and it was this advantage that Lismore made considerable effort to achieve. The belief of Lismore campus was that unless it stood firm and maintained its independence, Armidale campus would be predominate.

Early in 1990 Professor Robert Smith was appointed Vice-Chancellor and attempted to devolve activities substantially in line with the legislation and Lismore ideas. The activity and confusion which followed was substantial. Special government grants were given to facilitate the merger. There were numerous face-to-face meetings and considerable travel undertaken to make the merger work. The work of the Vice-Chancellor’s unit (with university wide responsibilities) was then seen at Armidale as an additional element of university
governance that would be unnecessary were it not for amalgamation and consequently its role was never clear to Armidale staff (Harman, 1993 pp 129 - 131). Unfortunately there was considerable antagonism towards the Vice-Chancellor’s unit when for example a new corporate logo was developed with the help of consultants. The cost of the consultancy, which included comprehensive advice on the nature and design of the logo and its use and application was $38,000. As a result the cost of the logo, and what was judged as its unsatisfactory appearance, the Vice-Chancellor’s unit became an object of ridicule (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 p 75).

**Errors in Judgment Contribute to the Dispute**

Errors in judgment and difficulties in other ways also jeopardised the network university. For example the campus principals were made Deputy Vice-Chancellors but it never seemed other than that they were chief officers of the competing elements of the university. Also basic concepts contained in the enabling State legislation were not fully clarified. It was unclear whether the new university was a federation or a federated network, a network or a network federation. The intent of the legislation was never made clear to all concerned and the tensions about interpretation were never resolved. When Professor R Smith was Vice-Chancellor he noted (in a memorandum of 26 March 1992) that differing views on the nature of the amalgamation were basic to the controversy that had become obvious to each of the university’s members.

He stated in the memorandum that the prevailing view was that on 17 July 1989, an amalgamation occurred with a clear commitment to unitary policies. However he said that Lismore had consistently argued that it joined a federation of equal partners and that the legislative network was therefore defective. Lismore (he said) also perceived that, while the intention was almost certainly otherwise, several of the Act’s provisions militated against achievement of a corporate identity for the university as a whole. He added that on the basis of this and on the fact that the third year of amalgamation was passing, it was obvious too much energy and money was being dissipated in the conflict (Harman and Robertson - Cuninghame, 1995 pp 80 - 81). This was no doubt due to the hands off approach of the State and Federal authorities.
Final Break Up of Network University

In early 1992 the bad relationships in the merged institution deteriorated and on 1 May 1992 its Board of Governors resolved to seek the support of the New South Wales Minister for Education and Youth Affairs to make possible a new arrangement i.e. in future the network should be broken up, and two separate universities should be developed, based in Armidale and Lismore. A detailed submission was prepared. Discussions then took place between the State and Federal Ministers for Higher Education and on 15 May 1992 an independent high-level advisory group headed by Professor Michael Birt was set up to consider the submission and restructure the university network. The Group was asked to report on the needs of the northern regions of New South Wales and to advise on the effects of the delivery of higher education within the existing University of New England network. The Committee reported to the Ministers in October 1992 and (inter-alia) made the following recommendations:

- A new university should be established on the North Coast region of New South Wales as an integrated institution incorporating the current University of New England campuses incorporating Lismore and Coffs Harbour.
- For a period of three years from the date of its establishment this university should be formally affiliated with and develop under the sponsorship of a major metropolitan university (most likely the University of Sydney).
- Orange Agricultural College should negotiate with the University of Sydney a form of institutional affiliation acceptable to both the New South Wales and Federal Governments.
- University of New England – Armidale incorporating the Armidale College of Advanced Education should be reconstituted as an autonomous university (Harman, 1993 p 132)

The two Ministers soon after accepted the recommendations and agreed that the University of New England network break up into two universities. There were numerous reasons seen at the time and in retrospect. Importantly were the differences in view over resourcing, status issues and therefore leadership of the
network. For example in a report to the March 1992 meeting of the Board of Governors, the Vice-Chancellor identified several major sources of tension in the university confirming the diagnosis of the network university previously given in this chapter:

- “A fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of amalgamation particularly at Armidale”. (Lismore saw the merger as formation of a federation, while Armidale saw it as an amalgamation implying commitment to unitary principles).
- Imprecision in the enabling legislation.
- Too much emphasis on devolution in the governance of the network.
- Enhancements made to governance structures were ineffective.
- The legislative framework for the network was ineffective (Harman, 1993 p 133).

Moreover:

Other university documents identified additional factors, such as the differences in culture between Armidale and Lismore campuses, sensitivities over academic status issues, difficulties of distance and communication between campuses because of the … distances involved and disputes over the allocation of financial resources and new funded student load (Harman, 1993 pp 133 – 134).

The views of the Principal of the Northern Rivers campus, Professor R Treyvaud, emphasises such difficulties. According to Treyvaud:

We (Northern Rivers campus) have had to protest at the lower level of funding provided for its students in comparison to other members of the network university.

Similarly Northern Rivers could not accept the diversion on tenuous premises of almost all research funds going to Armidale (Armidale Express, 20th May 1992 in Harman, 1993 p 134).

Another concern of the Lismore campus was that it could not accept the transfer of additional student load earmarked for the north coast, to campuses at Armidale and Orange.

The Birt Committee (Advisory Group) endorsed all of the reasons indicated for the failure of the network university. It identified a long list of achievements but these were insufficient to keep the merger a viable option. It said that a range of
factors contributed to what happened, in the evolving context of the University of New England and the following factors were of particular importance:

1. Differences in expectations of the legislation that created the network arrangement.
2. Complexity of structures of governance established by the legislative framework.
3. Problems associated with institutional funding: and

The Advisory Group commented on the difference of interpretation that Armidale and Lismore took as to how their relationship would evolve under the enabling legislation. It said for example:

The predominant view at Armidale was that the former University of New England, would as an established university in its own right have senior status in the new institution with respect to matters of academic planning and development, and that the new institution should function as an integrated unit with the complementary provision of courses at each campus.

The view at Northern Rivers, however was that the two network members specified in the Act (Armidale and Lismore campuses) should have equal status in all matters of institutional governance and academic operations, and that the institution should function as a loose federation of largely independent campus members (Report of the Joint Ministerial Advisory Group, in Harman, 1993 pp 134 - 135).

The Birt Committee also recognised that complexity of the governance structures contributed to difficulties especially with respect to the role of Vice-Chancellor and the campus principals (who were given chief executive status). It also pointed to the difficulties experienced by the university from making campus principals members of the governing body on an equal footing to the Vice-Chancellor. In the case of institutional funding the Birt Committee was also critical of the university move to an adoption of the Commonwealth Government’s relative funding model for internal allocations. It saw a three-fold effect resulting:

It forced redistribution of student funding throughout the university at a faster rate than the Commonwealth had accepted for adjusting institutional relativities across the system as a whole.

It attempted to provide recurrent research funding to all network members without regard to the record of performance.

It did not make adequate provision for discretionary adjustment to deal with existing staff commitments and institutional planning priorities as distinct from individual campus demands (Report of the Joint Ministerial Advisory Group in Harman, 1993 p 135).
It also noted that although the distances between campuses were not insurmountable individually the cumulative effect of these difficulties was to impede the process of institutional collaboration to the point where the development and maintenance of joint activities was unsustainable.

**Break Up in Retrospect**

In the view of Harman and others there have been numerous factors identified that explain why the merger was not successful. The fundamental reason for the discord and failed merger were the major differences in view of Armidale and Lismore as to whether the university should be a strong unified system of governance or a loose federation. These observers believed that not only were the two institutions from different sectors of higher education but that the two institutions had very different orientations and cultural traditions. The former University of New England was a very conservative British-style university with a traditional form of academic organisation of departments, and its academic staff had very little contact with the world of business and most of the major professions. It was often seen to be concerned about academic standards and especially how local and overseas institutions might see its work. Harman believed (and it seems more or less consistent with the public record) that the established University of New England held the belief that it would have to be accepted as a senior partner and the guardian of academic standards for the new university.

However as noted by Harman (and consistent with the public record) the Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education at Lismore was a relatively new institution, was academically organised in schools related to professional areas and most of its courses had strong vocational emphasis. Lismore had also become known for having established close contacts with business, a number of professions, and employers but had not undertaken similar action in the basic or non-applied humanities, social sciences, and physical and biological sciences. Even so, Lismore immediately claimed all the trappings of a university eg honours degrees, research masters degrees, PhD and infrastructure funding for research, and professorial titles for senior staff. Harman observed that Lismore demanded equal status to Armidale and was not prepared to recognise the
Armidale element as the guardian of academic standards for the network. Understandably a major conflict resulted (Harman, 1993 p 136).

Harman also noted that of vital importance to the merger failure was the eventual lack of deep commitment by Armidale and Lismore campuses to the merger, when a number of the basic motivations for the former UNE and the former Northern Rivers CAE combining soon lessened in importance or evaporated completely. For example staff at Armidale accepted the need for amalgamation on the basis that the Armidale campus fell short of the required EFTSU of 8000 for comprehensive research funding. It soon became obvious that the combination of University of New England campus and the Armidale College of Advanced education campus would be sufficient to gain full research funding. It also became clear that the Commonwealth Government was not going to enforce the EFTSU benchmarks as strictly as expected. There had also been a failure on Armidale’s part to communicate to Lismore the full benefits and key objectives that should be focused on through the merger. By about 1991 the possibility of Northern Rivers campus becoming a separate university became a genuine reality once several other institutions with far less than 8000 EFTSU were allowed to become separate universities (Harman, 1993 p 137).

According to Harman there appears to be another major factor that contributed to a failure of the merger: this was the structural aspect of the governance of the merger design. In his view a devolved structure not only did not suit an institution where key partners lacked strong commitment to stay together but created opportunity and motivation for Armidale and Lismore to press for independence and stand alone from each other. The network university was originally planned to be a unitary organisation with staff working together on teaching programs and especially combining expertise in offering degree and diploma courses by distance education. Many of the senior staff at Armidale campus argued strongly for cross-campus faculties. In response to pressure from Northern Rivers some concessions were made in early negotiations and following the passage of the legislation, which provided for a federated network structure further concessions were made. The merged university emerged from negotiations (with the proposal for cross-campus faculties having been largely defeated), and Lismore becoming identified
as a separate budget centre and having its own campus, academic board and advisory council. In the end at both Armidale and Northern Rivers campuses, academic boards and advisory councils played key roles in the push for dis-amalgamation (Harman, 1993 p 137).

Throughout the process of challenge and change a few personalities played a strong part in the break-up of the merged institutions. It is true that the staff at Armidale and Lismore frequently found it difficult to work together. According to Harman there were several changes at very senior levels (such as Vice-Chancellor) that limited the scope and perhaps the effectiveness of those who replaced them. Harman has also observed (consistent with the public record) that in some cases conflict appeared to be provoked by particular deliberate actions, and that a small number of staff played a key role when lobbying particular cases. He also says:

One notable feature of both the amalgamation negotiations and the events that led to the decision on dis-amalgamation break-up of the network university was that the key actors were almost exclusively from the former University of New England and the former Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education. Senior staff from the Armidale College of Advanced Education played a constructive role in the merger negotiations while the negotiations which resulted in Orange Agricultural College joining the network, proceeded smoothly and quickly. In the events leading to the decision on the break up of the university, former Armidale College of Advanced Education did not play a major role while senior staff at Orange supported continuation of the network university until the Ministers had made their decision (Harman, 1993 p138).

Summary

In summary then, the former University of New England initially combined with three colleges of advanced education to form the network University of New England. It was a voluntary amalgamation strongly supported by the State and Federal Governments. Unfortunately the history of the network, and the process of negotiations intended to make it viable, made it a failure. The network university was wound down to become two separate institutions by late 1993. According to Harman:

Participants and observers have identified many different factors that have contributed to the conflict and the break up but three factors were of particular importance. These were that the former University of New England and the former Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education proved to be unsuitable
partners who lacked a strong commitment to maintenance of a single amalgamated university but provided Armidale and Northern Rivers campuses with convenient local structures to use in the push for dis-amalgamation, and personalities played an important role (Harman, 1993 p 139).

Harman also observed that amalgamation had failed in that the combined institutions were required to split into two universities. However at the same time there had been quite a few achievements, especially in the range of courses available in northern New South Wales. Dis-amalgamation would therefore not mean going back to the pre-amalgamation days since a combined institution in Armidale would remain, and campuses at Lismore and Coffs Harbour on the north coast became part of the newly founded Southern Cross University centred at Lismore. He further noted that one important effect of the conflict between the former University of New England and the former Northern Rivers College of Advanced education was that the merger between the two institutions at Armidale received very little attention or public comment in 1988-89. However over the previous two decades various attempts had been made and failed to produce a merger. The context for change in this area had become justified and the merger proceeded without much trauma (Harman, 1993 p 139).

The lesson to be learned from this case study is that leadership can be fundamental to the successful implementation of a government policy. At no stage despite the early signs of conflict and misjudgement was the decision to merge withdrawn, and new partners tried within the time frame devised. Moreover feedback played virtually no role in the adjustments that were made. Sensitivities over finance and growth prospects, especially for the Lismore campus, were not resolved adequately. Poor leadership is the likely reason the project failed, at the political level in the network design, and at the managerial level in negotiating effective compromise.
Outline of Critical Events

1928
- Armidale CAE founded as Armidale Teachers College (and became a CAE in the 70s)

1938
- UNE Armidale began as a small university college of the University of Sydney (and became an autonomous university in 1954)

1960s
- Northern Rivers CAE was founded as Lismore Teachers College (and became a CAE in the 70s)

1970s
- Early 1970s Orange Agricultural College was established

1987
- UNE realised that on its own it would not qualify as a teaching and research university
- Lismore CAE realised it would not qualify as a broad teaching institute with some research activity
- Armidale CAE realised it had no prospects without merger with a larger tertiary institution
- Orange Agricultural College realised it had no prospects without merger with a larger tertiary institution
- In July immediately following to office of the Hawke Government John Dawkins becomes Federal Minister responsible for higher education
- Green Paper released by Dawkins (December)

1987-c. 1991
- Abolition of the binary system was a key event enhancing the prospect of mergers of nearby universities and CAEs
- State Governments put up little opposition to merger of tertiary educational institutions – this is important because educational institutions depend on State legislation

1988
- White Paper released by Dawkins (July)

1988-89 NSW Minister for higher education was Dr Tony Metherell
- October 1988 NSW position paper “The Future Structure of Higher Education in NSW” supported seven network universities
- On 10 August 1988 the UNE Armidale, Armidale CAE and Lismore CAE signed a document to work together towards a merger
Amalgamation Implementation Committee of 9 experts (3 from each institution) prepared two reports one interim in 1988 and one final in early 1989

Controversy surrounded the work of the Amalgamation Committee

1988-92

Controversy continued over governance issues Joint Boards of Studies were set up but these proved ineffective. Significant effort and special grants were made by government but to no avail.

1989

Minister Metherell intervened in early 1989 with controversial legislation – which made the merged university into a federated university

In early 1989 the Commonwealth provided growth funding to support UNE to begin teaching University courses at Coffs Harbour

Report of the Task Force on Amalgamations in Higher Education made available (April)

In July the Armidale CAE, the Lismore CAE and the University of New England Armidale form a “network university”

Orange Agricultural College approached UNE Armidale, and CAE Lismore and CAE Armidale

The NSW higher education system was rationalised from a system of 7 universities and 15 CAEs to one of 9 universities and no CAEs

Mid 1989 a trans-campus administrative unit was set up to facilitate the “network university” Armidale and Lismore each had there own CEO (responsible to the Board of Governors) and reported to the trans-campus Vice-Chancellor

1990

Orange Agricultural College joined the network (January)

1991

UNE at Coffs Harbour recognised as a university facility in its own right

1992

1 May Board of Governors resolved to request the NSW Minister for Education to replace the network university with two universities.

Birt Committee reviews the situation and supports request in October

1993

Two universities devolved from the network were created by end 1993
CHAPTER 6: IMPLEMENTATION

FAILURE — THE ANU MERGER

This chapter is the last of three discussing three separate Commonwealth government proposals to merge selected Australian tertiary institutions, all in line with the 1988 Labor government higher education policy discussed in Chapter 2. The three discussions are undertaken with a view to supporting the thesis argument that leadership is a key requisite for the successful implementation of policy.

The tertiary institutions discussed in this chapter are the Australian National University (ANU), the then-Canberra College of Advanced Education (CCAE), and the Canberra Institute of the Arts (CITA). The proposal was selected for discussion because it represents an important group of proposals under this policy, namely those that failed – the merger did not proceed. It is thus an example of failed policy implementation. The proposal was also the first attempt to merge two campuses of similar student numbers, and to merge a national institution with an institution committed to serving the need of a regional community. Leaders of each of the principal institutions were often in disagreement, and reliance by the Minister on reinforcing the stand-alone mentality of each institution as a way in which to resolve merger problems was counterproductive.

Institutional Profiles

The then-Australian National University was a medium sized university located in the centre of Canberra:

It was founded as a national research institution and … operates through two distinct components: the Institute of Advanced Studies and the Faculties. The university is a multi-disciplinary tertiary institution but has a limited academic profile, covering humanities, social sciences, economics, science, law and forestry (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 95).

In 1988 the Australian National University had 5,614 EFTSU, of which about 5,000 EFTSU were attracted from Canberra and the surrounding region to undertake undergraduate study in the Faculties. The Institute (a postgraduate
institute) attracted many of its research students from across Australia, as well as scholars from overseas (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 95).

In 1988 the *Canberra College of Advanced Education* was a small multi-disciplinary institution about 6 kilometres from the Australian National University and the Canberra Institute of the Arts. It was estimated that, at the time of the proposed merger, three quarters of its students undertook studies mainly in the areas of business, humanities, social science, education, mathematics/computing and science. The College also offered vocationally-oriented courses, for example, teacher education, nursing, accounting, architecture and tourism – all of which involve close collaboration with industry and employers (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 95).

The *Canberra Institute of the Arts* was at the time of the proposed merger a very small specialist institution (513 EFTSU in 1988). It offered higher education courses in the visual arts and music. The Institute also provided programs for preschool and school students as well as preparation courses for tertiary entrance. As part of the proposed merger the Institute was to benefit from the opportunity to offer postgraduate courses and to have access to the wide range of academic input available through the ANU’s graduate school (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 pp 95 - 96).

Responsibility for education in the *Australian Capital Territory* was held by the Commonwealth Department of Territories until 10 May 1989, when it became the responsibility of the ACT Legislative Assembly.

**The Amalgamation Process – I**

**The Commonwealth’s Proposal**

Following the issue of the Government White Paper on higher education in July 1988 the Minister responsible for education at the federal level (Mr John Dawkins) wrote on 26 July 1988 to the ANU, CCAE and CITA, suggesting that:
… the full range of educational benefits from amalgamation set out in the policy statement and substantial cost efficiencies would be generated if the three institutions were consolidated into a single university (Steering Committee on Amalgamation of the ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 p 1).

In his letter the Minister proposed that a new merged university (to operate at both the existing campuses) be established under Commonwealth legislation, possibly be called the Australian National University, and be governed by a Council of no more than 15 members. The Minister made arrangements to support implementation processes through the device of a steering committee, which was to be assisted by a reference group. Staffing and industrial relations matters would be discussed directly with the relevant staff associations and unions (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of the ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 p 1). The Minister’s letter indicated that:

… special consideration will be given to securing the position of the Institute of Advanced Studies in order to ensure the maintenance of its national and international reputation.

He also proposed that after a period of two years the Government:

… will review the relationship between the new university and the self governing ACT administration and will retain in Commonwealth legislation those functions that are of a clearly national character, particularly as they relate to the Institute of Advanced Studies (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of the ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 p 1).

It is noteworthy that the special role of the Institute of Advanced Studies, and the sensitivity concerning changes in its capacity or organisation, were recognised at the outset. The three institutions responded to the Minister’s letter of 26 July indicating a willingness to cooperate but stressing the need of certain conditions which should be recognised.

The Institutions’ Responses

CITA Response

Professor Karmel (Executive Chairman of CITA) took the view, as did his advisors – the Director of the Canberra School of Music and the Director of the Canberra School of Art, that CITA’s relocation within the new university would be straight-forward and advantageous for CITA provided that:
- The Institute’s schools continue to operate under their respective Directors.
- The Institute’s staff and courses maintained their orientation towards the practice of the arts.
- The selection criteria for staff and students, and the conditions of employment of staff, continued to reflect the special characteristics and needs of the Institute.
- The Institute retained the capacity to offer community-access activities, summer schools, non-award courses, and the artistical and music education of the very young (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of the ANU, CCAE and CITA, Appendix 2, pp 1 - 2).

Significantly CITA expressed a concern lest the name of the merged institution were to be other than Australian National University. Professor Karmel, on behalf of CITA, stated that the Australian National University had a considerable reputation (nationally and internationally) which had been built up over forty years by the many distinguished scholars and scientists who had been members of its academic staff. It would, he thought, be quite contrary to the interests of the institutions joining the newly formed university, the Australian Capital Territory, and the nation, to allow an investment of forty years to waste. This anxiety, as perceived by the three institutions, the Federal and Territory Governments, and local community, later evolved into a widespread debate (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of the ANU, CCAE and CITA, Appendix 2, 1988 p 2).

In addition Professor Karmel expressed the view that the proposal to review the relationship between the merged university and the ACT administration after two years was a matter of concern. Although not clear from the public record he may have feared that there was a possibility of a future split in the enlarged university (as for example in the organisation and relationship of the Institute of Advanced Studies and its relationship with the new university). He believed this possibility would mean additional uncertainty and consequently less definite plans for the merger to succeed (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of the ANU, CCAE and CITA, Appendix 2, 1988 pp 1 - 2).
**CCAЕ Response**

Ms Lynne Wenig (Acting Chair of the CCAЕ council) wrote in reply to the Minister that there were positive educational advantages for the merger and that the CCAЕ would like to see the following aspects incorporated in the merger:

- Continued access for a wide range of students and maintenance of service to the needs of local public and private employers.
- Retention of links with the local community including TAFE.
- A new name recognising both the national and local roles of the new institution, which would symbolise the fact that a merger rather than a takeover was occurring.
- New legislation rather than amendments of existing legislation; and
- A selection process for all senior staff positions which should be declared vacant (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of the ANU, CCAЕ and CITA, Appendix 2, 1988 pp 4 - 5).

The CCAЕ was attempting to support the Minister’s initiative to bring about a merger but in its own response clearly emphasised that there needed to be much emphasis on a fresh start, and a high degree of equality in standing of the CCAЕ and the ANU. This approach was not supported by ANU.

**ANU Response**

In reply to the Minister’s letter Sir Gordon Jackson (Chancellor of the ANU) noted the university’s strong preference to remain a separate institution with cooperative links with the CCAЕ, and wrote that the amalgamation proposed should preserve and enhance educational effectiveness and that he regarded the following conditions as vital if the amalgamation was to proceed:

- The name Australian National University be retained.
- The new institution be regarded as a national institution established by an act of the Commonwealth Parliament.
- The university Council be free of detailed government regulation and maintain a balanced representation of interests and expertise.
- The particular characteristics of the Institute of Advanced Studies be preserved as defined in the ANU Act.
● Existing contractual obligations of the three institutions be carried forward so that staff may transfer with the minimum disruption, without loss of benefits and in compliance with existing awards.

● The current range of research and teaching activities, the international, national and regional functions of the Faculties, and the strong links in postgraduate research and teaching with the Institute of Advanced Studies, should be preserved and extended (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITa, 1988 pp 3 - 4).

As can be seen in the emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo in the ANU reply to the Minister, the issues concerning (inter alia the future role of the Institute of Advanced Studies) were to be handled by ANU in a highly defensive manner, as it viewed the IAS as contributing significantly towards its national and international reputation.

**Changes in Points of View Over Time**

Points of view expressed in initial responses to the Minister’s letter (indicated earlier) did not vary much over the period of debate. The ANU and CCAE attempted to give support to the Minister’s request but really did not wish for amalgamation to be achieved. CITA sought to amalgamate with ANU, as it thought this was straightforward, but did not rule out merger with the CCAE. For example the ANU advised Dawkins in August 1988 (and later) of its strong preference to remain a separate institution working cooperatively with the CCAE (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988a). The Canberra College of Advanced Education only supported the amalgamation as part of a process whereby it could become a university. Consequently, in correspondence with the Minister it highlighted the prospect of it becoming a stand-alone institution, which could be achieved if the CCAE was recognised as a university of technology, or if an association was formed by the College with an established university, to eventually become a stand-alone university (CCAE Council Minutes of 22 February 1988 and correspondence of August 1988 (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988b).
The possibility of a CITA merger with ANU was not as uncertain. CITA strongly supported the amalgamation with the ANU given its proximity to the ANU campus and the excellent relationship it had with ANU staff - indeed staff sometimes interchanged between these institutions, and there was a long history of mutual respect. Professor Karmel consistently indicated the strong preference of CITA for independence but, failing that, amalgamation with ANU. The continued context of debate created an uncertain environment but Minister Dawkins indicated his preference for the planned merger to proceed due to the expected benefits of economies of scale and wider choice available to students that could be expected if the merger were to proceed (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988a).

The Hudson Steering Committee, and the Reference Group

A Steering Committee, and the Reference Group, were set up by the Minister to assist with the merger, and were supported by the Commonwealth Department responsible for education. Although not clear from the public record it seems likely the committees were given instructions to make the merger successful.

The Steering Committee was headed by Mr Hugh Hudson (the former Chairman of the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission) other committee members were Professor Roger Scott (Principal of Canberra College of Advanced Education), Professor Peter Karmel (Executive Chairman of the Canberra Institute of the Arts), Professor Laurie Nichol (Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University) and Mr Keith Lyon (Deputy Secretary) (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITA, Appendix 1, 1988 p 4). The ACT Legislative Assembly was not created until 10 May 1989. The Steering Committee (sometimes known as the Hudson Committee) met for the first time on 1 August 1988 and in all met nine times. On the 6th and 29th of September 1988 the Committee met with a broadly-based Reference Group that the Minister had indicated would be set up, after consultations with interested parties, to provide advice on proposals put to it or which it devised.
The Reference Group’s membership comprised representatives of academic and general staff and students, the Trades and Labor Council of the ACT, and the Confederation of ACT Industry. The Registrar of the ANU, the Assistant Principal (Administration) of the CCAE and the Secretary of CITA attended Reference Group meetings, but in an ex-officio non-voting capacity: it is not clear from the public record why this was so but it could be to promote freedom of discussion and independent resolution of issues.

Meetings of the Steering Committee and the Reference Group were held generally in a supportive manner in an attempt to find resolution to specific problems, and also possibly to give high priority to the Minister’s wishes. For example, following the first meeting of the Reference Group with the Steering Committee on 6 September 1988 the Reference Group met on 16 September 1988 to consider further the question of the size of the Council of the new university. The resolutions passed at its meeting were presented to the Steering Committee and discussed at the joint meeting of 29 September. They included a resolution that if the Reference Group’s preferred option of around 25 members was unacceptable to the Minister, a non-representative Council of no more than 10 members be established. (The Minister had indicated he envisaged a governing Council of no more than 15 members. The Reference Group proposal was thus a compromise developed to support the Minister’s wishes, although the reasons for this are unclear from the public record) (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 p 4).

The Size of the New University

The Committee noted that the new institution, if amalgamation proceeded, would have a student load in excess of 10,000 EFTSU and could thus qualify easily for membership of the Federal Government’s Unified National System. It would thus be eligible for funding by the Federal authorities as a national institution capable of offering a broad range of teaching and research activities, and the preservation of the Institute of Advanced Studies together with the research activities of the Faculties would provide a research base in excess of the larger State universities. The amalgamation offered the prospect of economies of scale, which in the medium to longer term could permit an economical expansion in student numbers.
Any additional costs stemming from the amalgamation would be met from the reserve fund maintained by the Federal Government for such a purpose. In addition the amalgamation would permit wider subject choices in some courses and help to build up student numbers in those subjects where there was capacity (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 pp 4 - 5).

The ACT and surrounding region of New South Wales were seen as areas of growth in demand for higher education. The enlarged university would be well placed to support significant expansion of student load, particularly due to the good prospects of the availability of part-time work and accommodation suitable for students in the ACT. Consequently the Committee felt strongly (but probably unrealistically) that the Federal Government should commit to twenty per cent growth in the new university’s student load over the following four to five years, as this could lead to a substantial contribution by the new university to meet Australia’s demand for tertiary education. The Committee hoped that such large-scale growth would resolve issues such as the job prospects for academic and general staff, and the creation of new faculties beyond what otherwise would have been the case (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 pp 5 - 6).

**The Name of the New University**

The Steering Committee viewed the amalgamation as requiring a new act of Parliament and the repeal of all existing legislation which might otherwise have applied. Various views were put forward to the Committee on the appropriate name with the aim of emphasising that the merger would create a new institution and did not involve an ANU takeover of other institutions. The suggestions included variations on the name “The Australian National University, Canberra”. Other names suggested included “Chifley University” and the “National University of Australia”. Retention of the name “Australian National University” was strongly supported by those associated with the existing ANU and the Canberra Institute of the Arts. The Canberra College of Advanced Education staff and students indicated this name was not first choice but they would accept the name “Australian National University” to facilitate the merger (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 pp 9 - 10).
**The Time Table for Action**

The Committee considered that the amalgamation should proceed urgently, that enabling legislation should pass both Houses of Parliament before the end of the calendar year, and that before the Minister determined the final form of the bill, senior management of the existing institutions be given the opportunity to comment on the draft legislation. Public awareness of the issues surrounding the merger was prompted by the widespread public and internal campus debates that resulted (Steering Committee on the Amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITA, 1988 p 11).

**The Kinloch Committee**

The widespread political and parliamentary debate following the work of the Hudson Committee, together with the internal debates within the institutions, led to the development of a report conducted by the ACT authorities. The report broke new ground (including the relationship of the ANU, CCAE and CITA to the ACT authorities) – as self-government was at that time new to the Territory. The chair of the committee that undertook the report was Dr H Kinloch, Deputy Chair was Mr Bill Wood and the member was Mr Gary Humphries. The ACT legislative Assembly appointed the committee on 1 June 1989 to inquire into and report on the possible amalgamation of the three institutions, the alternatives to full amalgamation and the relationship between the ACT executive and the institutions (see page 146). The committee was requested to report to the Assembly on 27 July 1989 (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p 5).

The Kinloch Committee, according to the public record, was supportive of the move being made by the Federal Government to encourage rationalisation of higher education in the Territory. Consequently this Committee recommended that ANU and CITA move towards amalgamation under Commonwealth legislation (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p vii). Due to the financial relationship between CITA and the ACT government stemming from self-government in the Territory the Committee recommended that a formal agreement between the ACT Government and CITA be entered into spelling out the facilities and services CITA would provide, and the funding and assistance made available when received from the ACT Government (Australian Capital
Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p vii). The Committee viewed the CCAE as a responsibility of the ACT Administration, and accordingly recommended the Commonwealth Government transfer the CCAE to the ACT Government (with funding under existing arrangements) (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p vii).

The Committee also recommended that, whatever its eventual status, the CCAE be established (as is the case for other state or territory-based institutions) under ACT legislation as a university as soon as possible (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p vii). The Committee recognised that the community and internal debate concerning the prospect of an ANU and CCAE merger could mean the merger was a long way off. However the Committee recommended the ANU and CCAE hold discussions to see whether a merger could be possible and in addition encouraged the ANU and CCAE to move towards formal and informal collaborative agreements (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p vii).

According to the public record, the Committee also saw benefit in the ANU’s Institute of Advanced Studies and the Faculties moving towards greater cooperation and collaboration. The changes recommended were not restricted to the bilateral and multi lateral aspects of the merger proposed between ANU, CCAE and CITA (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p vii). The Committee also pointed out a unique feature of the proposed merger between the ANU, CCAE and CITA, namely, up to late 1988 there had been only one example of an amalgamation between two already-established universities i.e. Murdoch University and the University of Western Australia. Given the expectation that the CCAE would become a university, the alternatives to the merger should be seen in this context (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p 15).

In summary the Kinloch Committee viewed the principal task of those seeking to negotiate an ANU, CCAE and CITA merger as identifying models that would realise the benefits of amalgamation, without impairing the distinctive features of the current institutions. Given this outlook the necessary steps would need to be
taken, in the opinion of the Committee, very cautiously (Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, 1989 p 15).

The Disamalgamation Process

The CCAE's Perceptions and Tactics

The CCAE was motivated strongly to finalise its position by September 1988, as Dawkins invited all institutions that wished to join the Unified National System to do so by the end of September 1988 (Dawkins, 1988 p 28). However the CCAE did not wish to seek an association with the ANU unless it could ultimately be independent. In the Council minutes of 22 February 1989 the following motion of August 1988 was recalled: “CCAE Council prefers to stand alone as a university in its own right or as a university of technology” (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988b). However neither of these options was supported by Dawkins. The CCAE request was overshadowed by the finalisation of the Hudson Committee Report, that affirmed the amalgamation of the three institutions and its presentation to Minister Dawkins in October 1988 (see page 149).

There were further developments that also overshadowed the CCAE request. On 28 November 1988 Sir Geoffrey Yeend (Chair of the Interim Council of the new university in the ACT) recommended to Dawkins that Professor Laurie Nichol (Vice-Chancellor of the ANU) become Vice-Chancellor and Professor Roger Scott (Principal of the CCAE) become Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the proposed new university (Department of Education, Science and Training, 1989). The Minister later announced legislation to merge the ANU, CCAE and CITA in December 1988 (see page 149). According to the public record Dawkins did not at this stage depart from his plan to merge the three institutions and appeared to rely on each of the institutions to negotiate the merger.

There were also differences of opinion within the CCAE about what should be achieved. For example CCAE staff took a different position to that of CCAE Council at its meeting of 21 February 1989, and confirmed their support for the proposed merger of ANU, CCAE and CITA. Staff clearly saw the benefits of
being upgraded to university level that would be brought about if a merger were possible as proposed (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988b). However the CCAE Council continued to be doubtful of the benefits of merger with ANU and CITA and on 22 February 1989 reaffirmed its preference to stand alone (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988b). Council also resolved to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding between the three parties if this was still possible. This was achieved on 22 February 1989 (see page 149). It was hoped that this framework would encourage negotiations between the parties and that amalgamation could be devised and put into practical effect. On 8 March 1989 Dawkins advised the CCAE of his continued preference for the merger (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988b). This advice meant that the proposed merger was still the preference of the Federal Government and that the CCAE request for independence would be refused at this stage (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988b).

By May 1989, the legislation to permit the merger of the ANU, CCAE and CITA had been passed in the House of Representatives, but not in the Senate due to Opposition and Democrat opposition. According to the public record it had become clear at this stage that ANU Council, ANU Professorial Board and ANU Staff Association opposed the three-way merger (but not the merger with CITA) because of their perception that the ANU was the senior academic partner of the CCAE. In addition the ANU Council resolved that both the Institute of Advanced Studies and the Faculties should remain together under Commonwealth legislation. This may have been due to speculation that these two bodies would be affected at a later stage by new organisation proposals yet to be discussed, and especially through funding proposals which may have proven less generous (Department of Education, Science and Training, 1989)

In June 1989, according to the public record, the ANU proposed to the CCAE a federal model whereby each campus would be autonomous and pursue separate and distinctive missions but whose governance and financial control was centralised (see page 150). This was rejected outright by the CCAE. The CCAE decided not to let the ANU at Acton benefit from counting College students in their numbers to preserve research funding and then be considered as a campus
with a second-class role in the new institution (Department of Education, Science and Training, 1989). The CCAE did not let matters rest. On 24 July it indicated to the Federal Government a plan to commence an association with the University of New South Wales to become a university in its own right. This lapsed, possibly due to the already strong association between the University of New South Wales and the Defence Force Academy that was already established (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1988c). The CCAE continued to press for a solution that would lead to it becoming recognised as a university (but not through a merger with ANU and CITA as had been proposed) and sought recognition as a university in its own right. For example on Wednesday 9 August 1989 it passed several important motions at its Council meeting (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1989b):

Council agreed that as a matter of urgency the College should be created the University of Canberra by legislative action (Resolution C185/3).

Council agreed to accept the views of the Kinloch Committee, the ACT Government … … that a form of association with an institution other than ANU, would strengthen the College’s case for immediate action. Council agreed that the sponsorship by the ANU or further negotiations to vary the terms of the merger proposed in the current federal legislation and Memorandum (of Understanding) would be unacceptable (Resolution CI85/4).

Council agreed to authorise the Principal to enter into discussions with a view to forming an association with Monash University, to discuss the matter further with the CCAE Academic Board and report back to Council on arrangements formally proposed (Resolution C185/5).

Council agreed to authorise the Principal to write to Minister Dawkins confirming the view that the College regards such an association as an appropriate alternative to merger with the ANU, which now appears unattainable in light of ANU attitudes. Council agreed that this association should be for three years from January 1990 and that future arrangements will be considered during 1992 (Resolution C185/6).

The CCAE moved quickly to form an association with Monash University when authorised by Council (see page 150). At its meeting on 22 August 1989 the Academic Board of the CCAE unanimously endorsed a draft Memorandum of Agreement, drawn up after discussions between CCAE staff and the Monash Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor of Monash University visited the CCAE campus on 15 August 1989 to meet the management committee and officers of the Federal Department responsible for education. The College Academic Board no
longer saw as viable a merger with ANU as such an idea was only possible if the staff of each of the participating institutions had a commitment to genuine partnership. The Hudson Report, the subsequent negotiations of the terms of the draft legislation, the draft legislation itself and Memorandum of Understanding were all based on the presupposition of a genuine partnership and the integrated structure of a single board. This no longer seemed possible in the case of the ANU and the CCAE. Legislation was introduced to create the University of Canberra in October 1989 (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1989a p1).

Often opinions expressed during debates at the ANU on its various academic boards suggested that many staff members at ANU were not committed to such a partnership, possibly as it was not considered one of equals. For example of the five Faculties projected to be merged with the CAE six schools, four rejected the whole idea (in some cases by substantial majorities). The Science Faculty of the ANU although supportive indicated a large dissenting minority. The Research Schools (whose interests were to be protected by legislation) only supported the merger by a majority vote (3 Schools with particularly close subject relevance to College activities voted against merger). Consequently the CCAE perceived that the argument in favour of the merger was always phrased in terms of protecting the existing ANU’s financial viability, while promising that there would be minimal structural change. In practice this would mean that:

Staff at Acton would have the comfort and protection of their own version of an academic board, would not have to accept enrolments from students doing courses which would still be located at Bruce, would not have to mix with staff from Bruce or horror of horrors – be located there (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1989a p 2).

Not surprisingly on 8 September 1989 ANU wrote to Dawkins indicating it had resolved to terminate the Memorandum of Understanding with the CCAE, preferring separate development but possible collaboration at a later stage with the CCAE (see page 151) (Department of Education, Science and Training, 1989). The College at this stage fiercely advocated its right to associate with Monash University to become a university:

It would be an intolerable and politically indefensible outcome if the College were faced with making all these arguments again after a delay of 8 months-- a delay which would have allowed the ANU another academic year of exploiting
the benefits arising from defence of the status quo. This is one of the major reasons advanced at Academic Board for supporting the Monash alternative. It is now an urgent matter for the College to be able to carry forward these discussions (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1989a pp 2 - 3).

Senator McMullan on behalf of the Government expressed his concern that the College should be able to move rapidly to university status:

It cannot be left on the shelf as the only college of advanced education. Which route it takes to university status is a secondary question. For me, it is a matter for the institution itself to sort out, but I am concerned that it should not be forced down a particular route. … … that this will not be the case and the developments in relation to Monash are important in that regard” (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1989a p 3).

The University of Canberra was formally created in January 1990 through Commonwealth legislation.

**Dawkins’ Options in 1989**

The following propositions were put to Dawkins by public service staff in July 1989, to clarify Commonwealth options at this juncture:

- Full amalgamation of ANU, CCAE and CITA – this was the Minister’s preference but increasingly becoming unlikely due to the political and contestable nature of debate that had developed concerning such a merger.
- Amalgamation of the CCAE and CITA and retain the ANU as a separate Commonwealth institution. This prospect was in conflict with the straightforward option available to CITA to merge with the ANU. Both institutions had a long history of mutual respect and had interchanged staff. Consequently it was unlikely that CCAE and CITA merge and ANU remain a stand-alone institution.
- Amalgamate ANU and CITA and establish the CCAE as the University of Canberra under ACT legislation. This option was feasible so long as it was true that the CCAE did not wish to amalgamate with CITA and that there was a suitable university to support the CCAE becoming a university.
- Establish the CCAE as a university college under sponsorship of ANU through Commonwealth legislation. This option to date had proven impossible due to ANU and CCAE attitudes.
● Establish the CCAE as a university of technology. According to the public record, the Commonwealth or ACT Government did not pursue this option despite the strong links of the CCAE to TAFE.

● Establish the CCAE as a university college under sponsorship of the University of New South Wales. The reason this option was not adopted is unclear from the public record, but was possibly due to the already close connections of the University of New South Wales to the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra.

● Separate the faculties from the ANU and join these with the CCAE to become the University of Canberra. This option was fiercely opposed by the ANU which vigorously supported the status quo and would therefore be unlikely to be successful.

● Develop affiliation agreements between each institution and not formal amalgamation agreements, as these may not be possible. This would be a straightforward status quo exercise.

● Develop connections between each institution that were loosely federal whereby each institution retained its autonomy. Federal models (discussed above in this chapter) were opposed by the CCAE as an acceptable form of affiliation.

● Defer action on amalgamations for a period – Departmental Officers had a strong preference for this believing the institutions concerned were reform-weary

● Cease all action – if necessary (Department of Education, Science and Training, 1989).

As can be seen from the analysis of options above the scope to change higher education in the ACT had become limited by mid- and late-1989 and throughout 1990. The prospect of change in the ACT continued to be supported by Dawkins but the leadership of the process of change was increasingly left to each institution and the ACT government. For example the association of the CCAE and Monash University provided the CCAE with a window of opportunity on what it perceived as a breakthrough in the stalemate with the ANU. It was proposed by Monash that the association with the CCAE would extend for up to three years without full amalgamation by Monash of the CCAE being necessary or taking place. It was
also made clear that future merger of the CCAE with ANU would not be ruled out (Department of Education, Science and Training, 1989)).

The Amalgamation Process – II

The Future Role of the Institute of Advanced Studies at the ANU

The role of the IAS continued to be a point of study and dispute because of its historical importance and connection with the ANU. The ANU began soon after World War Two as an all-research establishment (similar to the CSIRO) on a campus next to the Canberra University College. In 1960 Mr (later Sir Robert) Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, merged these two bodies (the Institute of Advanced Studies and the Canberra University College) to form the ANU. As previously explained the Dawkins plan to merge the ANU with the CCAE became stalled and the next opportunity for consideration of the merger arose with the release of a report concerning the future of the IAS undertaken by a committee headed by a former Governor-General (Sir Ninian Stephen) which reported on 26 October 1990 (see page 151). The committee’s terms of reference were:

To review and report upon the role and standing of the Institute of Advanced Studies in the Australian higher education and research system, paying particular attention to:

- the respective roles of the Institute and other Australian research and higher education institutions
- the role of the Institute as a national centre for research in particular areas
- the development and maintenance of interactive links with the national education and international research community
- the role of the institute in postgraduate and post doctoral education and training, and
- the mechanisms of funding for the Institute (Sir Ninian Stephen et al, 1990 p ii)

In its report this Committee recognised that:

In most respects the Institute of Advanced Studies met outstandingly well its charter of engaging in research and in providing advanced training at the highest international standard and in areas of national importance to Australia (Sir Ninian Stephen et al, 1990 p 17).

The Committee recommended that the Institute continue these functions and in addition become a resource for the higher education research system and the Australian research system as a whole. The other major recommendations were
that the Institute should implement a new type of academic appointment subject to five-year review and major restructuring of the John Curtin School of Medical Research (ANU, 1981b).

Following publication of the Stephen Report, the Minister for Higher Education and Employment Services, Mr Peter Baldwin (an assistant to Dawkins) commissioned Professor Ian Chubb (Chair of the Government’s Higher Education Council) to report on the implications of the Stephen Report for education in the ACT. Professor Chubb visited the ANU campus in December 1990 and his report was made public circa January 1991 (ANU, 1981b). A key recommendation of Professor Chubb was that the ANU Faculties be amalgamated with the newly established University of Canberra, (ANU, 1981b). In a press statement of 16 January 1991, the ANU Acting Vice-Chancellor accepted most of the recommendations of the Stephen Report, but rejected by implication any prospect of the separation of aspects of the John Curtin School of Medical Research and implementation of some aspects of IAS staff tenure that had been suggested (ANU, 1981a). Prior to an ANU Council meeting in February resolutions were passed by the Faculty of Arts, Asian Studies, Law, the Faculties and the Institute of Advanced Studies rejecting the Chubb Report, and a report from the staff of the Faculty of Science rejecting the recommendations of the Chubb Report was resolved (ANU, 1981a).

Due to the history of political and educational contestability the proposed merger of the University of Canberra and the ANU and CITA lapsed. On 13 July 1990 the ANU Council resolved subject to the passing of appropriate legislation to amalgamate with CITA (see page 147). This took place on January 1 1992 (ANU, 1991). CITA also changed its name to Australian National University Institute of the Arts. The University of Canberra due to the complexities of politics and the history of the issues surrounding the issue of its future became a stand-alone institution under ACT legislation on 1 December 1997.

**Summary**

Implementation of the initial Dawkins plan was not successful due to the differences of opinion at Council level as to the nature of the proposed new
university, the inability of staff and university councils of the two institutions to find common ground, and the absence of ANU and CCAE leaders working hard to achieve a mutually satisfactory merger. The ANU regarded itself as the senior academic partner and believed it had the role of determining when the CCAE would become a university. There was limited scope in 1988 and 1989 left to the CCAE, if it wished to be granted university status, to seek association with another university. The option of merger with the ANU remains even to the present day but is highly unlikely given the history of the controversy entailed, both initially when Dawkins first approached the CCAE in 1988, and later, in the subsequent second attempt to see if change was possible, ushered in by the Stephen and Chubb reports.

In terms of achieving successful implementation of the Dawkins policy, leadership of the ANU and CCAE was poor. Leaders of each of the institutions were often in disagreement and unable to resolve differences to the point where it appears that they were, in fact, unwilling to work together to create a mutually acceptable merger solution, perhaps because they doubted their own ability to effect the necessary changes in academic culture involved. Unfortunately the Minister reinforced their stand-alone mentality, mistakenly thinking this would reduce differences in opinion on the proposed merger, especially that proposed for ANU and the CCAE.
Outline of Critical Events

1987

- In July immediately following to office of the Hawke Government John Dawkins becomes Federal Minister responsible for education
- Green Paper circulated by Dawkins (December)

1987-c. 1991

- Abolition of the binary system was a key event enhancing the prospect of mergers of nearby universities and CAEs
- State Governments put up little opposition to merger of tertiary educational institutions – this is important because educational institutions depend on State legislation

1988

- Meetings of steering committee chaired by Hudson commence circa July. (Members: H R Hudson, L W Nichol, K Lyon, P H Karmel, and R Scott)
- Meetings of reference group for steering committee commence circa July 1988. (Members: academics, staff, and students from ANU, CCAE, CITA and community)
- White Paper circulated by Dawkins (July)
- Minister writes to each institution requesting amalgamation along the lines suggested in the Green and White Papers (26 July)
- Internal and community discussions commence circa mid-1988 onwards
- ANU letter to Dawkins indicating strong preference of ANU to remain a separate institution working cooperatively with the CCAE (12 August)
- CCAE Council prefers to stand alone as a university in its own right or as a university of technology (August)
- Hudson report to Dawkins (October)
- Sir Geoffrey Yeend (Chair of Interim Council of the new university in ACT), recommends Professor Laurie Nichol of ANU be Vice-Chancellor and Roger Scott Principal of CCAE be Deputy Vice-Chancellor (28 November)
- Dawkins introduces legislation in Federal Parliament to amalgamate CCAE, ANU and CITA (December 1)

1989

- The meeting of the CCAE Association of Academic Staff confirms its support for the proposed merger of the ANU, CCAE and CITA (21 February)
- CCAE reaffirms stand-alone position (22 February)
- Memorandum of Understanding between CCAE, ANU and CITA commenced in adversarial atmosphere (22 February)
- Dawkins advises CCAE of his continued preference for merger of CCAE with ANU and CITA (8 March)
● Report of the Task Force on Amalgamations in Higher Education made available (April)
● CCAE seeks association with University of New South Wales to become a university (24 July)
● Dawkins presses for merger between CCAE, ANU and CITA in meeting with ACT Select (Kinloch) committee prior to its final report (mid 1989)
● Current situation perceived by education advisors of Dawkins (2 May) :
  1. Permit amalgamation of CCAE, ANU and CITA as legislation now passed by House of Representatives but not by Senate
  2. Opposition and Democrats oppose the amalgamations
  3. ANU Council, ANU Professorial Board and ANU Staff Association oppose 3-way amalgamation and support merger with CITA (this concurs with opposition position)
  4. ANU Council resolves that IAS and the Faculties remain together under Commonwealth legislation
● CCAE rejects ANU proposal to federate and emphasises amalgamation should mean true integration (June)
● Dawkins considers all options (14 July)
  1. Full amalgamation of CCAE, ANU and CITA
  2. Amalgamate ANU, CITA and retain CCAE as separate Commonwealth institution
  3. Amalgamate CCAE and CITA and retain ANU as separate Commonwealth institution
  4. Amalgamate ANU and CITA and establish CCAE as University of Canberra under ACT legislation
  5. Establish CCAE as a university college under sponsorship of ANU through Commonwealth legislation
  6. Establish CCAE as university of technology
  7. Establish CCAE as a university college under sponsorship of the University of New South Wales
  8. Separate the Faculties from the ANU, join the Faculties with CCAE to become University of Canberra
  9. Develop affiliation arrangements between each institution
  10. Develop “federation” arrangements whereby institutions retain autonomy
  11. Defer action (very strong preference)
  12. Cease all action
● ANU and CITA finalise an affiliation agreement (24 July)
● Legislation to amalgamate ANU and CITA prepared (24 July)
● Report of ACT Select (Kinloch) Committee on Tertiary Amalgamation tabled (27 July)
  1. ANU and CITA to merge
  2. CCAE to be incorporated under ACT legislation
  3. Longer term roles of the ANU and CCAE to be developed – later merger not ruled out
● CCAE to develop association with Monash to become university (4 August)
  1. Sponsorship might extend for three years
  2. Full amalgamation ruled out by Monash
3. Agreement not to rule out future merger with ANU

- CCAE Council agreed that as a matter of urgency the CCAE be created a university through legislative action (9 August)
- CCAE Council stipulates no variations further acceptable to negotiations concerning: ANU sponsorship, the terms of merger with ANU and CITA and the Memorandum of understanding (9 August)
- CCAE Council authorises association with Monash University to become a university (9 August)
- ANU resolves to terminate the Memorandum of Understanding to amalgamate with CCAE and CITA and prefers separate development and possible collaboration with CCAE but merge with CITA (circa 8 September)
- CCAE Council agreed that CCAE, ANU and CITA amalgamation not attainable at present (13 September)
- Legislation is introduced into Federal Parliament to establish the CCAE as the University of Canberra under sponsorship of Monash (4 October)

1990

- University of Canberra created (January) through Commonwealth legislation
- ANU Council resolved (13 July) subject to passing of legislation to amalgamate with CITA. The planned date for amalgamation being 1 January 1991.

Proposed ANU changes 1990-1991:

- Review of IAS by Sir Ninian Stephens (October 1990) recommends that IAS continue as stand-alone and become national resource, and that John Curtin School of Medical Research become self-governing and funded by NHMRC
- Mr Baldwin (Minister assisting Dawkins) soon commissions Professor Ian Chubb to report on implications:
  - Chubb recommends (circa January 1991) that the Faculties should amalgamate with the University of Canberra
  - In a press statement of 16 January 1991, the ANU Acting Vice-Chancellor accepted most of the recommendations of the Stephen Report, but rejected by implication separation of aspects the John Curtin School of Medical Research and implementation some aspects of IAS staff tenure that had been suggested
- Prior to an ANU Council meeting in February resolutions were passed by the Faculty of Arts, Asian Studies, Law, the Faculties and the Institute of Advanced Studies rejecting the Chubb Report, and a report from the staff of the Faculty of Science rejecting the recommendations of the Chubb Report was resolved
- Moves to merge the ANU and University of Canberra stagnate

1992

- ANU and CITA amalgamate (1 January) with CITA to be known as the Australian National University Institute of The Arts
1997

- University of Canberra stand alone institution under ACT legislation (1 December)
CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I examine the extent to which the Cerych and Sabatier model of implementation in the higher education sector explains the observed outcomes. Results of reach of the case studies are discussed, followed by a table which analyses the principal and allied factors which led to the results of the implementation of the Dawkins policy. The key factor which appears to explain both the successes and the failures of the college and university mergers in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia is leadership, though there are a number of other secondary aspects, especially culture.

In this thesis there are three case studies for comparison of results of attempted amalgamation analysed below. Only the Monash case study was a success story and this is compared to the failed attempt to merge the ANU, CCAE and CITA, and the partial success (for a period) but eventual failure of the UNE network merger. Only one case study (Monash University) was successful in the sense that it continues as an ongoing organisation to the present day. ANU, CCAE and CITA were never merged into a single organisation, and the proposal to merge lapsed having been considered on two occasions. However CITA did merge with ANU. The merger between UNE, NRCAE and ACAE was dissolved in late 1993 after a long period of controversy. However the ACAE did merge subsequently with UNE and this merger continues to the present day.

Why did the Monash merger go ahead, while the other two failed? Cerych and Sabatier suggest that discussion of all of the following factors would be relevant:

- Degree of system change
- Clarity of objectives
- Adequacy of causal theory (including jurisdiction and resources)
- Commitment to objectives of those inside and outside implementing organisations
- Degree of Ministerial control
• The role of ‘fixers’
• The extent to which a specific objective was affected over time by changing socio-economic conditions that gave rise to conflicting public policies or that undermined (or fostered) its causal theory or political support

Comparison of Cerych and Sabatier Model (1986) with Thesis Research Results

In examining implementation from an organisational perspective, and in comparing outcomes at this level, the thesis raises a number of issues not covered in the Cerych and Sabatier model which deals only with broad system change in higher education. The thesis research therefore represents an assessment of the extent to which the factors in the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model ‘translate’ to the more detailed micro-implementation scenario.

The context in which the amalgamations took place explains why, in the overall sense, the program of mergers was successful.

Degree of system change

There was little evidence from the research that the degree of system change adversely affected the likelihood of the success of implementation. The overall changes introduced included abolition of the binary divide which would mean that thereafter colleges of advanced education would be regarded as universities for status and funding purposes. This consequently became a powerful incentive for complex widespread change. The change attempted was nation wide and effected all tertiary institutions irrespective of size, organisation design and status. About thirty institutions were involved in advanced negotiations which saw the number of colleges and universities fall from 65 to about 40 (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p105).

The mergers brought about by the Dawkins’ policy of amalgamation were investigated by a specialist Task Force. The Task Force found that it had been generally impressed, in its meetings with institutional representatives, to see most looking forward to the opportunities that restructuring would bring through the
mutual influence of advanced education and university strengths and traditions (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 102). Consequently the merger reform process was widely and quickly adopted throughout Australia despite complexity issues.

At the organisational level, the degree of difficulty did not vary significantly between the case studies, as each of the three mergers involved a roughly comparable degree of change (in terms of the numbers of institutions involved, and the cultural differences between them). The different outcomes in each case must, therefore, have been due to other factors.

The Monash merger with three CAE components had a different profile to that of the established Monash. The problems of granting university-wide degrees and professional standards appropriate for courses needed to be thrashed out, as well as the status of CAE staff in the new university regime. This was done with judgement and tact and resolved in a short period of time (as discussed in Chapter 4). Thus, integrative structures were gradually developed that kept structural and cultural divisions to a minimum.

In the case of ANU, CCAE and CITA the degree of difficulty was also moderate. The principal institutions involved were only a few kilometres apart and about the same size in student numbers. There was, just prior to the proposal to merge the institutions, very little on the public record that would prevent a merger from taking place. Consequently it might be expected that the proposal would lead to no fuss and would be straightforward. But this was not the case for reasons already discussed.

The development of the UNE network was moderately difficult as it required the merger of two nearby organisations (UNE and ACAE) and the NRCAE and Coffs Harbour Campus of the UNE, which were both several hours by road from the Armidale campus. Communications systems made possible integration of each of the campuses but face-to-face contact of staff was more difficult.
Clarity of objectives

In the case of the merger of Australian colleges of advanced education and universities the overall goals were clear from the start and in general were effectively translated into action (Harman, 2005). The research of the thesis indicates that in translating these goals to the level of individual universities, clarity of purpose underpinned the Monash merger, but in the other two case studies, the initial goals proved unachievable.

Adequate causal theory (including jurisdiction and resources)

The causal linkages of the Dawkins’ program were well understood, providing for voluntary mergers and State or Territory approval processes. There was little or no impact throughout the Dawkins’ period of changes in socio-economic variables that may have undermined or reinforced the policy to merge institutions. Financial resources for the merger processes were also adequate.

Dawkins and his staff made a vigorous attempt to communicate the new program successfully to State and Territory Governments, institutions and the general public. The Dawkins’ policy of mergers of institutions relied on the capacity of individuals and institutions to develop understanding of and commitment to objectives by all those concerned. Commitment to objectives of a university reform was thought of as a very important factor underlying successful implementation by Cerych and Sabatier (1986 p 17) and this view is supported by the thesis research. New institutions to enable a fresh start (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986 p 18) were not utilised under the Dawkins’ policy.

Commitment to objectives of those inside and outside implementing organisations

As indicated earlier thesis research established widespread support for the voluntary merger of colleges of advanced education and universities within and outside implementing organisations. The Monash case study evidence is consistent with this result as there was strong institutional and governmental support for the merger. However in the case of the ANU two attempts at merger failed due to lack of institutional support and also inability to pass the requisite
legislation in the Australian Senate. In the case of the UNE merger strong governmental support from without the merged institution was insufficient to circumvent the high degree of autonomy sought by the Northern Rivers partner and this finally led to a brake up of the institution.

**Degree of Ministerial control**

Cerych and Sabatier maintain that the degree of control of the Minister of Education in the implementation process of university reform is through a complex chain of indirect command (Cerych and Sabatier 1986 p 18). This was also the case under the Dawkins’ policy of merger of institutions. State and Territory governments were responsible for approval of mergers while institutions were free to choose partners.

**The role of ‘fixers’**

Cerych and Sabatier believe the role of actors such as a fixer, and interest groups, is an essential precondition of successful implementation (Cerych and Sabatier, p 20). The findings of their European research are paralleled in the thesis research in the case of Dawkins and his staff who acted as fixers, and sometimes individual State or Territory Ministers for Education and the interest groups such as staff trade unions and the Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee.

**The extent to which a specific objective was affected over time by changing socio-economic conditions that gave rise to conflicting public policies or that undermined (or fostered) its causal theory or political support**

The economic environment of the day played its part. Efficiency gains and widening the scope of the higher education system were relied on to boost national competitiveness. Government finance was strongly influential and made practical many mergers. Thesis research found that the development of a unified national system was not therefore dependent on fiscal or other external constraints. Capacity for private funding of university fees was later considered and developed to modify the very large commitments involved. This further development was not an object of case study research which focuses on the merger process and its significance.
Change at the organisational level: factors explaining comparative success

Table 7.1 sets out the results of the analyses of the case studies using the following three headings:

1. Leadership,
2. Political Guidance.
3. Incentives.

Each of these is a factor which is significant because it assists the explanation of the case studies. A successful outcome is one consistent with Dawkins’ policy intentions.

The Monash example of mergers in the 1980s and 1990s is the only example in this thesis of a success story. It is also the case study where the leadership provided was most appropriate to the successful implementation of the Dawkins policy, especially given the level of difficulty and cultural differences between the university and college components, and consequently best use was made of incentives, and political guidance. It became a success in the sense that the organisational changes and financial provisions provided in support were sufficient to create a new organisational whole which exists to the present day. The ANU process did not result in any university/college of advanced education merger. The UNE was merged with CAEs but the resulting network was dissolved in late 1993.

Table 7.1: Comparisons of Implementation of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Political Guidance</th>
<th>Incentives</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monash</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Worked</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNE</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>Part Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Leadership

“Leadership” refers to the way institutions were steered in the merger process. The question of leadership was the most important discriminating factor in determining the success or otherwise of the policy implementation discussed in the individual case studies, and consequently has been included as a separate
variable in a modified version of Cerych and Sabatier (1986) (Diagram 2 - Appendix). For example the Monash case study reveals how Vice-Chancellor Mal Logan successfully set about developing a large integrated university through balancing local identity and course provision. Logan’s personal tact and judgement together with the advice of his advisory team kept the lid on disputes over the status of the CAE components of the new university that was put together in the 1980s and 1990s. Monash did not impose the idea that it was the senior academic partner.

On the other hand leadership in the case of the UNE and the ANU was ineffective to undertake a merger task. In the case of the ANU, CCAE and CITA the ANU assumed it was the senior academic player and that this status meant that the CCAE could not afford to stand alone if it wished to become a university and consequently the relationship was not one of equal partners wishing to comply with Dawkins’ intentions. In the case of the UNE network merger the differences of opinion and leadership styles of the UNE and NRCAE were poles apart and conflicted throughout their association. The UNE was a traditional academic institution while NRCAE placed emphasis on a modern entrepreneurial style. The UNE assumed it was the senior academic player and that this would be accepted by all in the network. The distance between the UNE campus and NRCAE also contributed to difficulties in the association.

According to Cerych and Sabatier (1986, p 20) there are important members of parliament or executive officials who have the desire and the staff to closely monitor programme implementation. They perform the role of a fixer. Fixers can also be organised interest groups that have a long term interest in a programme. The role of fixers is similar to the role of leaders identified in this thesis.

To lead means to show the way, to influence or guide others. According to Goldfinch and t’Hart (2003 pp 238 - 241) the leadership role of fixers can be identified in the following five contexts of success:

1. The more dramatically leaders portray current events or issues and serious acute crises, the higher the likelihood of reform success.
2. If reform leaders gather together allies to form a team in support of important changes, prospects for success are enhanced.

3. If reformers develop and employ strategies targeted at persuading their political environment that the proposed changes are both desirable and inevitable, as well as being practically feasible, they are more likely to be successful.

4. Successful leaders manage to secure early support of implementing actors for their strategy.

5. The tighter the leadership’s control over the crisis management process, the higher the likelihood of reform success.

According to Kotter the term “leadership” conjures up the image of someone who is willing to do things differently and challenge the status quo. The verb “to manage” stems from the Latin word “manus” meaning “hand”. It is about exercising control or domination over others. The Dawkins process required leadership and discernment and a shift from operational to strategic issues i.e. a shift from coping with complexity to coping with change. Table 7.2 below outlines Kotter’s analysis of the shift from operational tasks to leading change (adapted from Graetz, Rimmer, Lawrence and Smith, 2002 p 207):

**Table 7.2: Leading Change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Budgeting:</td>
<td>Establishing Direction:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing detailed steps and time tables for achieving needed results</td>
<td>Developing a vision of the future, often the distant future and strategies for producing the changes needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organising and staffing:</td>
<td>Aligning People:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing some structure for accomplishing Plan requirements, staffing the structure with individuals etc</td>
<td>Communicating the direction by words and deeds to all those whose cooperation may be needed, so as to influence the creation of teams and coalitions that understand the vision and strategies, and accept their validity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling and problem solving:</td>
<td>Motivating and Inspiring:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring results versus planning</td>
<td>Energising people to overcome major political, bureaucratic and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


resource barriers to change by satisfying very basic, but often unfulfilled, human needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production of a degree of predictability and order:</th>
<th>Production of change:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of the potential to produce consistently the key results</td>
<td>Evolution of change often to a dramatic degree which has the potential to produce extremely useful change (for example, new products that customers want; new approaches to labour relations that help make a firm more competitive)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Graetz, Rimmer, Lawrence and Smith, 2002 p 207).

Kotter’s leadership model suggests that strong interpersonal skills – not technical and analytical know-how – are a key contributing factor to effective change leadership (Graetz, Rimmer, Lawrence and Smith, 2002 p 208).

This was demonstrated many times by Mal Logan in the circumstances of the Monash case study.

The willingness of political and executive leaders to lead others through the Dawkins change process was repeated many times and best illustrated in the case study research of the role of Mal Logan (Vice-Chancellor) at Monash University in the 1980s and 1990s. The profile of such a strong leader has been suggested by Goleman as the following:

- Self awareness – comes from a clear and realistic understanding of oneself – one’s strengths, weaknesses, ambitions and needs. Self aware people are honest with themselves and with others, and as a result, their opinions are respected and sought
- Self regulation – implies self control, where a person is in charge of their emotions and does not act on impulse
- Motivation – refers to the drive to achieve and seems to be the one trait all effective leaders possess
- Empathy – ability to consider and acknowledge employees’ needs and opinions
- Social skill – refers to a person’s ability to relate to and work effectively with other people. Leaders with a high degree of social skill develop a strong rapport with their employees (Adapted from Graetz, Rimmer, Lawrence and Smith, 2002 p 208).
Leaders of systemic change therefore must practice the art of inclusion. This means breaking down the traditional barriers between functional areas, and involving able employees at all levels of the organisation. Logan demonstrated this capacity over a long period (from his appointment as Deputy Vice-Chancellor and thereafter as Vice-Chancellor), and through the development of an open approach (a kitchen cabinet in one case) to the integration of two CAEs with the Monash campus at Clayton, the development of university-wide course awards and the integration of all staff despite the issues of the professional standing of former CAE staff and courses. He also demonstrated strong vision and ability when negotiating the merger with the Victorian College of Pharmacy. His leadership ability contributed to the solution being found whereby the CCAE could become a university in its own right after the negotiations to merge with ANU and CITA broke down.

Leadership is only one component of success. This is a very complicated question, with the leadership effect being almost impossible to isolate from other factors of success. Nevertheless, for chief executives who do not see themselves in a charismatic mould, it may be reassuring to know that change can be achieved without, to use Bennis’s words, “a compelling vision that brings others to a place they have not been before”. If the leader has good support at senior levels and knows which levers to pull, significant change in performance can result. The downside is that some people come to see themselves as change ciphers without a significant sense of ownership in their jobs and often a powerful distrust of management. Consequently it is not clear whether the Monash experience needed to be repeated at the other universities for success in the terms of the Dawkins’ process to be achieved (Stewart and Kringas, 2003 p 686). However the Task Force on Amalgamations noted that the number of institutions unwilling to change their perspective and to take up new leadership challenges was extremely small and that increasingly the new institutions were finding opportunities that could not have been provided within their previous structure (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 102).

The Dawkins process put pressure on Vice-Chancellors and senior staff of tertiary institutions, and required management skills of a high order if the mergers sought
by the process were to be achieved in the short period of time as required. There was no resourcing or special training of senior executives at tertiary institutions to bring about a smooth and rapid change. Despite the ANU example, overall the success of the merger process contradicts myths that the academic community could not negotiate change on this scale. The Task Force on Amalgamations in Higher Education was generally impressed in its meetings with institutional representatives to see most looking forward to the opportunities that restructuring would bring through the mutual influence of advanced education and university strengths and traditions. This was seen as an important way to bring about greater diversity and higher quality of educational provision to the system (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 102).

The failed merger of ANU and the CCAE is an example also of the criticality of leadership in achieving an end result whose success and purpose was at odds with Dawkins’ intentions. Roger Scott was appointed Principal of the CCAE in 1987 and his first task was to assist in the preparation of the College’s response to the Green Paper and defend the response once the White Paper had been issued (Scott, 2004 p 10).

This was seen by all concerned to require developing strategies for expanding enrolments to meet growth targets required to meet the minimum size requirements for entry to the Unified National System. Given the planning constraints on numbers within existing institutions, this seemed only possible by some form of affiliation with other institutions (Scott, 2004 pp 11 - 2).

Minister Dawkins announced in July 1988 only one university would exist in Canberra under the new Unified National System, and he instituted a small committee chaired by Hugh Hudson to oversee the project. The reaction of Hugh Hudson was that the CCAE should comply fully (Scott, 2004 p 12). The founding Principal, Sam Richardson remained in touch with events since his departure and in his regular correspondence with Roger Scott advised him to opt for the strategy of devolution and separate development. He told Roger Scott that he should aim at being left alone on the existing CCAE campus and become in effect the manager of a separate college of the ANU. Scott decided to reject both pieces of advice. He decided to take a public position strongly in favour of amalgamation but striving
in fact for the creation from the CCAE of the University of Canberra (Scott, 2004 p 13). Scott succeeded in his objective.

The thesis research also found that Minister Dawkins was also an outstanding leader:

The reforms initiated by Minister Dawkins were dramatic and extensive, and far more ambitious than any single set of reforms initiated previously or since then in the Australian higher education system. Further, they were far more extensive and substantial than any of the European reforms discussed by Cerych and Sabatier. They thus pose the intriguing question as to how a single Minister and Government of which he was a member could have so fundamentally changed a large national higher education system over the space of about three years (Harman, 2005 p 1).

Moreover:

Apart from all this, of vital importance were political factors and political alliances, particularly the political skills and commitment of the Minister, and his ability to attract support, persuade, publicly confront opponents, bargain and personally steer the implementation process. Significantly, the Minister used a surprisingly large range of different policy instruments while the speed with which he moved and the breadth of the reform package provided difficulty for opponents to mount effective and timely opposition (Harman, 2005, p 23).

Leadership is an important variable. Given the central role it plays in the implementation process and (demonstrated in the case study material) it deserves inclusion in a modified version of Cerych and Sabatier (1986) (Diagram 2 - Appendix), and any general model of implementation.

2. Political Guidance

“Political guidance” refers to the manner in which the merger process was influenced by State and Federal Ministers. Political guidance was always a considerable influence given the close collaboration of Federal and State or Territory authorities responsible for the authorisation of mergers of tertiary education institutions in the 1980s and 1990s throughout Australia. It was not included in the Cerych and Sabatier model (1986) (Diagram 1 - Appendix) and consequently has been included it in the modified model of Cerych and Sabatier (1986) (Diagram 2 - Appendix).

The presence or otherwise of political guidance varied significantly in the case studies. In the case of the Monash merger Mal Logan was politically well connected throughout the higher education sector and with Federal and State
politicians. Communication within this network was excellent and well maintained by Logan and his plans were well articulated through the network and the responses refined and given clarity through a two-way communication process.

Dawkins made clear to ANU, CCAE and CITA of his intention for each of these organisations to merge but his reliance on each of the organisations to achieve this through reinforcing a stand-alone mentality for each and leaving each to decide whether it should merge demonstrated poor political guidance and leadership on his part. Senior ANU/CCAE and CITA leaders complied outwardly with the Minister’s request but did not sufficiently endorse the proposal for the merger to take place, and took advantage of the Minister’s stand-back approach to the proposal. For example Roger Scott, Principal of the CCAE from 1987 admits outward conformity only to the Minister’s wishes (Scott, 2004 p 13).

The UNE network was not well supported through enabling legislation for which the NSW Minister for Education was responsible. The legislation provided for each campus to have a CEO as well as a trans-campus CEO. This provided the basis for continued tension, and development of a stand-alone mentality of the Armidale, Coffs Harbour and NRCAE campuses, which finally resulted in break-up of the network in 1993.

3. The Role of Incentives

To assist the merger process the Federal Government provided initiatives such as recurrent and capital funding and a national priority fund to assist amalgamating institutions with communication links, integration of library systems, students, staff and financial administration systems, transportation links and miscellaneous expenses including signs, publicity and new letterheads (Curri, 2002 p 135). These incentives as reported in the case studies of this thesis only worked well in the case of Monash as the incentives were able to play the role they were designed for and where other factors especially the leadership and political guidance were superior.

This variable is similar to that of “Adequacy of Financial Resources” of the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model and has not been made explicit in that model.
but has been included in the modified Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model (Diagram 2 - Appendix).

**The Significance of Culture in the Merger Process**

The mergers attempted in the 1980s and 1990s of Australian universities and colleges of advanced education involved complex combinations of substantially different cultures which added to the complexity and uncertainty associated with the leadership of final outcomes sought due to the degree of system change:

> When deeply entrenched organisational and academic cultures are forced together they can present a considerable force in preventing or severely regarding change. As merging denotes radical change cultures or “souls” of the partners are as deeply affected as the changes in systems of governance (Skodvin, 1999 p 66).

Although this variable is similar to the concept of values change associated with for example the “Strength of Commitment” of those charged with implementation identified in the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model - given the importance of culture as a variable (particularly at the organisational level) it is surprising that its function is not explicitly included in the Cerych and Sabatier model (1986) (Diagram 1 - Appendix). Organisational culture has therefore been included in a modified model of Cerych and Sabatier (1986) (Diagram 2 - Appendix) and should be included in any general model of implementation given its significance which is analysed below.

Shared or complementary culture makes possible the merger of otherwise stand-alone institutions, but this can be particularly difficult in higher education organisations, where professionals have a large degree of discretion as to how they carry out their work (Kyvik, 2002 p 60). Indeed the culture of each of the case study component institutions was often very different and made the development of a cohesive merged institution either difficult or impossible. There are accordingly limitations to the extent to which academic synergy may be achieved in merger situations (Kyvik, 2002 p 66). Cultural differences were especially great when comparing an established university to a CAE. In the case of Monash these differences were overcome with an attitude of no fuss by the Vice-Chancellor Mal Logan. In the case of ANU/CCAE and CITA the cultural
differences between the CCAE and ANU were sufficiently prohibitive as to prevent a merger on each of the two occasions when considered. This was also the case of the UNE network.

Australian academic culture in the 1980s and 1990s can be interpreted as historically transmitted patterns of meaning expressed in symbolic form through the shared commitments, values and standards of behaviour peculiar to members of the professions, as well as the traditions, myths, rituals language and other forms of expressive symbolism that encompass Australian academic life and work. In Australian universities academic culture is deeply embedded and is not easy to unfreeze or turn off at will. Universities are indeed complex examples of organisations as they are unsurpassed as homes for contested views, contradictions, debate and intellectual conflict: “Indeed Universities do not merely house these conflicts but generate them”.

To illustrate how different campus cultures operated in different academic settings in Australia it is useful to differentiate cultural aspects of academia that typically existed in universities from those of CAEs in Australia immediately prior to the Dawkins reforms at the time the UNS was created. These can be seen to relate particularly to role ambiguity and conflict, comparative values associated with teaching and research, reward structures, disciplinary and institutional loyalties and governance style, as illustrated in Table 7.3 (Harman, 2002 pp 97 - 98).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASPECT</th>
<th>UNIVERSITIES</th>
<th>COLLEGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic role</td>
<td>Roles ambiguous and marked by divided loyalties</td>
<td>Roles more clearly prescribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional loyalties</td>
<td>Loyalties directed more to the disciplines and learned</td>
<td>Loyalties directed more to the institution and the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>societies</td>
<td>respective professions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching versus research</td>
<td>A strong research culture and less value ascribed to</td>
<td>Less emphasis on research but teaching highly valued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>teaching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward structures</td>
<td>Research a key criterion for scholarly recognition and promotion</td>
<td>Teaching and service to the profession the key criteria for promotion and recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Collegial, democratic decision making structures highly valued</td>
<td>Structures more hierarchical and bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Harman, 2002 p 98)

As a professional group, university academics were characterised at the time of the merger process initiated by Dawkins (and mostly still are) more by divided loyalties, role ambiguity, heterogeneity, anarchical tendencies, conflict and self-interest, than any other professional group. Despite their overall commitment to the idea of the university and what it stands for, academics, particularly in major research universities in the 1980s and 1990s, varied greatly as to the directions in which their professional loyalties were directed. In professional schools in particular, where the cultures of scholarly academia and professional, client-oriented practice intersect and inherently conflicted, teaching staff were pulled in different directions, constantly attempting to balance tensions which arose between the two: “Such role ambiguity was not so rampant in CAEs” (Harman, 2002 p 98). Moreover:

In terms of loyalties, Gouldner’s (1957-1958) concepts of “cosmopolitan” and “locals” is also particularly pertinent here. That is to say, loyalties of university staff were typically cosmopolitan in that they were more attached to aspects of their disciplinary affiliations and learned societies rather than to their institution. These aspects ran counter to the allegiances of CAE academic staff who tended to be attached more locally to their institution and to serving their respective professions … Greater value placed on research in universities, created a considerable cultural divide between the reward systems of staff in universities and CAEs (Harman, 2002 p 99).

Furthermore, whereas in universities, prior to the UNS being instigated, research was a key criterion for promotion and scholarly recognition, CAEs (which were not funded for research), placed greater emphasis on teaching and service to the professions for promotion and recognition. In addition apart from the scholarly research of a minority, research had little place in CAE culture (Harman, 2002 p 99).

Differences in managerial style and structures also created problems when integration especially of universities and CAEs was attempted in Australia in the
University academics believed strongly (in the 1980s and 1990s and still do) in:

... collegial, democratic decision making, two guiding principles being that intellectual authority derives from the disciplines and that truth is no respecter of status and hierarchy. This unifying and powerful myth derived from the “community of scholars ideal”, reflects the ethos of the medieval guild – collegial decision making by a body of equals in an un-hierarchical and collaborative enterprise (Harman, 2002 p 99).

While such a myth serves largely to explain a kind of reality that leads to ignoring some of the more negative or disintegrative features of academic life, hierarchy, and bureaucracy were nevertheless not (and continue to be not) readily tolerated by university academics. CAEs at the time of the mergers authorised by the Dawkins process were structured more bureaucratically, with lines of authority much more defined and formal hierarchies an accepted mode of operation (Harman, 2002 p 99).

When CAEs and universities merged in Australia aspects of their un-complementary cultures collided head on in many institutions. Managing culture became a considerable challenge for leaders during the Dawkins process, especially when strengthening academic programs, enhancing research profiles and consolidating policies pertaining to professional development, recruitment and promotion and providing for new organisation designs. “The challenges of morale and community building and dealing with cultural cleavages also loomed large” (Harman, 2002 p 99). How these challenges were addressed is the subject of the case study research of this thesis:

While some mergers from the late 1980s in Australia have worked well, others have not. Those that have worked well have been typically well managed by competent senior executives who established integrative structures that kept structural and cultural divisions to a minimum (Harman, 2002 p 96)

The UNE case study in this thesis reveals the only case of a de-merger in the Dawkins years in the 1980s and 1990s – the multi-campus federated network University of New England (UNE) which broke up at the end of 1993. After many years of often bitter struggles against amalgamation and with strong political pressure at both State and Federal levels, the merger between the old UNE and ACAE and NRCAE and Orange Agricultural College finally occurred in 1989
with the creation of the UNS. Following the break up, two of the former partners became universities – Southern Cross University (created from the former Northern Rivers CAE and the Coffs Harbour campus of the old UNE) and the reconstituted UNE (the merged old UNE and local CAE), while Orange Agricultural College merged with the University of Sydney. The merger which occurred in Armidale between the CAE and the old UNE remains intact. The principal reason for the break up was conflict between personalities and differences of culture at senior management level and inappropriate structures that gave too much power to individual campuses (Harman, 2002 p 96).

Strengthening academic programs in institutions formed from different missions and cultures is no easy task. However achieving academic excellence involves not only strengthening academic offerings but building new innovative programs and developing a sounder financial base. Understandably, during curriculum review processes that involve restructuring of academic programs, cultural, territorial and seniority-based conflicts, coupled with anxiety and confusion, occur amongst faculty and administrative staff alike. In the case of the UNE, anxiety was rife from the commencement of the merger process, and communication by senior management was poor. Note for example the informal questionnaire distributed to staff which revealed a high degree of misunderstanding and confusion. It is also notable that a referendum on the merger was prohibited by senior management.

In conclusion, weakly developed social and professional networks appear to be the major obstacle to the development of academic co-operation across discipline boundaries. The reasons for these problems are primarily cultural differences between staff in vocational programmes and faculty in more academically oriented study programmes and the fact that many of the courses are very different in character (Kyvik, 2002 p 66).

In summary the thesis research indicates that for comprehensiveness the Cerych and Sabatier 1986 model needs to include four extra factors:

- Leadership
- Political Guidance
- Incentives
Summary and Conclusions

The successful implementation of the policy to merge of Australian colleges and universities in the 1980s and 1990s appears to be a function of several important factors: leadership, political guidance, incentives, and culture. None of these factors has been specified as a stand-alone variable in the Cerych and Sabatier model of 1986, and consequently has been included in a modified version of this model (Diagram 2 - Appendix). The most important of these factors appears to be leadership as good or excellent leadership, brought about success in the context of the case studies and poor leadership brought failure.

While a number of factors identified by Cerych and Sabatier (such as ministerial control, political guidance, the strength of commitment of implementers and the role of fixers) contain leadership elements, the model does not recognise the role of personal leadership as an integrating factor in implementation at the organisational level.

In addition, it is important to note that the thesis draws on a rich literature on the role and importance of leadership that post-dates the work on higher education reform undertaken by Cerych and Sabatier. As argued previously in this chapter, leadership is an ensemble of factors at the organisational level which are not considered explicitly in this way in the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model.

Both the Cerych and Sabatier model (1986) and its modified version provide for the variable “implementation processes” (see Appendix). The Cerych and Sabatier model (1986) does not indicate the range of processes, whereas this has been included in the modified version - see for example “perfect implementation”, “imperfect implementation”, “top down or bottom up” etc and other models of the implementation process (Diagram 2 - Appendix). This amendment closes the loop from discussion in this chapter to the literature review which more fully accounts for discussion of this aspect of the topic.
As can be deduced from discussion of the role of Cerych and Sabatier (1986) variables, their explanatory power does not differ that much from one case study to the next. A modified version as outlined (Diagram 2 - Appendix) is suggested.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

In his critique of the Cerych and Sabatier model of implementation in the higher education sector, Harman found that the model gave insufficient attention to factors ‘related specifically to power and politics, and to political resources and their effective use in implementation’ (Harman 2005, p 17). In their theoretical framework, Cerych and Sabatier pay no attention to simultaneous policy developments in other policy domains of government, or the possible impact that other problems being tackled by government at the same time might have on higher education reform. Neither is there attention to where higher education reforms fitted in a government’s overall policy agenda, or the possible effects of there being a number of administrative steps between implementers and higher education institutions (Harman, 2005 p 17).

The comparative analysis of specific amalgamations reported in this thesis suggests that in explaining outcomes at the organisational level, the Cerych and Sabatier model should be complemented by an understanding of the role of leadership in overcoming opposition, dealing with differing organisational cultures, and in making effective use of incentives. More generally, the study supports the value of ‘bottom up’ perspectives on implementation that stress the importance of communication and negotiation, while also acknowledging the overarching importance of contextual factors.

To recapitulate, the thesis argues that the following additional factors need to be explicitly provided for in the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model:

1. Leadership
2. Political Guidance; and
3. Incentives.

It is also contended that the model pays insufficient attention to the importance of organisational culture in shaping the context in which leadership skills are exercised.
1. Leadership

No single factor other than leadership appeared in the research as the predominant reason for the success or otherwise of an individual case study. However leadership is notably omitted from the 1986 Cerych and Sabatier account of policy implementation in the context of higher education. The role of leadership is a very complicated question with the leadership effect being almost impossible to isolate from other factors, such as political guidance and incentives, which can also influence outcomes. If a leader has good support at senior levels and knows which levers to pull, significant change in performance can result.

The Task Force on Amalgamations stated that the number of institutions unwilling to change their perspective and take up new leadership challenges during the Dawkins’ period was extremely small, and that increasingly the new institutions were finding opportunities that could not have been provided for within their previous structure (National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 1989 p 102). In this context, there was no resourcing or special training of senior executives at colleges of advanced education or universities to bring about smooth and rapid change. The general success of the Dawkins’ merger policy contradicts myths that the academic community could not negotiate change on this scale, and offers substantial evidence that in general there was strong and effective leadership throughout the higher education sector albeit with some instances to the contrary.

What dimensions of leadership were important in the case of the Monash case study, the only case study where a successful merger was negotiated between college and university components? The case study is an example of change leadership whereby change was brought about by a leader, Mal Logan, through a process of envisioning, energising, and enabling (refer Chapter 4). The personal qualities of such a leader have been discussed in Chapter 7.

A successful strategic leader such as Logan also has developed high level cognitive skills such as the ability to think conceptually, to absorb and make sense of a multitude of trends, and to condense all this information into a straight
forward plan of action and direction setting (Durbin and Dalgish, 2003 p 378). It has been suggested that the critical role of change leaders such as Mal Logan is dependent upon a number of important factors also discussed in Chapter 7. There is ample evidence in the Monash Case study (refer Chapter 4) that Mal Logan demonstrated these qualities and activities.

2. Political Guidance

The amount of political guidance varied significantly in the case studies but was always a considerable influence given the close collaboration of Federal, State or Territory authorities responsible for the authorisation of mergers, the close connection of colleges and universities to the public sector, and the meaning and function of leadership. Political guidance is close to the meaning of the Cerych and Sabatier variable of the degree of Ministerial control over institutions. However it is contended that this term is not as general in meaning and significance as political guidance, which consequently is regarded as having been omitted from the Cerych and Sabatier model.

3. Incentives

The role of incentives has also been omitted as a variable in the Cerych and Sabatier model of the implementation of change in the higher education sector. Although it is similar in meaning to the concept of adequacy of financial resources and changes in social and economic conditions highlighted by Cerych and Sabatier, incentives are a more direct effect of policy instrumentation. Incentives, subject to appropriate leadership, play a vital role in bringing about change as identified by European data and Australian experience.

4. Organisational Culture

This variable is not explicitly referred to in the account by Cerych and Sabatier (1986) of the implementation of change in higher education. The variance in culture, established in thesis research was often at its greatest when comparing a college of advanced education and a university. Organisational culture is the values context for leadership at the institution and the wider level.
Implications for Implementation Theory

In establishing broader implications of the research, it is necessary to situate the models used in relation to the field of implementation theory. The Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model is an adaptation, for policy implementation for the tertiary education sector, of a general model of effective implementation by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) discussed in detail in the literature review (Chapter 1). A brief summary of the 1979 model follows.

There are five conditions necessary for successful implementation:

1. The program of action is based on a sound theory, which relates changes in the target group behaviour to the achievement of desired end-state objectives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 486).

2. The statute or other basic policy decision is composed of unambiguous policy directives and structures the implementation process with the desired effect of maximising the probability that target groups will comply as desired (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 487).

3. The leaders of implementing bodies possess the necessary managerial and political skill and are committed to statutory objectives (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 494).

4. The program being implemented is actively supported by organised constituency groups and by a few key legislators, or the chief executives, throughout the implementation process, with the courts being neutral or supportive (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 pp 495 - 496).

5. The relative priority of objectives of the program is not significantly undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public policies or by changes in the relevant social conditions that undermine the technical theory or political support of the program (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979 p 499).

The significant differences between the 1979 and 1986 models relate to the impact of the complexity of the higher education situation and environment on the need for values change (for example commitment to the objectives of a university reform), the difficulty in transmitting commands directly (as in the case of federal relations such as in the Australian context), and the autonomy of university
institutions. Consequently the role of fixers and interest groups, according to the 1986 Cerych and Sabatier model (and as supported by the thesis research), in overcoming bottlenecks can be crucial to implementation success.

**Implementation as Negotiation and Bargaining**

As pointed out by Ryan (1995), the work of Sabatier and Mazmanian represents an attempt to integrate ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to implementation by highlighting the importance of ‘mid-level’ actors and interest groups. The present study suggests the importance of leadership in uniting these elements. It also suggests that in understanding processes of implementation where direct channels of command are not available, implementation theories that stress the importance of processes of conflict and bargaining, are of particular importance (see for example Elmore 1978).

As can be seen in the case studies while resistance to change can be overcome through determined leadership in the resultant situations of negotiated implementation the outcome was always shaped by the way participants saw the situation and the way in which they defined their interests. Success therefore did not necessarily equate to a completed amalgamation.

**General Conclusion**

In summary, the thesis research found that an understanding of leadership and factors such as culture is needed if significant problems of implementation of policy are to be overcome. Consequently leadership and its role in bringing about successful implementation needs to be the subject of additional research.

In undertaking the research reported here, ‘success’ was assumed to be the achievement of Ministerial preferences as expressed in policy. However, university leaders and university communities, in the period under study, had sufficient autonomy to determine how they would react to the policy context. There is a need for future research to look specifically at the dilemmas faced by leaders in these situations. For example two of the most challenging questions about university leadership are still largely unanswered. How will leaders know
they are morally right when they act? How should leaders decide what is important? These questions concerning values and significance should be considered in the realm of ideas in future research (Duignan and Macpherson, 1993 p 19).
APPENDIX

This Appendix contains two diagrams. The first is a representation of the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model of implementation of higher education policy. The second is a representation of that model modified to include factors seen to be relevant to successful implementation but not explicit in the Cerych and Sabatier (1986) model. In the diagrams a one direction arrow describes a situation largely of one way influence. A double headed arrow represents a situation of interaction between two factors.

The first model Diagram 1 – commences with the box marked “Policy Formulation”. This box represents the processes which result in the production of an approved policy, whose implementation the model describes.

The next step is the box marked “Implementation Processes” denoting the commencement and delivery of the implementation processes. “Implementation Processes” directly influence the “Amount of System Change” and “Goal Clarity”, which in turn affect the “Adequacy of Causal Theory” (see appropriate boxes). Cerych and Sabatier (1986) contend that the “Adequacy of Causal Theory” is also dependent on the interaction of the “Adequacy of Control of Ministers and Officials”, the “Strength of Commitment of Implementers”, the “Adequacy of Financial Resources”, the “Strength of Commitment of those outside Implementing Organisation”, and “Fixers” whose role is influenced by “Changes to Specific Objective due to Changes in Socio-Economic Conditions”. Cerych and Sabatier (1986) also contend that the “Adequacy of Causal Theory” is the final link in the chain of events via “Fixers” to either “Reformulation” (and thence start again at “Implementation Processes”) in the event policy change is needed or directly to “Policy Formulation” in the cases where no policy change is needed.

Diagram 2 similarly commences at “Policy Formulation”. The next step is “Implementation Processes” which can take a variety of forms depending on the
model of implementation used, indicated below the “Implementation Processes” box. “Implementation Processes” are then depicted as directly influencing “Organisational Culture”, “Amount of System Change” and “Goal Clarity”. Organisational Culture” is depicted as influenced directly by the “Strength of Commitment of Implementers” and as a result of interaction with “Strength of Commitment of those Outside Implementing Organisation”. “Organisational Culture” is also depicted as directly interacting with and providing a context for “Leadership” which is also influenced through interaction with “Political Guidance”. “Fixers” are also depicted as interacting with “Leadership” which is also dependent on interactions with the “Adequacy of Causal Theory. “The “Adequacy of Causal Theory” is depicted as dependent upon “Amount of System Change”, “Goal Clarity” and as a result of interaction with “Adequacy of Financial Resources”, “Changes to Specific Objective due to Changes in Socio Economic Conditions”, the “Adequacy and Control of Ministers and Officials” and “Incentives”. The final link in the diagram is through “Fixers” to “Reformulation” and then “Implementation Processes” once again in the case of policy change or directly to “Policy Formulation” in the case of no policy change.
DIAGRAM 2

CERYCH & SABATIER (1986)
MODEL OF IMPLEMENTATION – MODIFIED

Implementation Processes

Policy Formulation

Perfect Implementation

Organisational Culture

Strength of Commitment of Implementers

Imperfect Implementation

Strength of Commitment of those outside Implementing Organisation

Amount of System Change

Leadership

Top Down or Bottom Up

Incentives

Overhead Control Model

Adequacy of Causal Theory

Adequacy of Financial Resources

Fixers

Changes to Specific Objective due to Changes in Socio-

Incentive Theory

Adequacy of Control of Ministers and Officials

Other Models

Reformulation
REFERENCES


ANU – see Australian National University.


Australian National University 1981a, file 14.1.3.81 (1).

— 1981b, file 14.1.3.81 (5).


Canberra College of Advanced Education 1988a, file R88/577 (1).

— 1988b, file R88/557 (3).

— 1988c, file R88/557 (4).

— 1989a, Principal’s Newsletter No 16.

— 1989b, Council Minutes of 9 August (provided by staff of John Dawkins).

CCAE – see Canberra College of Advanced Education.


Costar, BJ and Blyth J 1989, respectively President ASAC and UCAC (Chisholm Sub-branch) and Chairperson, VCUSA (Chisholm Sub-branch), Minute to P Ramler, 9 March, Costar papers cited in O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 4) p 13.


DEET – see Department of Employment, Education and Training.


— 1993, file 93/05614.


Goedegebuure, LCJ and Meek, VL, (eds) 1988, *Change in Higher Education; The Non-University Sector – An international perspective* – Papers presented at the Ninth European Forum of the Association for Institutional Research (AIR) August, 1987 at the University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, Uitgeverij Lemma BV, Culemborg.


Proposed UNE Network c. 1988, *Draft Heads of Agreement*, intended for the UNE Network University, held by the University of New England.


Watson, TR and Butcher, BL 1990, (respectively Dean and Director, Victorian College of Pharmacy Ltd, and President, Pharmaceutical Society of Australia (Victorian Branch) and Vice President, Victorian College of Pharmacy Ltd), *Letter to JS Dawkins*, 4 September, Monash File 90/1634. “Institutional Links –Affiliation – Victorian College of Pharmacy Ltd”, cited in O’Neill, 1999 (Chapter 5) p 1.