Australian Media Traditions Conference, Canberra, 2005

"Lord Southcliffe" and the Prime Minister: A re-examination of Sir Keith Murdoch and Joe Lyons.

By Dr Nick Richardson

The impetus for this paper is the long-standing riddle at the heart of Joe Lyons' defection from the Labor Party and his elevation to the prime ministership: what role did the newspaper barons, particularly Keith Murdoch, play in Lyons's success?

The paper sets out to answer this by looking at the model for Murdoch's approach to his relationship with Lyons and Murdoch's understanding of what this relationship conferred upon him in terms of political power. My argument is that Murdoch's approach to Lyons was coloured by the memory of English press baron, Lord Northcliffe, a benefactor and mentor for Murdoch at a formative time in the Australian's life. Murdoch was in no way a Northcliffe clone, but he was smart enough to appreciate that running influential newspapers was the pre-requisites for becoming a player in the political landscape. Murdoch never came close to the manic intensity of Northcliffe's brinkmanship: he was more measured in his application of the Northcliffe willingness to intervene directly in the political process. Furthermore it can be argued that Murdoch's stomach for domestic political intrigue paled over time, especially towards the end of Lyon's tenure as prime minister. By then, Murdoch's focus had shifted to the international scene surrounding the build-up to World War II and the strength of the newspaper business.

On May 3, 1932 in the House of Representatives in Canberra, the polite but uncompromising Labor member for the Adelaide seat of Hindmarsh, Norman Makin, was moved to make a statement to the house.

> A large newspaper combine at the head of which is the Melbourne Herald is making a determined effort to usurp the rights and powers of Parliament. Apparently it is the ambition of Mr Keith Murdoch to become Northcliffe or Beaverbrook of Australia and dictate public policy (CPD, 3 May, 1932:265).

Makin's comparison between Northcliffe and Murdoch is at one level really quite absurd. Northcliffe was part of a newspaper dynasty that contained madness as well as genius. His brother, Rothermere, was not much different. Beaverbrook was equally quixotic. Murdoch, in comparison, seems, on the face of it, to be a study in mild ambition.

Yet for some Australians in public life during the 1930s there was a remarkable resemblance in the way Northcliffe had conducted himself in England and how Murdoch tried to do so in Australia. Not for nothing was Murdoch known in some circles as Lord Southcliffe (Mayer 1964:29), an Antipodean version of Northcliffe, complete with the perception of political power that went with being a press proprietor.

This view of Murdoch recognised two things: the first was Murdoch's relationship with Northcliffe, and second, a fear among some politicians in particular that a media owner with a political agenda posed a potential threat to the presumptions of a democratic society.

That view still has currency. Those who took the white-knuckle read with noted diarist and former politician Mark Latham will recall that the spectre of Packer and Murdoch's impact on the Labor Party's electoral fortunes remains a routine consideration within some sections of the ALP.

Seventy-five years ago, there was a degree of confusion about what exactly was the connection between media ownership and political power. But the central questions were still the same: how much power did a media owner have? What did politicians think of the press? Just who was helping whom and for what purpose?

This similarity between Murdoch and Northcliffe was forged by the pair's strong relationship that started at a formative time for Murdoch and continued through the early stages of developing his persona as a newspaperman – that multi-faceted figure, who understands the demands, necessitates and pleasures of editorial and advertising, printing and distribution.

This concept was a particularly durable twentieth century ideal of the media proprietor as a kind of Renaissance figure who could write, produce, edit *and* be a commercial, intellectual and political figure in his community.

I would argue that Murdoch's relationship with Northcliffe was the fundamental professional relationship of Murdoch's early career and it coloured the manner of Murdoch's behaviour in several key areas, notably in striving for the same political influence he attached to his mentor.

As one of Murdoch's biographers noted: "The influence of Northcliffe on Murdoch was almost obsessive. His admiration of the man amounted to flattery, unashamed. Northcliffe for his part liked Murdoch. Their association from the first meeting was warm and close as the years passed, a friendship that few men enjoyed with Northcliffe." He added:

> Considered as a friendship it was as close as Northcliffe had with many in Fleet St for the last six years of his life. The career of Northcliffe, and the advice and guidance that he gave him, was always in front of Murdoch….Murdoch greatly admired Northcliffe's ability as a journalist and newspaper controller: his aim was to attain greatness as both. Northcliffe was proud that he was a guide and mentor of

> young Keith Murdoch whom he considered bore the mark of newspaper greatness. He gave friendship and guidance to his pupil without stint (Sayers ND:296–99).

This bond between the two men coincided with Northcliffe's increasing isolation as well as his physical and mental decline that media historians now openly describe as megalomania and insanity (Cudlipp 1980:139 and Engel 1996:88). Murdoch was witness to the decline of one of Britain's finest press barons, and he saw up close Northcliffe's increasingly bizarre attempts to remain a political agitator through his newspapers.

We can only speculate on what impact this had on Murdoch, but it seems that he saw and admired the intent of Northcliffe's actions, even if he realised that the manner of their execution betrayed an excess and lack of judgement. Nonetheless, during these fraught times, Northcliffe found in Murdoch a young ally who made no hasty judgements about his political aims and, importantly, remained loyal to him at a time when the number of Northcliffe's acolytes was dwindling. It was no wonder that Northcliffe trusted Murdoch. The young Australian was one of the last great Northcliffe protégés, an antipodean version of the Fleet St prototype that had been the measure of Northcliffe's early dominance of Fleet St and his conversion of British journalism into the popular fold.

There was, on the face of it, nothing to commend Northcliffe and Murdoch to friendship. Northcliffe was of Anglo-Irish stock, the eldest of fourteen children, three of whom died in infancy. Through his ownership of the mass circulating *Daily Mail* and the establishment newspaper, the *Times,* Northcliffe was integral to British politics. Cudlipp claims that no single figure at the time exercised more power than Northcliffe. No single figure used that power more ruthlessly. Newspapers had a monopoly on information at that time and Northcliffe recognised the power that his newspapers conferred on him.

Murdoch's background was quite different. He was the son of a Presbyterian minister, who ran a bluestone church in West Melbourne, (Zwar 1980:2) He had four brothers and a sister. His biggest challenge was a stutter that he struggled to master until middle age. It was Murdoch's father, Patrick, who secured Keith's first job in newspapers, with the *Age,* which was then under the control of Murdoch Senior's friend David Syme. After five years, Murdoch became one of the newspaper's federal political correspondents. Murdoch cultivated his contacts, including two key Labor figures Andrew Fisher and Billy Hughes (Hetherington 1960:87). Both of these relationships turned out to be vitally important to Murdoch's career. In 1915, several months after ANZAC troops had landed at Gallipoli, Fisher, by then prime minister, delegated Senator George Pearce to ask Murdoch to investigate postal matters affecting the Australian soldiers in the Dardanelles.

It was this assignment that eventually brought Murdoch to Northcliffe's attention. Murdoch wrote an 8,000-word report for Fisher, which was brutally frank about the tactical blunders of the British campaign and the appalling conditions on the peninsula. It drew on the observations and recommendations of an English journalist, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, who had given Murdoch a letter to give to Prime Minister Asquith urging an end to the campaign. That letter had been confiscated at Marseilles.

To avoid the possibility of becoming sidetracked into a discussion about the legitimacy of the young Murdoch's reporting of the Gallipoli campaign we should perhaps turn to Northcliffe's sources for a slightly different perspective on what happened.

After returning to London, Murdoch shared his story with the editor of the Northcliffe-owned *Times* newspaper, who insisted the story be told to the War Cabinet. Northcliffe was also given a copy of Murdoch's observations. Northcliffe was instantly taken with it and vowed that he would "not be able to rest until the true story of this lamentable adventure was so well known to force immediate steps to be taken to remedy the state of affairs. The manner has haunted me ever since I learned about it" (Lee Thompson 2000:246–47).

As Bruce Page, the acerbic biographer of Rupert Murdoch, noted: "Northcliffe was one major figure in England who believed in the impact of Murdoch's letter" (Page 2003:43).

Murdoch, of course, was in no doubt about his contribution to the end of the campaign. He was proud of it, although some historians have added some significant qualifications to its effect. Nonetheless, the episode was a vital marker for Murdoch – he enjoyed the role and the effect he had on the public debate. He was already pre-disposed to believing he should have such a role. The AIF's official war correspondent, Charles Bean, gave this thumbnail sketch of the young Murdoch. "He was a man of forceful personality, combining keen love of power with an intense devotion to his country and countrymen" (Hetherington 1980:89). Northcliffe was no different: power and patriotism were the divine sparks of his career.

The controversy that followed the Murdoch's letter is well-known – and it spelt the end of the career of the Gallipoli commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton. Northcliffe used Murdoch's report to help bolster his push on the British politicians for an evacuation from the Dardanelles that duly came. The episode marks the first confluence of Murdoch's and Northcliffe's ambitions.

There was another element to their relationship and it harked back to one of Murdoch's early reporting contacts – Billy Hughes, who replaced Fisher as Prime Minister in 1915. Hughes arrived in England with the patriotic intention of ensuring Gallipoli never happened again to Australian troops but his other increasingly potent message was that the war itself was actually a trade conflict that promised rich pickings for the winners. It seems that Murdoch helped foster Hughes' reputation with Northcliffe, which only added to the Little Digger's growing reputation

in England (Horne 2000:109-110). Hughes' message about the war suited Northcliffe's agenda: it destabilised Asquith and promoted that other Welshman, Lloyd George. As a consequence, Murdoch became caught up in the biggest political game in England.

These episodes confirm Sayers's view about the fundamental similarity between Murdoch and Northcliffe, what he calls "the ambition for power" (Sayers ND:299). As Page notes: "The skills that Keith Murdoch acquired from Northcliffe during the war had more to do with the management of political intrigue than the management of newspapers" (Page 2003:29).

Murdoch spent most of the war working for a cable news agency that supplied copy to Australian newspapers, but the legacy of his Gallipoli work was profound. Northcliffe was so impressed he helped negotiate for Murdoch a rare press accreditation to the British delegation for the Paris Peace Conference (Younger 2003:90).

At a picture taken of Murdoch's London farewell, Northcliffe is on his left, and to Northcliffe's left, the Little Digger himself.

Murdoch looks to be enjoying himself, tall, serious but confident. Northcliffe, smaller, taut and coiled, and uncomfortable. It is like looking at two objects at different points of a trajectory – Murdoch on the way up in his career, and Northcliffe on the way down.

Despite this, Northcliffe still felt he had much to offer the young man and Murdoch was deeply grateful. In a letter back to Melbourne, Murdoch wrote of Northcliffe's absence from London on a European trip: "Northcliffe has gone away for two months. He really is the closest and best friend I have on this side. He is the most generous man I have met in Europe" (Sayers ND:298).

Murdoch was in thrall to Northcliffe and he wrote and told him so:

> I will not say more than you have been the biggest influence and the biggest force over me here [in England]; largely on account of the many kindnesses you have shown me, but even more largely from the example I have readily seen in you and the standard you have set me. I am certainly coming back, but if I never met you again I would retain the influence to the end of my life" (Lee Thompson 200:336).

Part of the reason for this is Northcliffe's approach to journalism, which was built around a steady stream of energetic, young men who he felt had the spirit to do journalism his way. Murdoch fitted the type.

After learning that Murdoch had taken over running the *Herald* in 1921, Northcliffe sent him a detailed letter outlining possible changes and giving the young newspaperman some advice. Murdoch's fealty didn't stop with implementing such directions. He even brought out to Australia one of Northcliffe's trusted aides, the news editor of the *Daily Mail,* Tom Clarke to help change the paper (HWT 1952:10).

Northcliffe told one source that Murdoch was “ a great travelling companion and a veritable dynamo of energy,” but more than that, as Northcliffe biographer, J Lee Thompson points out, Northcliffe came to regard Murdoch “almost as a son” (Lee Thompson 2000:362). Northcliffe also invited Murdoch to a special post-war summit he called in January 1921, which included leading British politicians and industry figures to discuss the economic malaise gripping the country (Lee Thompson 2000:346). It does seem quite likely that Murdoch could have stayed in London and worked for a Northcliffe publication, probably the *Times* instead of accepting the job of editing the *Herald* in Melbourne, but he chose to work in Australia (Younger 2003:93).

So what exactly did Murdoch learn from Northcliffe when it came to appreciating the political influence of the newspaper proprietor? There is a strong case to be made that Murdoch learnt three important things from Northcliffe. The first was to build an audience that responded to popular journalism. Northcliffe achieved this with the *Daily Mail,* ”a Juggernaut, which was pulled by readers and pushed by advertisers” (Brendon 1982:114). The second was the importance of taking a position in the newspapers and sticking to it, and the third was the implicit rationalisation that such positions were couched in the national good. Commercial reasons – that is, self-interested rationalisations – were not good enough. This was particularly true at times of national emergency, such as World War I. Northcliffe’s use of the *Daily Mail* in particular as a tool for campaigning was a powerful example to Murdoch of how a press proprietor could be pro-active during a national crisis, and became a model for Murdoch’s papers’ role in the public debate during the Depression.

It should be pointed out that Murdoch was, technically speaking, not a press owner in these early days. He was a manager and executive at The Herald and Weekly Times, but his aspirations and style foreshadowed the manner of the press baron. Murdoch learnt that control of the right newspapers was the first step to establishing the opportunity to have an influence on political events. Northcliffe dominated two critical parts of the British reading public – the lower middle class, with the *Daily Mail,* and the upper classes with the *Times.* Murdoch had the *Melbourne Herald,* which was in dire need of rejuvenation when he took over the editorship, a task he achieved with the help of the redoubtable chairman Theodore Fink. Central to the *Herald’s* influence was that it was based in Melbourne, where the Federal Parliament still met. This meant Melbourne was the political centre of the nation.

The city’s prominence was reinforced by its strong business community and the presence of the trade union movement.

Not only that, but Murdoch’s creation of a new morning paper, the *Sun News Pictorial,* helped change the balance of press power in Melbourne (Lloyd 1998:4).

This made Melbourne the perfect platform for an editor or a proprietor with ambitions to make a contribution to the nation's development – and Keith Murdoch certainly believed in that.

Sayers wrote: "He believed that his Australianism would be vindicated only through private enterprise and personal initiative, [and] felt there was too much tendency to look to the country's government for aid instead of working for oneself" (Sayers ND:411)

Murdoch and Northcliffe both felt they could achieve more as "outsiders": neither was actually interested in elected power. They felt power came to them through their media roles, not the government. Both men failed to match their press influence when they were given official government positions, Murdoch as Director-General of Information during World War II and Northcliffe as Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries in 1918. Northcliffe was smart enough to know such formal appointments were counter to what he perceived to be his real forte. "Do you realise that if I enter political life, I have to abandon all connection with the Press, which is my sole source of power," he wrote (Brendon 1982:122).

The final important element in Murdoch's approach that was also evident in Northcliffe's worldview was that newspaper proprietors had a role to play in shaping the big debates of the time. This might seem self-evident, but it was how Northcliffe saw his newspapers. His publications became part of the clamouring chorus to end Asquith's prime ministership and replace him with Lloyd George. Asquith's failings were that he had, according to Lloyd George and Northcliffe's newspapers, failed to prosecute World War I in a more aggressive manner. It was a charge that angered Asquith supporters, who had no doubt where to lay the blame for the prime minister's falling support. One non-Northcliffe newspaper columnist wrote:

> If the present government falls, it will fall because Lord Northcliffe decreed that it should fall, and the Government that takes it places, no matter who compose it, will enter on its as the tributary of Lord Northcliffe (Clarke 1931:105).

According to one Northcliffe biographer this was overstating the press baron's role. Instead "he was a violent critic of the government," Paul Ferris writes, "which fell as a result of moves to which he was not privy, but whose roots he had helped to water" (Ferris 1971:201).

Once Asquith went and Lloyd George was elevated in his place – as Northcliffe wanted – the press baron started to have doubts about the new incumbent in what seems to be an indicator of Northcliffe's fading mental stability (Ryan 1953:136). Nonetheless, Northcliffe found nothing to be ashamed off in his campaign against Asquith in his newspapers, believing he had been responsible for changing the political leadership of the country (Engel 1996:88). "Who killed cock robin?" Northcliffe asked one of his brothers. "You did," the brother replied (Cudlipp 1980:118).

It was an intriguing example for Keith Murdoch.

I'd like to now look briefly at an episode in Murdoch's control of the Herald and Weekly Times group, which reveal a Northcliffe-like understanding of the political impact of the press owner. Space prevents from discussing here in greater detail several other instances that I originally researched which help to develop my idea.

If there is one question that remains tantalising in Australian political history, it is the role Murdoch played in elevating Joe Lyons to the prime ministership.

There is, to my mind, a strong circumstantial case that Murdoch believed he was critical to Lyons's success. We can be confident in that assessment because of the way Murdoch behaved – and the expectations he had – of Lyons in power.

The truth, however, points to Murdoch occupying the role of another important force, alongside the Melbourne Group, led by Lyons friend, the stockbroker Staniforth Ricketson – in pushing Lyons from the ALP into the third force of Australian politics, the United Australia Party.

But how great was their combined influence on Lyons? It is almost impossible to know, yet it is beyond argument that the spirit of Murdoch's championing of Lyons was pure Northcliffe. Murdoch certainly believed he had to use his newspapers to support Lyons, and he was clear that it was a matter of national interest.

By 1931, Keith Murdoch was 45, married, and he presided over an empire that had newspapers in every state capital city except Sydney and Hobart. He had also transformed the *Herald* into a lively, readable broadsheet that was a legitimate standard bearer for the Murdoch newspaper group.

Such good health was not evident in the Federal Government – Prime Minister James Scullin was battling a chronically divided Labor Party while trying to find a solution to the ravages of the Depression.

It is not clear when exactly Murdoch began to lose faith in Scullin. But Murdoch's political philosophy was conservative and he had a strong antipathy to the Labor Party and the union movement. He believed Scullin's Government had made life difficult for newspaper owners by imposing a hefty customs duty on newsprint. The newspapers' opposition to Labor was so profound that Melbourne Trades Hall Council declared a boycott against the *Herald* and its morning stable mate the *Sun*, in May 1931.

Murdoch, according to Sayers, believed that Lyons stuck with Scullin only out of loyalty, but he sensed Lyons was "veering" towards leaving Labor. "Keith Murdoch… wooed Lyons. He was an important factor in Lyon's decision to get out of the Labor Party" (Sayers ND:520).

Wooing can take various forms of course. In the period leading up to his departure from the ALP and the establishment of the United Australia Party, a reporter from the *Herald* met

Lyons at Spencer Street railway station in Melbourne to extend an invitation for Lyons to join Murdoch for a meal.

In truth, the end of the Scullin government was as much about the parlous state of Labor Party and the dark shadow of Jack Lang's faction in NSW than the influence of the press baron. Yet Murdoch, it seems, believed that he was entitled to expect some return on his investment in backing Lyons. He boasted several years later that he had put Lyons in office and he would put him out (Hart 1979:115), sounding suspiciously like Northcliffe's Cock Robin rhetoric about Asquith.

If we pause for a moment and consider Murdoch's motives for supporting Lyons, we can see that there was a clear benefit for Murdoch and his organization in getting rid of Scullin. In the same way that Northcliffe saw Asquith as an impediment to the British war effort, Scullin's Government was seen, by Murdoch and the so-called Melbourne Group, as an impediment to the financial regeneration of the nation.

Murdoch and the Herald and Weekly Times supported stringencies for harsh times. Not for them mild attempts to kick-start the economy. Belt-tightening was the only way. This was a personal and business decision. It was also, for Murdoch, a patriotic one. But it has to be said that although the Melbourne Group and Murdoch had the same goal, their methods were different and the crossover between their activities was minimal (Hart 1979:126).

Murdoch used his newspapers to push the case for Lyons. In the early months of 1931, following Lyons resignation from the ALP, Murdoch engaged in an intense exchange about the state of national politics with his man running the Adelaide *Advertiser,* Lloyd Dumas. The letters show Murdoch's determination to end the Labor government and promote Lyons. His position is unequivocal; his purpose is the national interest; his method is the use of press power.

On March 23, 1931 Murdoch wrote to Dumas:

> The nation has been disorganised, brought close to bankruptcy, disunited, demoralised and now is threatened with immediate destruction by civil war and the closing up of industry, because of its government by Labor Party and by Bruce-Page Party (Dumas NLA).

Murdoch was equally clear about Lyons's appeal:

> On the other hand, an experienced far-seeing and ruggedly honest legislator has come forward and been acclaimed throughout the length and breadth of the land as the man for the occasion. His policies are sound as a bell - a bit more human and a bit wiser than those of our stern-minded friend. His qualities as a leader are undoubted. He is more able, more shrewd, more sympathetic than anyone else outside the Labor Party, and he has great gifts of speaking. He has such an

> immense personal prestige already that the nation is demanding that he should lead it.

Murdoch went on:

> Now it seems to me to be a duty of men to get behind Lyons, but of course each man has a perfect right to decide for himself. Our newspapers are, however, not as free in this matter as outside individuals, because we have stood by him and encouraged him for about nine months, and at times when his decisions were extremely difficult we told him what to do…
>
> It is most important I think that during the next few days we should continue to beat the Lyons drum. Our policy should be to demand the coming together of all classes of people or whatever party or political predilection under Lyons as the national leader. If Australia can afford to return to party politics are the mess has been cleaned up then let it do so. But for the next three years at least we will have to have a real clean up of the mess, even if it means disturbing large blocks of voters. Nothing else will prevent not only default but industrial stagnation.

Then came the final exhortation to Dumas: "I think a leader [editorial] on these lines would be most useful indeed" (Dumas NLA).

The nature of this letter characterised the exchanges between Murdoch and Dumas during the following months. Murdoch believed that his role as a media proprietor conferred certain privileges upon him. That was a view he shared with Northcliffe. Murdoch had seen how his mentor had made great political capital out of his power. Murdoch was as a young man intrigued by the possibilities of that power.

However, he never overreached himself in the way that Northcliffe eventually did.

History has a qualified view of Murdoch's father figure. A.J.P. Taylor wrote "Northcliffe aspired to power instead of influence and as result forfeited both" (Cudlipp 1980:138). Murdoch might have dreamt of having Northcliffe's power. He certainly relished the political intrigue but in the end, he realised that political influence was the best he could hope for. This was the most profound lesson for Murdoch, and one that Northcliffe never embraced – a pragmatic acceptance that circumstance may hold greater opportunities than the blunt attempt to wield political power. It was a lesson not lost in 1939 on the boy growing in his father's shadow, the young Keith Rupert Murdoch.

When the time came, that pragmatism became the young Murdoch's trademark.

Dr Nick Richardson is group news editor of Leader Community Newspapers, (published by News Ltd) in Melbourne. He is a senior associate in the Journalism program at RMIT University.

ENDNOTES

Alfred, Viscount Northcliffe 1923, *My Journey Around The World – 16 July 1921-26 February 1922*, London: The Bodley Head.
Brendon, P. 1982, *The Life and Death of the Press Barons*, New York: Atheneum.
Clarke, T. 1931, *My Northcliffe Diary*, London: Victor Gollancz.
Cudlipp, H. 1980, *The Prerogative of The Harlot: Press Barons & Power*, London: The Bodley Head.
Dumas, L., (papers and correspondence), National Library of Australia: MS4849.
Engel: M. 1996, *Tickle The Public: One Hundred Years of the Popular Press*, London: Indigo.
Ferris, P. 1972, *The House of Northcliffe: A Biography of an Empire*, New York: World Publishing.
Garden, D. 1998, *Theodore Fink – A Talent for Ubiquity,* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Grattan, M. (editor) 2000, *Australian Prime Ministers,* Frenchs Forest: New Holland
Griffen-Foley, G. 2003, *Party Games; Australian Politicians and The Media From War to Dismissal*, Melbourne: Text.
Hart, P. R. 1967, "J.A. Lyons: A Political Biography." Ph.D thesis, ANU, Canberra.
Hart, P. R., "The Piper and the Tune" in Hazlehurst, C. 1979, *Australian Conservatism: Essays in Twentieth Century Political History*, Canberra: ANU Press, pp.111-147.
Hetherington, J. 1960, *Australians: Nine Profiles*, Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, pp.81-103.
Horne, D. 1979, *Billy Hughes*, Melbourne: Black Inc.
HWT 1952, *Keith Murdoch, Journalist*, Melbourne: Herald and Weekly Times.
Inglis, K.S. 1983, *This is the ABC*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Lee Thompson, J. 2000, *Northcliffe: Press Baron in Politics 1865-1922*, London: John Murray.
Lloyd, C. 1998, "The Influence of Parliamentary Location and Space on Australia's Political News Media." Senate Occasional Lecture, Parliament House, Canberra.
Lloyd, C. 2001, "Reporting Caucus: The Press and Labor Crises", in Faulkner, J., and Macintyre, S., *True Believers: The Story of Federal Parliamentary Labor Party*, Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, pp. 184-202.
Mayer, H. 1964, *The Press In Australia*, Melbourne: Landsdowne Press.
Page, B. 2003, *The Murdoch Archipelago*, London: Simon & Schuster.
Petersen, N. 1993, *News Not Views: The ABC, the Press & Politics 1932-1947*, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
Robertson, J. 1974, *J.H. Scullin: A Political Biography,* Nedlands: UWA Press.
Ryan, A.P. 1953, *Lord Northcliffe,* London: Collins.
Sayers, C.E, undated, *A Life of Keith Murdoch, newspaper reporter,* unpublished manuscript.
Stone, G. 2005 1*932: A Hell Of A Year*, Sydney: Pan Macmillan.
Younger, R. 2003, *Keith Murdoch: Founder of a Media Empire,* Sydney: HarperCollins.
Zwar, D. 1980, *In Search of Keith Murdoch*, South Melbourne: Macmillan.