

The role of Reuters in the distribution of propaganda news in Australia during World War I

Paper presented to the Australian Media Traditions Conference
24-25 November 2005, Canberra

**Peter Putnis and
Kerry McCallum
University of Canberra**

Introduction

This paper examines the role the international news agency Reuters and its Australian press subscribers played in distributing overseas sourced propaganda news in Australia during World War I. This story is told against the backdrop of the development in Britain during the course of the war of a comprehensive system of propaganda production and distribution, both for audiences at home and overseas, in which the British press played a willing and integral role. This development culminated in the establishment of a British Ministry of Information in March 1918 headed by the press baron, Lord Beaverbrook. Reuters, albeit a privately owned company which made much of its editorial independence and journalistic impartiality, was a key component of Britain's propaganda machinery, particularly in the overseas distribution of propaganda inspired news.

In the course of the war Australia established its own machinery for distributing officially sanctioned news to the Australian press through, for example, the despatches of official war correspondent, Charles Bean. Australia also established its own Directorate of Propaganda in October 1918¹. However, the Australian public's main source of propaganda inspired war news was through institutionalised links with the British propaganda system via agencies such as Reuters and the two Australian cable service providers, the Australian Cable Association (also known as the Australian Press Association or APA) and United Service Limited (USL)². A key role was played by Reuters' Imperial News Service. This paper focuses, in particular, on the nature of this service and its use by the Australian press.

Phillip M. Taylor has usefully described propaganda as:

An attempt to influence the attitudes of a specific audience, through the use of facts, fictions, argument or suggestion – often supported by the suppression of inconsistent material – with the calculated purpose of instilling in the recipient certain beliefs, values or convictions which will serve the interest of the author, usually by producing a desired line of action³.

Against this definition, all Australian mainstream newspapers played a major role in the distribution of propaganda. War news, reliant as it was on military sources and subject as it was to strict censorship, was inevitably selected and framed in accord with official propaganda purposes. This is not to say, however, that all Australian newspapers (albeit that there was almost unanimous support for the war amongst them) adopted a propagandist stance with equal enthusiasm. This paper argues that

Australian newspapers subscribing to Reuters, which included the *Sun* in Sydney, the *Herald* in Melbourne and the majority of Australia's provincial press, played an especially prominent role in the distribution of propaganda by virtue of their relationship with Reuters.

The British context

At the beginning of the war Britain had no system of Government propaganda. Indeed, the concept of government propaganda was viewed by Britain's governing classes as antithetical to British values. However, by the end of the war Britain had the most highly developed machinery for influencing public opinion of any of the World War I belligerents⁴. As the war dragged on with no prospect of an early end in sight 'the conflict came to be seen less in traditional terms of a limited war fought between small professional armies, but more in terms of one nation's entire resources pitted against those of the enemy'⁵. In this total war, 'morale came to be recognised as a significant military factor and propaganda began to emerge as the principal instrument of control over public opinion and an essential weapon in the national armoury'⁶. While much of this propaganda was directed at British audiences, particularly in the latter half of the war, there was also a concerted effort to mould public opinion overseas, particularly in allied and neutral countries⁷. Much of the propaganda effort directed overseas took the form of news distributed by cable. Here, Britain had a great advantage over her enemies as early on in the hostilities Britain had successfully cut the German transatlantic cables thus greatly limiting Germany's capacity to distribute news globally.

Following the outbreak of war, censorship of all press cable traffic was introduced. Sanders and Taylor argued that the early preoccupation with censorship delayed the British Government's appreciation of the value of the press as a medium for official propaganda⁸. Nevertheless, in the months following the outbreak of war two government organisations were established designed to influence foreign reporting. The Neutral Press Committee, formed under the aegis of the Home Office in September 1914, took major responsibility for the transmission of news abroad by cable and wireless to neutral and allied countries. As well, the Foreign Office established a news department which also established daily transmissions of news telegrams to its overseas representatives who were instructed to make use of them for propaganda purposes in the foreign press. These activities became the responsibility of the Department of Information on its establishment in February 1917 with John Buchan as its Head. That organisation also had a section 'responsible for supervising the compilation and transmission of...official cable and wireless messages'⁹. Subsequently, this responsibility fell to the Foreign Propaganda Section of the Ministry of Information when it was formed in March, 1918.

Much of the effort to mould public opinion overseas was directed towards the distribution of news which favoured the British cause. Particularly in the early years of the war, the British favoured this 'low key' approach wishing to avoid open association with blatant propaganda for overseas audiences along the lines of German efforts¹⁰. The main objective was to assure credibility by using the overseas press as a medium of official British propaganda. To do this successfully propaganda needed to be disguised. The Foreign Office wished, as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil put it, 'to do good by stealth'¹¹. There

was considerable faith that extensive and accurate news reports, albeit selected so as to favour the British cause and funded, or at least subsidised, by the government would have a powerful and favourable effect on public opinion overseas. But as the war progressed there was a turn towards more blatant propaganda, still packaged in the form of news.

The role of Reuters

While the British Government could utilise its diplomatic and consular representatives abroad as distribution agents for propaganda, it had no direct channel to overseas news agencies and newspapers. Furthermore, the British approach, advocated particularly strongly by the Foreign Office, laid emphasis on the importance of avoiding the appearance of conducting propaganda by operating in a way designed to 'conceal more or less its official character in neutral countries'¹². In the first three years of the war at least, camouflage was considered to be a necessity and there was a 'genuine belief in the value of disguised and indirect propaganda'¹³. One obvious way by which propaganda could be disguised was by embedding it in regular news services. Reuters was ideally placed to provide this kind of camouflage. Also, of course, Reuters had long experience in the international news agency business and had a well developed global distribution system. It was in a position to greatly assist the Government, albeit at considerable risk to its reputation for independence.

Reuters had acted as a vehicle for the distribution of official news on behalf of the British Government prior to World War I. In 1911, Reuters entered into a secret agreement with the Asquith Liberal Government to facilitate propaganda use of its Imperial News Service, a daily service distributed to British colonies in Africa, India, the Mediterranean, and the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Government secretly paid Reuters for the cost of including in the service full reports of Government statements¹⁴. Reuters' Chief Editor, F.W. Dickinson, described the arrangements in a private and confidential letter to branch managers in July 1911, noting that:

The Government has manifested the desire to take advantage of our Imperial Service and of our special channels for the purpose of securing wide publicity in the Colony, India and elsewhere for important official utterances upon questions of the day...It is a great advantage to us to act on these occasions as that hand-maid of the Government. Our doing so strengthens our position...and...shows those in authority, who have it in their power to be agreeable or disagreeable to ourselves, that our great organisation can be of infinite value to them.

The Government was willing to pay all of the costs involved, including those of extra work undertaken by Reuters' managers in the colonies. Dickinson urged managers to send him without delay 'as many cuttings from newspapers publishing the telegrams as are available', doubtless so that he would be able to demonstrate to the Government the efficacy of the service¹⁵. While Reuters' managers could identify the special messages via coded identifiers, their nature would not have been made known to subscribers. The Government indicated its 'wish' to Reuters 'that these extended reports should form a natural part of your general services, and not be earmarked in any way'¹⁶. This arrangement can be regarded as the forerunner of the even closer

relationship that was established between Reuters and the British Government in the course of World War I.

The war initially had a very negative impact on Reuters' business. Censorship disrupted its news services. More critically, the Government's decision to ban private telegraphic codes made its private telegram and remittance services uneconomic leading to a major retrenchment program and the prospect of total closure of its Traffic Department¹⁷. Questions were also being asked about the 'Britishness' of Reuters given the German origins of its founder and the existence of German shareholders. The British Government was concerned at the danger of Reuters 'falling into the wrong hands, perhaps foreign'¹⁸. This problem was addressed via a Company re-structure, financially aided by the Government, which placed the Company in 'safe hands' and ensured, via Foreign Office representation on the Board, that the Company would act in accordance with public policy¹⁹. According to Reuters' General Manager Roderick Jones the re-structure was necessary to preserve an 'institution which was beginning to render great service to the State'²⁰. The close relationship between Reuters and the Government was further cemented by the fact that Jones, while managing Reuters also worked, on an unpaid basis, for the Government, initially as Head of the News Section of the Department of Information and later as Director of Propaganda in the Ministry of Information²¹.

Early in the war, Jones determined 'to place the Reuter international network at the disposal of the government for the fullest dissemination all over the world of British and Allied intelligence'²². Jones later insisted in his autobiography that his offer and the subsequent arrangements entered into with the Foreign Office had been conditional on Reuters being able to maintain its independence and impartiality such that it could not be forced by the government to carry official propaganda²³. It appears, however, that nothing prevented Reuters from becoming a willing partner of government in such work for Jones acceded to a Foreign Office proposal that Reuters supplement its existing services to foreign countries with telegrams specifically 'composed in the interests of the government.' These became collectively known as the Agence Reuter Service²⁴. While this service was initially a comparatively small affair, it grew rapidly. In the year to July 1918 over 8 million words were despatched in the Agence Reuter Service to destinations across the world²⁵. Such was the relationship between the Foreign Office and Reuters that a 1917 internal report on the operations of the Foreign Office's News Section could note, without any need for special comment, that 'the work of the News Section is carried on at the Department of Information...and at the offices of Reuters Agency'²⁶. This arrangement opened up a new source of revenue for Reuters and doubtless contributed to the confidence expressed by its Chairman at the 1916 General Meeting where he noted that 'the company had already retrieved the position so seriously prejudiced by the outbreak of war' and could 'look forward to the return of prosperity'²⁷.

The Agence Reuter Service was less propagandist in tone than the 'news services' distributed by the Department of Information itself. The 1917 internal report on the News Section noted that, while the Department of Information News Service was 'frankly semi-official propaganda', the work done by Reuters was 'that of an independent news agency of an objective character, with propaganda secretly infused'. The report went on to say

The general service of news which Reuters distributed through associated agencies throughout the World, while independent in character, always endeavours to put the Allied case in the most favourable light. For obvious reasons it is essential that independence should be preserved and that great care should be taken in the interpolation of any matter of even a vaguely propagandist character. Reuters' business relations with its associated agencies stipulates for the supply of a certain amount of news...Reuter, at the expense of the Government adds a supplementary service [carrying] all the news favourable to the allies...there is no indication by the recipients of this service that it is in any way a supplement to the ordinary service. Special care is taken to keep this a secret²⁸.

Jones himself argued that while the main object of the service was to provide a 'proper presentation of the Allies' point of view' it did so 'by a candid and exact description of events as they occur'. He emphasised the need for moderation in reporting so as to create 'that intangible atmosphere of confidence which is indispensable if the service is to be trusted by the people at home and abroad and is therefore to be of value'²⁹. However, Jones also acknowledged that supplementary news was selected for its propaganda value rather than its inherent news value. For example, explaining changes to Reuters' Imperial News Service arising from the inclusion of 'Reuters Agency' material, Jones wrote to his Bombay manager, 'it has become necessary, in view of the extreme issues to which the war is approaching, to combine with the Imperial Service news calculated to advance the cause of the Allies'³⁰. The secrecy of the arrangement between Reuters and the Foreign Office was important for both parties. As Reuters Manager and Secretary, S.C. Clements explained to Lord Beaverbrook, 'for good official reasons the Foreign Office were anxious that nothing should be known of the Government's telegraphic propaganda, or of the channel through which it was conducted. For equally good reasons, Reuters were anxious to preserve [their] reputation for independence'³¹.

Reuters and the Australian Press

As noted earlier, Reuters had established an Imperial News Service in 1910. Since 1911 that Service had included supplementary material, such as extended reports of political speeches, whose transmission costs were paid for by the Colonial Office. Reuters also distributed a special service of positive stories from India supplied by its Indian agent, Edward Buck, but drafted by the Home Office of the Indian Government and checked personally by the Viceroy. After the outbreak of war these telegrams emphasised stories portraying loyal Indian support for the war effort³². As Read noted, 'this propaganda service used the Reuter name, but was paid for by the Indian Government'³³.

In January 1916 the Government decided, following a submission from Roderick Jones, to transfer the locus of Government support for the Imperial News Service from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office and to expand its scope and bring its content more into line with the already established Agence Reuter Service. A major problem for Reuters in securing greater Government support for the Imperial Service was that at the beginning of the war Reuters did not have direct access to newspapers in Australia and New Zealand. While its Imperial News Service was sent directly to most countries in the Empire, the arrangement with respect to Australia was that

Reuters supplied its news to the offices of the Australian Press Association (APA) in London who used it, along with other material, to compile its own service. Hence, Reuters could not guarantee that its propaganda messages actually reached Australian newspapers. The British Government was not happy with this state of affairs, given its support for Reuters. It noted, with respect to the transmission of a key Prime Ministerial statement, that 'it is essential that Australia, New Zealand and Fiji should be served equally with the other dominions and colonies'³⁴. Reuters, in the meantime, had begun negotiations with APA's rival, United Services Limited (USL), with the aim of achieving more direct access to the Australian press for Reuters' material.

At the outbreak of the war, the Australian press was served by two suppliers of daily cabled news from London. The APA was the largest concern. Its core members included the *Argus* (Melbourne), the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the *Age* (Melbourne) and the *Evening News* (Sydney). It had an extensive network of subscribers across Australia and also served the New Zealand press through New Zealand's United Press Association. Its rival, the cable company USL, was a joint venture of Sun Newspaper Ltd of Sydney and the Herald and Weekly Times Ltd of Melbourne and was established via a partnership agreement in December 1912³⁵. USL's main source of overseas news was the London *Times*. Under a 1912 agreement with Sun Newspaper Ltd, the *Times* gave a USL editor access to its proofs in its London office prior to publication. The USL editor compiled the cable service from these proofs³⁶.

Reuters was dissatisfied with its arrangements with APA. They generated little revenue because the original terms of the agreement were set at a time when Reuters was in a weak bargaining position. The arrangement also limited Reuters' capacity to serve the interests of the British Colonial and Foreign Offices in Australia and New Zealand. In mid-1915, Reuters began negotiating with USL with a view to re-establishing the direct link to Australia which it had forgone as part of an agreement with the United Cable Association (the forerunner of the APA) in 1895³⁷. Instead of supplying APA with its service in London, Reuters sought an agreement to supply USL with its Imperial News Service in Melbourne and Sydney. In October 1915 Jones wrote optimistically to his Australasian manager, John Barraclough, about the prospect of 'restoring our broken news service fortunes in the Commonwealth'. He assured Barraclough that in his renewed negotiations with the Australian press he could rely on Jones' every assistance and support. Jones hoped to achieve a position for Reuters in Australia similar to the one it had in South Africa where Reuters was the dominant supplier of overseas news and had achieved a clear profit of over £8,000 in 1914³⁸. While such a situation seemed beyond its immediate reach in Australia given the power of APA, Reuters did achieve an agreement with USL in December 1915 which provided a base for further development of its business in Australia. Under this agreement USL paid Reuters a subscription of £2,000 per year plus additional cable costs accruing to Reuters as a result of service. It also reimbursed Reuters for the cost of distribution of its service in Australia up to a maximum of £1,250 per year. Reuters would also receive substantial further commission on further Australian and New Zealand subscriptions to the service³⁹. At the same time, Reuters gave notice to APA that it would discontinue providing its service to it in London. The new arrangements came into effect on 1 July 1916. The renewed direct Reuters service to Australia was hailed by Reuters as marking 'the opening of a new era in the history of Reuter in that part of the world'. The arrangements enabled Reuters/USL to offer subscribers in Australia and New Zealand a service consisting of a minimum of

500,000 words per annum during the war and a minimum of 400,000 words per annum thereafter. The service was 'principally composed of Reuters' telegrams from all parts of the world, and the special cables of the London *Times*, besides news from other sources'⁴⁰.

Reuters/USL quickly built up a network of subscribers building on earlier arrangements Reuters' Australian office had had (in cooperation with APA) to supply overseas news to the country press in Victoria and NSW. Importantly for Reuters, the United Press Association of New Zealand decided to take the service as well as continuing its subscription to APA⁴¹. By 1917 Reuters/USL supplied daily evening papers in Adelaide, Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne as well as seventy papers in New Zealand via its Press Association and about one-hundred and seventy provincial papers in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Fiji⁴².

In the months following the introduction of the Reuters/USL service on 1 July 1916, the new service and the APA service operated independently. However, in September 1916 the British Government notified both companies that, as a consequence of the growing congestion of traffic on the Eastern and Pacific Cables, the duplication of news in rival press services must come to an end. The Government proposed that, 'one General Service should be supplied for the different parts of the Empire and that small supplementary services should be allowed to various groups of newspapers'⁴³. In response, a meeting which included Roderick Jones, T.S. Townend, the London manager of APA, and Keith Murdoch, the London manager of USL, was convened on 6 October, 1916 to 'arrange the working of a cable service common to all parties'. It was agreed to establish such a service but the content was to be strictly limited to official news comprising, a) allied communiqués issued either by the Press Bureau or by Reuter, b) enemy communiqués issued by Reuter and, c) other news issued by the Press Bureau including reviews of the military situation, lists of honours and so forth'. The cables were to be compiled jointly by staff of Reuters and APA and were to be delivered to the Australian addresses of the parties to the agreement. Stories published from this Service (which was addressed 'Unicab' and came to be known as the Unicab Service) were published in each paper as coming from the agency to which that paper subscribed⁴⁴.

The Supplementary Imperial Service

During the first two years of the war the focus of the effort to use cable news to influence public opinion via the Agence Reuter Service was on allied and neutral countries which were not part of the British Empire. Perhaps such an organized effort to distribute propaganda news was thought less necessary within the Empire given traditional loyalties. As the war continued, however, public support for the war waned and the maintenance of pro-war sentiment became a priority both in Britain and within the Empire. Hence, there was a shift towards a greater emphasis toward 'internal' propaganda⁴⁵. With respect to cabled news to Australia and the rest of the Empire, a decisive turning point came on the 19 March 1917, when Reuters introduced a Supplementary Imperial Service.

This Supplementary Service was the outcome of a submission put forward by Roderick Jones to Walter Long, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in January 1917 which proposed an additional service of 10,000 words per month to meet 'the

necessity for increasing the flow of Imperial news to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa' and 'securing the introduction into Canada of a purely British cable service'. Under Jones' plan, transmission and Reuters' administrative costs were to be met by the government⁴⁶. The proposal was timely given that in the same month the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, had asked Robert Donald, editor of the *Daily Chronicle*, to report on the effectiveness and organisation of British propaganda. Donald's report, printed just days after Jones made his proposal, advocated a more aggressive approach to propaganda while at the same time recognising that it should be undertaken 'on lines that will conceal more or less its official character'. He argued, with respect to anti-German material, that 'we have made good use of the outrages committed by the enemy...but have not taken full advantage of the facilities at our disposal'. He advocated fuller use of the global communication network: 'strategically, in the sphere of propaganda, everything favours the allies, and more especially England...the cables of the world are at our command and we possess the only world wireless system'⁴⁷. Whether fortuitously or as a result of inside knowledge, Jones' proposal directly addressed issues raised by Donald and, not surprisingly, Jones' plan was approved as a project of Reuters and the Department of Information when the Department was established in February 1917⁴⁸.

Reuters issued a special set of internal 'Editorial Orders' on 19 March 1917 which indicated the propaganda purposes of the Supplementary Imperial Service and provided Reuters staff with operational instructions. The service was to be 'on Agence lines'. Its 'governing idea' was:

- To promote the interests of different parts of the Empire-
- (a) in each other and in Imperial unity, and
 - (b) in the continued vigorous prosecution of the war

Class A cables (those designed to achieve the objective of Imperial unity) would comprise important news from each Dominion suitable for distribution to the other Dominions. The London office of Reuters would act as a news hub for news interchange amongst the Dominions. Class A cables would also comprise 'important speeches by Ministers and other public men in this country, and official announcements, bearing upon the war and other Imperial questions'. Class B cables (those promoting the vigorous prosecution of the war) would 'cover good war news, and other intelligence bearing upon, or calculated to maintain, Colonial interest in the war'.

Cables in this service were to be signed 'Reuters Agency' and a separate count was to be kept of their wordage. Those despatched to Australia were to be also offered to the APA. If APA accepted them they could be incorporated into the Unicab service, but if they were declined they would be incorporated into Reuters' ordinary service to Australia⁴⁹.

In April, 1917 a further Editorial Order was issued on the grounds that further directions for the guidance of editors were deemed to be needed. The order explained as follows:

There are two main purposes to be kept in mind, the advancement of the interests of the Empire (under which head the diffusion of news interesting

to and tending to bring into closer understanding the Mother Country, the Dominions, and the Dependencies lying far apart geographically, is included) and, in the present circumstances, the interests of the Allies.

We shall shortly be furnishing copies of our Imperial Agency telegrams to the Information Department, and our despatches should be such that no question can ever arise as to their appropriateness. The Imperial Service may be turned to admirable account in cases when our limits will not allow us to do justice to a particular matter: but it must not on any account be used by us as a mere substitute for our own Service. In short, every Imperial Agency telegram must bear upon its face the stamp of its character⁵⁰.

Copies of all telegrams despatched under the 'Reuters Agency' signature were sent to the Department of Information from May 1917.

The Supplementary Imperial Service represented a significant departure from normal editorial practice, at least as far as news services to the Dominions were concerned. Jones felt obliged to explain the change to his managers in the Dominions albeit guardedly, given the danger of interception of the mail by enemy shipping⁵¹. Jones explained to his Indian manager, A.H. Kingston, that 'in introducing this somewhat new feature in our service' Reuters was 'acting in accordance to the views of those who take a wide outlook of Imperial affairs'. He noted that 'the newspapers which received the service will not be required to contribute to the cost in any form'. He was nevertheless concerned that exception might be taken to some of the messages and asked Kingston to 'watch the development of the service very carefully'⁵². Reuters' Chief Editor, F.W. Dickinson, acknowledged the partiality of the service noting that, 'the very essence of the Imperial Service is that it should seek to unite the different parts of the Empire by bonds of common interest and discordant notes would hardly favour that aim.'⁵³

Reuters' Australian manager, John Barraclough, queried the status of these cables on several occasions, doubtless to Jones' annoyance. Jones wrote on 19 April, 1917 that those telegrams 'which have nothing to do with Imperial interests' per se 'are calculated to have a good effect in promoting the allied cause as a whole'⁵⁴. When Barraclough persisted in his queries Jones replied tersely, 'you have had ample opportunity of judging the character of this service which we rightly term a new service. The old Imperial service is...merged with it'⁵⁵.

The Supplementary Service grew from 10,000 words per month at its inception to over 35,000 words per month in May/June, 1918. It is difficult to fully reconstruct the character of this service as items from it were not separately identified on publication. Indeed, when Barraclough raised the issue of identification, Jones replied that 'there must be no question of distinguishing, so far as the public is concerned, between one telegram and another'⁵⁶. We can, however, glean the general tenor of the service from the regular reports by Reuters' Dominion editor, William Turner, to the Chief Editor, F.W. Dickinson and to Jones, written with a view to extolling the efficacy of the service.

In August 1917 Turner wrote to Dickinson about the excellent take up of the Service by the Canadian press. He enclosed cuttings from Canadian newspapers which he suggested should be sent to the Head of the Department of Information, John Buchan, as examples of items Reuters was sending throughout the Dominions. He listed the headlines for six items of general news, including five from Australia which related to proposed higher income tax, reorganisation of recruiting, censorship, ex-soldier settlement on the land, and Australia's part in the British defence. He commented that this is 'the sort of matter which it is highly desirable that Canadian people should get a chance of reading as issues being dealt with are also Canadian problems'⁵⁷. These telegrams would have been included in the Service as Class A cables designed to promote Imperial unity. This group included many cables publicising the war effort of particular countries in others throughout the Empire. Hence Reuters' Special Representative in India, Edward Buck, contributed stories on 'How India's whole strength in being gradually thrown into the war' and 'What the women of India are doing in connection with war work'. These were duly sent on to Australia.⁵⁸ There was also the necessity of countering German allegations that the Dominions were proportionately contributing more troops to the front than Britain.⁵⁹

With respect to recruitment and self-sacrifice, the Service tried to promote 'a sort of inter-Empire rivalry... created in a most desirable direction.'⁶⁰ In April 1918, Turner wrote that the Service 'can claim to have done a great deal towards arousing in South Africa the spirit of renewed effort'. The Service had given special prominence to 'Australia's decision to help to the utmost' and had 'in a host of other ways impressed South Africa with a sense of the gravity of the position and the need for full assistance.'⁶¹ The most common topics of this 'inter-Empire' section of the Service were contribution to the war effort and various expressions of tribute in relation to this. Typical examples of stories about Australia sent to the rest of the Empire are: 'Eight hundred Sydney voluntary aid women offer to go to the trenches' sent on 14 April, 1918, and 'Premier Hughes pays tribute to Britain's gigantic war effort, and says Australia means to play its full part in destroying militarism root and branch' sent on 15 June 1918.

Class B cables in the Service included more extreme propaganda designed to evince contempt for Germans. In his letter of August 1917 to Dickinson on the success of the Service in Canada noted above, Turner distinguished between inter-Empire items and others with a more explicit propaganda purpose. He wrote:

From a purely propagandist point of view the following, among other items, are bound to do some good,

German communiqués lying re British air losses.

Our own Headquarters message – summing-up of German losses on Western front.

The fine story of the British drifters in the Adriatic.

German treatment of Belgian women.

Verbatim report of Lloyd George's reply to Michaelis⁶².

At the beginning of the war Reuters telegrams had been relatively muted in their propaganda content. They presented the allied forces in the best possible light and emphasised the ineffectiveness of German actions. Germans were always ‘having the worst of matters’. Their attacks were everywhere repulsed while the British were making progress, however slight. At the least, the ‘allies were holding their own’ while the Germans were characteristically in retreat. If the Allies gave ground at some points, they always advanced in others. If the British had losses, the Germans had even greater ones. This studied optimism is not surprising given that the vast majority of Reuters telegrams derived from official communiqués, British Press Bureau sources or accounts provided by British Headquarters by their official ‘eye witness reporter’, Sir Ernest Swinton⁶³. These reports, while highlighting German lack of success, nevertheless included, albeit occasionally, recognition of German skill and humanity. A dispatch of 25 October 1914 noted that ‘many of the Germans only had two months service. Nevertheless the enemy in front were fighting well and skilfully showing considerable powers of endurance’. A dispatch of 23 October 1914 noted that ‘the Germans asked for an armistice to bury the dead. We refused and on resuming the offensive we made fresh progress’⁶⁴. Reuters telegrams of 1917, however, betray their more overt propaganda purpose via dehumanising references. The Germans become mechanically cruel ‘Huns’. For example, we have the following description of German fighting methods: ‘the Hun is very mechanical in his methods. The lure of certain places seems irresistible and, as far as one can see, is not always governed by a purely tactical reason’ (telegram from Reuters Special Correspondent at British Headquarters in France, 7 August 1917)⁶⁵. The story on the German treatment of Belgian women noted above represented the women as being ‘in the grip of the Hun – imprisoned, shot and starved’⁶⁶.

With respect to the Supplementary Imperial Service, the shift to more overt propaganda is evident in the decision in April, 1917 to include, as a Reuters telegram, a story alleging the existence of a German ‘corpse factory’ converting human corpses into war commodities including soap. The allegation, which was later exposed as a complete fabrication⁶⁷, originated in a Belgian newspaper and was published in the *Times* of 17 April, 1917. With the domestic press taking the lead in publicising the story in Britain, the Department of Information decided to exploit the story overseas⁶⁸ and it was incorporated into Reuters despatches of 17 April. It was in response to the receipt of this story Barraclough in Australia urgently cabled Jones for advice on whether these telegrams should be published as ‘Reuters’ to which Jones replied ‘certainly publish as Reuters’⁶⁹. In the event, however, the story appeared throughout Australia in newspapers within the USL Group, not headed as being a ‘Reuters telegram’ (nor as being from the *Times*) but rather, as being ‘from our special representative’. Whether this was because Barraclough delayed authorising the Reuters signature until he received confirmation from London or because USL received another dispatch on the matter from its London representative, Keith Murdoch, and preferred to use it, is not known⁷⁰.

The story gained great prominence in the USL group of papers it was variously headed, including ‘Boiling down the dead, Huns Crowning Infamy’, (the *Ballarat Courier*) and ‘Fat from the dead: Horrible German method’ (the *Sydney Sun*). The *Herald* (Melbourne) published the story under the heading ‘Desecrating the dead’ alongside a more extended feature entitled ‘The German Beast: A nation dehumanised’. The story was not published at the outset in the *SMH* or the *Argus*.

Indeed the first mention of the matter in the *Argus* was not until 23 April 1917 when a story appeared headed 'Disposal of the dead: Berlin denies gruesome reports'. The first mention in the *SMH* was not until 2 May, 1917 when it reported the comments of Lord Robert Cecil, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons, that while 'the Government had no information regarding a factory...in view of other actions of the German military...there was nothing incredible in the charge'⁷¹.

Reuters telegrams, with their high propaganda content, came to dominate war related news in the Sydney *Sun*, the Melbourne *Herald* and the dozens of smaller newspapers which subscribed to the USL service. This Reuters dominance was a matter of considerable concern to Chairman of the *Sun*, Hugh Denison, not because of the propaganda content of these cables, but because of the prominence that was being given to Reuters at the expense of USL itself and its other partner, the *Times*. Denison complained to Murdoch that 'more than two-thirds of the messages appearing in our paper were headed Reuter, including all cables of general interest', and that Reuters' Australasian Manager, Barraclough, was 'attempting in every possible way to push Reuter in front of the United Service'. He continued:

His object in doing this...is manifest. The Reuter agreement is for seven years, and he is anxious that during the term of his management, Reuters' position shall be so strongly entrenched in the public mind that if, at the end of the term, they should consider it advisable to make a break with us, they will be in a strong position to sell their service to anybody and with the full knowledge that it is the paramount service in Australia⁷².

Denison recognised the financial attraction of relying on Reuters rather than having an independent service but at the same time wished to curtail Reuters' dominance. He complained in June 1917 that 'our service has come to be almost a Reuter monopoly' and in October that the service continued to grow as Barraclough had no concerns regarding costs since it 'cost Reuter nothing' while at the same time it increased Reuters' prestige. When he sought to curtail Reuters' dominance he received no support from the editor and owners of the Melbourne *Herald* who, were 'practically running their paper on our service'. According to Denison, 'local news is almost wholly neglected in their columns, with the result that whenever any mention is made of curtailment for any reason whatever, they are up in arms against it...Davidson [the editor of the *Herald*]...does not care a jot apparently for the prestige of our United Service system, and is only out for a big service at cheap rates'⁷³.

Controversy in Britain

While Reuters' contribution to achieving Britain's war aims was recognised by the British Government there was nevertheless concern towards the end of 1917 about the extent of payments made to Reuters and the undocumented nature of the relationship. There were allegations in the press that Reuters was profiteering from the war and that Jones had an untenable conflict of interest in working for both Reuters and the Government. S.C. Clements, Manager and Secretary of Reuters, explained to Lord Beaverbrook that practically all the agreements between Reuters and the Foreign Office had been verbal in order to preserve the utmost secrecy that was desired. He agreed, however, that the changed circumstances arising from the establishment of the Ministry of Information meant that it was desirable to embody the terms of the

relationship in a formal written contract⁷⁴. In the meantime there was pressure on Reuters to reduce expenditure with an instruction in July 1918 to limit expenditure on all Government funded services to £10,000 per month⁷⁵. Jones denied that Reuters made excessive profits and in a submission to Beaverbrook reiterated the 'invaluable services rendered by the agency all over the globe, services which no other organisation in the world could render...by virtue partly of its world network of agencies and correspondents and, by virtue partly of the entrée to the press of all nations which Reuter alone can exact through the great allied agencies under his exclusive contracts with these agencies'⁷⁶.

The process of developing a formal contract between Reuters and the Ministry of Information involved documenting in detail various categories of payment to Reuters. The agreement finally reached involved, as well as reimbursing Reuters for telegraphic charges, an administrative charge covering costs of administering the Service in each of the Reuters' offices around the world as well as a 5% profit margin on all Reuters' expenditures on behalf of the Government. The schedule of administrative costs included a British Government contribution of 20% of the costs of maintaining Dominion offices with a cap which in India was £948, in South Africa £886 and Australia £360⁷⁷. After the war Reuters' special services to Australia were scaled down, particularly after the closure of Britain's Ministry of Information. However, a subsidised service continued into the 1920s funded by Britain's Colonial Office.

Conclusion

Reuters, though a private company, became an integral component of the British Government's propaganda effort. While maintaining an aura of independence, it received substantial secret payments from the British Government, including payments directly related to its services to Australia. As the war continued, the propaganda content of Reuters' news became more marked. In the context of the service to Australia a significant turning point was the introduction of the Supplementary Imperial Service in March 1917. There is no evidence that Reuters itself fabricated news, but it certainly was agreeable to distributing news items based on hearsay which could serve a propaganda purpose. These included items which were strongly suspected of being fabricated, even at the time. The most notorious example in this regard was the corpse factory allegation. There is some evidence that Reuters' Australian manager, John Barraclough, expressed concern about the direction Reuters' reporting was taking.

While Australia developed its own system of war correspondents who provided news from the war front, the daily demand for war news could only be satisfied by news agency services. This demand provided opportunities for the British authorities to achieve propaganda purposes with the complicity of the Australian press. At the beginning of the war Reuters had no direct link to the Australian press but, recognising that it needed such a link to properly service the British Government's needs, it established one via USL and commenced a direct service to Australia in July 1916. Through USL (jointly operated by the Sydney *Sun* and the Melbourne *Herald*) Reuters established a comprehensive distribution network in Australia and New Zealand. This enabled Reuters to play a key role in distributing overseas sourced

propaganda news in Australia and New Zealand during World War I and to become a major force in the shaping of that public opinion.

Acknowledgements

This article utilises materials held at the Reuters Archive, the Fairfax Company Archive, the National Archives of Australia, the National Library of Australia and the Australian War Memorial. The authors would like to thank staff of these archives and libraries, in particular, John Entwisle of the Reuters Archive and Sandra Arthur of the Fairfax Company Archive. This research has been undertaken with the support of the Australian Research Council.

Notes

¹ *Establishment of Commonwealth Directorate of Educational Propaganda on War and Peace*, 1918, National Archives of Australia, NAA A2481 A1918/6573; Ernest Scott, *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918*. Oxford: Angus & Robertson, 1921, p. 469. Scott refers to the Directorate as '...the only attempt at systematic propaganda that was inaugurated in Australia...', but as it was established just weeks before the Armistice was signed it played little role in the way the war was played out in Australia.

² This USL service was generally referred to as the United Cable Service. Keith Murdoch identified himself in his evidence to the Dardanelles Commission as Manager and Editor, United Cable Service, Australasia. Murdoch Papers, National Library of Australia. MS2823.

³ Phillip M. Taylor, *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 4-5.

⁴ M.L. Sanders and P.M. Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918*. London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 2. See also Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.

⁵ Ibid. p. 28. See also Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1986; Cate Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War*, London, Allen Lane, 1977; H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. New York: A A Knopff, 1938, Peter Buitenhuis, *The Great War of Words: Literature as Propaganda 1914-18 and After*, London: Batsford, 1989, and Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975 for discussions of British use of propaganda in World War I.

⁶ Ibid. p. 2. See also Haste, op cit p. 21 'It was part of a wider recognition of the new wartime role of government, which entailed the extension of state control into all aspects of national life. Liberal laissez-faire doctrines which prevailed at the outset were eroded under the pressure of war'.

⁷ See, for example, Jeffrey A. Keshen, 1996, *Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War*, Alberta: University of Alberta Press, and Hartley Grattan, *Why We Fought*, New York: Vanguard Press, 1929.

⁸ Sanders and Taylor, op.cit., p. 23.

⁹ Ibid. p. 64.

¹⁰ Kevin Fewster, *Expression and suppression: Aspects of Military Censorship in Australia During the Great War*. PhD Thesis. University of New South Wales, 1980, p. 114. Fewster argues that in Australia, this system of 'sanitizing the war' through glorified reports from the war front and censorship of the realities of fighting caused numerous problems for recruiting as the war proceeded.

¹¹ Lloyd George to Balfour, 27 August 1918. FO800/212. Quoted in Sanders and Taylor, op.cit., p. 50. See also Messinger op. cit. p. 90. 'Buchan's concept of official propaganda...echoed Masterman in maintaining that propaganda was circulation of facts and the truth, not the alteration or fabrication of information'.

¹² Donald to Lloyd George, 9 January 1917, INF4/4B. Quoted in Sanders and Taylor, op.cit., p. 59.

¹³ Sanders and Taylor, op.cit., p. 102.

¹⁴ Donald Read, *The Power of News: The history of Reuters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 3. It is noteworthy that Reuters also provided a similar service to the Australian Government. An agreement of November 1909 provided for the Australian Commonwealth Government to pay Reuters 2 pence per word for the cost of distributing Australian pre-paid telegrams to London, Canada and the USA. This arrangement, which began as a twelve months' trial, continued throughout the war. Reuters

Telegram Company Limited, Particulars of agreements entered into by the Company; arrangements with agents and correspondents from 1910 to 1914. Reuters Company Archive, London (Hereafter RCA).

¹⁵ F.W. Dickinson to Branch Managers, 4 July 1911. RCA.

¹⁶ R.H. Davies, Private Secretary to the Master of Elibank to Reuters, 14 August 1911. RCA.

¹⁷ See Read, *op. cit.*, p. 119. On the possible closure of the Traffic Department see Jones to Barraclough, 21 October 1915. Jones Letterbook, RCA, London. In this letter to his Australasian General Manager, Barraclough, Reuters Managing Director Roderick Jones noted that the 'period of stress and strain' arising from the war and its 'attendant miseries of impoverished business and enforced retrenchments' have nowhere 'been more seriously felt than in Australia.'

¹⁸ Read, *op. cit.* p. 129. The Australian Government shared with the British Government a suspicion that Reuters was under German influence. In 1916 the Australian Government asked for a report from its High Commissioner in London on Reuters' activities. The report said, 'Thus in the year it was incorporated (a little later) the company worked in conjunction with the Anglo-American Telegraphic Company and has since then frequently acted in conjunction with continental concerns. This was notoriously the case in the early stages of the present war and caused a grave suspicion to be attached to the impartiality and non partisanship of Reuters war cables. The London Times bitterly criticised the Company and the danger of its connection with a german [sic] firm, the result of which criticism led Reuter to declare that while it was true there had been a connection it was at an end and had no longer any influence on the character of its telegrams. Certainly it is that Reuters telegrams are either more severely censored or that the company no longer possesses the influence it exercised during former years'. Reuters Telegram Co., National Archives of Australia, TE 1375.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-2.

²⁰ Jones to Barraclough, 15 July 1917. RCA.

²¹ Roderick Jones, *A Life in Reuters*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951, pp. 205-207.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 212. See also Graham Storey, *Reuters' Century 1851-1951*, London: Max Parrish, 1951, p. 160, which also details the agreement between Jones and the British Government.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ S.C. Clements, Manager and Secretary of Reuters to Lord Beaverbrook, Ministry of Information, 17 June 1918. RCA.

²⁵ The actual number of words was 8,194,338. Weekly Agence Report for 6 August 1918, RCA, London. Meticulous records were kept regarding wordage since the British Government paid for all transmission costs in addition to a payment to Reuters for administrative expenses and overheads. In 1917 the British Government paid £119,855 for the service of which £75,305 was spent on telegraphic costs and £44,490 went to Reuters. Roderick Jones estimated that Reuters' profit on this service was £8,231. Roderick Jones to Sir Edward Carson, 10 November 1917, RCA.

²⁶ Department of Information, 'Report on News Section to Mr Robert Donald by Ernest A. Parris', 11 July 1917. A copy from the British Public Records Office is held at RCA. Also noteworthy is a Foreign Office internal memo of 7 March 1916 which reads, 'the special service of telegrams sent by Reuters are the result of daily consultations with the Foreign Office'. Copy sighted in RCA.

²⁷ Minutes of the 1916 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, RCA.

²⁸ Confidential memo from Jones to Sir Edward Carson, 10 November 1917. RCA.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Jones to Kingston, 19 April 1917, RCA.

³¹ S.C. Clements to Lord Beaverbrook, 17 June 1918. RCA.

³² Chandrika Kaul, *Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India c. 1880-1922*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, pp.131-134.

³³ Read, *op. cit.*, p.151.

³⁴ F.G.A. Butler, Downing Street to Roderick Jones, 1 November, 1915. RCA.

³⁵ The history of this agreement is briefly recounted in a letter from Hugh Denison to Theodore Fink, 8 November, 1921. Fairfax Company Archives, Sydney.

³⁶ Agreement dated 23 August, 1912 between the Times Publishing Company Ltd and the Sun Newspaper Company Ltd., Manager's Letterbooks (1847 to 1915). The Times Archive. As a result, the *Sun* could claim that it published its international news concurrently with the *Times*: 'press time of the *Times* in the morning in London coincides with the press time of the *Sun* in the afternoon in Sydney. Readers in this city will obtain the world information and opinion of the *Times* at the same time they are placed before readers in London'. Statement for publication approved by the *Times* accompanying a letter to Sun Newspaper Ltd Chairman, Hugh Denison, 9 October, 1912. Manager's Letterbooks (1847 to 1915).

³⁷ For a discussion of this earlier phase of Reuters' history in Australia see P. Putnis 'How the international news agency business model failed – Reuters in Australia, 1877-1895', *Media History* (forthcoming).

³⁸ Jones to Barraclough, 29 October, 1915. RCA.

³⁹ Reuters Telegram Company Limited, particulars of agreements. RCA. While USL reimbursed Reuters for cable costs to Australia, it could still achieve substantial savings as it only needed to pay for cable costs from South Africa. Sydney *Sun* Manager, Hugh Denison, later wrote to London USL Manager, Keith Murdoch: 'when we took on the Reuters service the great inducement held out to us by Barraclough was that – apart from the merits of the Service – we should be able to save from 5,000-6,000 [pounds] a year by the method of utilising their imperial service and having thereby to pay on 3 or 3 ½ [pence] a word instead of the full 7½ from London.' Denison to Murdoch 24 June 1917. Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch. National Library of Australia ANL MS2823

⁴⁰ Letter from Barraclough to C.E. Davies, *Mercury*, Hobart, 27 March 1916. Fairfax Company Archives. This is one of many such letters written by Barraclough to potential new subscribers in Australia. Reuters' Australian office acted as managers for the service to provincial newspapers on behalf of USL.

⁴¹ Documents related to negotiations between Reuters, United Service Ltd and the United Press Associated Ltd. RCA.

⁴² Reuters Telegram Company Ltd, particulars of agreements...1918. RCA.

⁴³ Minutes of the Reuters board meeting of 4 October 1916. RCA.

⁴⁴ Notes of a conference held at Reuters, London on Friday October 6 1916. RCA. The issue of headings remained contentious during the agreement. In particular the proprietors of UCL were concerned at the growing prominence of the Reuters' brand in the service. Denison to Murdoch, 29 May 1917. Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch.

⁴⁵ Fewster op cit., p. 114. Falling recruitment and declining civilian morale can be seen to coincide with this increased emphasis on propaganda. In Australia, Prime Minister Hughes failed to carry two referenda on compulsory military service on 28 October 1916 and 20 December 1917. During this period, Hughes was accused of increasingly using censorship as a political tool. In London, the United Cable Service's (United Services Limited) Keith Murdoch used his position as 'Special Correspondent' to promote the British cause, and to promote a 'yes' vote for conscription among the troops in France, and in British and Australian newspapers, e.g. Murdoch to Hughes 24 October 1916, Murdoch Papers, ANL.

⁴⁶ Jones to Walter Long, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 January and 8 January, 1917. RCA.

⁴⁷ Report by Robert Donald to Lloyd George on propaganda arrangements, 9 January, 1917. Copy sighted in RCA. For further discussion of the British Government's use of 'atrocities propaganda' see, Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995, pp. 179-180. Taylor says: 'Atrocities stories were, of course, a time-honoured technique of propagandists. The First World War was no exception...; see also Haste op cit, who illustrates the tendency to demonise the enemy from the early stages of the war. 1917 represented a turning point in the amount and nature of atrocities propaganda in English newspapers; see also James Read, *Atrocities Propaganda*, New York: Arno Press, 1972.

⁴⁸ It is likely that there was consultation between Robert Donald and Roderick Jones on cable matters in the course of the preparation of Donald's report. As an adjunct to his report, Donald recommended to Lloyd George the appointment of Roderick Jones as a Deputy Director of the Department of Information. Sanders and Taylor, op cit, p. 62.

⁴⁹ 'Editorial orders', March 19th, 1917 to May 31st, 1917. RCA.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Jones wrote to Barraclough on 10 August 1917, 'we take the liberty of observing that in the present condition of affairs where our letters run a chance of falling into the hands of the enemy, it is not always desirable to be entirely explicit'. RCA.

⁵² Jones to A.H. Kingston, 29 March, 1917. RCA.

⁵³ Dickinson to Kingston, 26 June, 1917. RCA

⁵⁴ Jones to Barraclough 19 April, 1917. RCA.

⁵⁵ Jones to Barraclough 10 August, 1917. RCA.

⁵⁶ Jones to Barraclough 19 April, 1917. RCA.

⁵⁷ Turner to Dickinson, 29 August, 1917. RCA. See Kershen op cit, pp. 117-8 for an overview of the Canadian experience of WWI propaganda and censorship. Kershen says that: 'Canada's model of wartime information control demonstrated most commonality with Australia's...'

⁵⁸ Stories of 23 February, 1918 and 8 September, 1917. RCA.

-
- ⁵⁹ Turner to Jones, 20 November, 1917. RCA
- ⁶⁰ Turner to Dickinson, 8 September, 1917. RCA.
- ⁶¹ Turner to Dickinson, 8 April 1918. RCA. Turner even ascribed to the influence of the Service the imposition of limitations on horse racing across the Empire. He commented, 'I do not think it can be doubted that the restrictions on racing imposed in Australia some months ago were very largely due to the good example set by England, of which we kept the Dominions fully informed from time to time. We duly informed S. Africa and Canada of what Australia has done. Now comes the news from S. Africa that racing there is going to be cut down very severely. When it is considered how much racing absorbed the time and energy of tens of thousands both in Australia and S. Africa, and to that extent weakened the war effort of the Dominions, it will be admitted that any means by which it could be reduced were to be welcomed. Who would doubt that our messages played a big part in bringing this reduction about?' Turner to Jones, 23 October 1917. RCA.
- ⁶² W. Turner to Dickinson 29 August 1917. RCA. George Michaelis was German Chancellor between July and November 1917.
- ⁶³ Sanders and Taylor, op. cit., p. 23.
- ⁶⁴ The above observations are based on an analysis of Reuters telegrams 22 October 1914 to 25 October 1914. AWM27 90/4, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
- ⁶⁵ [AIF war diary:] Reuters Telegrams, Intelligence, General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, August 1917. AWM4, Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Murdoch's 'Special Correspondent' pieces also show a sharp shift in tone at this time. For example a story in the *Sun* 10 July 1917 is headed 'Diary of the War. German Lust and Hunger. Basic Physical Facts'.
- ⁶⁶ The *Sun* (Sydney), 14 July 1917.
- ⁶⁷ The story was finally exposed in 1925 in the context of a discussion in the British House of Commons. Sanders and Taylor, op. cit. p. 147.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 146.
- ⁶⁹ Jones to Barraclough, 19 April 1917.
- ⁷⁰ An analysis of Murdoch's propaganda role is beyond the scope of this paper. Certainly, however, he contributed to assuring prominence for the corpse factory story. For example he wrote a detailed follow-up in his correspondents letter published in the *Sun* on 13 July 1917 under the heading 'Huns shameful policies. Treatment of corpses'.
- ⁷¹ The comment was made by Cecil in the House of Commons on 30 April 1917.
- ⁷² Denison to Murdoch, 29 May 1917. Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch.
- ⁷³ Denison to Murdoch, 26 June 1917 and 31 October 1917. Papers of Sir Keith Murdoch, ANL MS2823.
- ⁷⁴ S.C. Clements to Lord Beaverbrook, 17 June 1918. RCA.
- ⁷⁵ C.W. Dawkins, Ministry of Information to W.C. Murray, Reuters. RCA.
- ⁷⁶ Jones to Beaverbrook, 17 July 1918. RCA.
- ⁷⁷ Agreement between the Minister of Information and Reuters Ltd., 29 October 1918. RCA.